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ABSTRACT
The study conceptualized Safety Management System (SMS) initiative, self-efficacy, and
transformational safety leadership as constructs that relates to safety behavior (measured by
safety compliance and safety participation) when mediated by safety motivation using a
concurrent-triangulation approach. The study also evaluated the relationship between safety
behavior and safety -related events. Structural equation modeling techniques was used to
derive a final measurement model that fit the empirical data and was used to test the study
hypotheses. Utilizing a sample of 282 collegiate flight students and instructors from a large
public university, a 46-item survey was conducted to measure respondent’s perceptions on
the study variables. Semi- structured interviews were also conducted with 4 top-level
management personnel to sample their opinions on the effectiveness of the SMS initiative.
Factual safety performance data on the flight program over a six-year period was analyzed to
complete a triangulation approach. The results indicate that perceptions of SMS policy
implementation have direct, positive effect on safety compliance and SMS process
engagement has direct, positive effect on safety participation. Self-efficacy had direct,
positive effect on both safety compliance and safety participation. Safety motivation fully
mediated the effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation. Safety –
related events did not fully mediate the effect between safety compliance and safety
participation. There were indications that respondents were not familiar with the Emergency
Response Plan. An ANOVA suggests that certified flight instructors significantly had better
safety participation and safety compliance than pre-private pilots did. Senior significantly had
better safety participation than juniors. A T-test of mean did not reveal any significant
differences in safety participation and safety compliance between respondents with formal
xix

SMS training and those without. A review of factual safety data suggests a positive effect on
the safety reporting and safety meeting attendance among respondents due to the SMS
initiative. Interviews revealed that top-level management support, resource provision and
resilience are key elements in the success of any SMS initiative. The theoretical and policy
implications of this study to improve proactive safety in collegiate aviation are discussed.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A reduction in General Aviation (GA) fatalities has been a top priority of the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and that has resulted in a goal to reduce the GA fatal accident
rate by 10 percent over a 10-year period (2009-2018). The FAA in partnership with the GA
community intends to use safety data and proactive initiatives to identify risk, pinpoint trends
through root cause analysis, and develop safety strategies (FAA, 2015c).
Collegiate aviation is generically classified under GA along with other flight training
activities and the rigorous operational dynamics of the flight training environment exposes
students, instructors and other operational personnel to the risk of incidents and accidents
(Hunter, 2006; FAA, 2012; Houston et al., 2012). Even though a lot of effort has been
expended by some collegiate programs to ensure safety of flight operations, accidents and
incidents do occur from time to time and sometimes with tragic consequences (NTSB, 2007;
NTSB, 2010; CBS, 2014). As part of the strategic objective to improve aviation safety, the
FAA has also collaborated with the aviation academic community and stakeholders such as
Aviation Accreditation Board International (AABI) and the University Aviation Association
(UAA) to leverage their expertise and develop best safety practices for improving flight
training (FAA, 2015c).
The need to develop best practices and safety initiatives that will identify and
proactively manage safety behaviors of all personnel involved in the flight training and
operations department is one of the challenges of collegiate aviation safety managers. These
safety managers, as part of their duties are tasked with establishing predictive relationships
between the perceptions of flight students and flight instructors on the safety culture and how
1

it affects their safety behavior (Hudson, 2001; FAA, 2012). A favourable perception of both
flight students and flight instructors on the effectiveness of a safety culture in an aviationtraining program has become very essential since it has a moderating influence on their safety
behaviors (Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010).
Background of the Study
One of the challenges of ensuring proactive safety management, enhanced safety
culture, and accident prevention in collegiate aviation programs is continuous improvement
of the safety program and the ability to adopt effective methods in establishing a relation
between the safety perceptions of students, flight instructors, and their safety behaviors in
flight operations (von Thaden, 2008). Previous studies have suggested that the perceptions of
flight personnel could influence their safety behavior in an aviation organization and some
risky safety behaviors can serve as precursors for safety occurrences like accidents (Hunter,
2006; Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum et al., 2015).
An accident in collegiate aviation programs could have a negative impact on
effective training and lead to loss of lives, equipment, reputation, and customer confidence in
the overall training program of a flight school (ASN, 2008; ICAO, 2009; NTSB, 2010). Some
collegiate aviation programs in the United States (U.S.) are also engaged in international
contract pilot training and an accident could have dire repercussions on their continuous
engagements in such foreign training contracts.
Some collegiate aviation programs in the US have implemented proactive safety
initiatives to mitigate risks associated with their training operations and improve the safety
culture (Adjekum, 2014b). Effective safety initiatives such as Safety Management Systems
(SMS) implementation has positively affected the safety culture, and subsequently enhanced
the accident prevention strategies in these aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum,
2015).
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The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) defines SMS as an organized
approach to managing safety, including the necessary organizational structures,
accountabilities, policies and procedures (ICAO, 2013). The FAA defines SMS as a formal,
top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and assuring the effectiveness
of safety risk controls (FAA, 2015b). SMS includes systematic procedures, practices, and
policies for the management of safety risk.
An SMS is a management device that uses proactive tools, in addition to reactive ones
and relies on safety performance with a focus on processes. An SMS is an effective tool in
hazards identification and mitigation of risks before operational safety is threatened. An SMS
consists of four main components: Safety Policy and Objectives, Safety Risk Management,
Safety Assurance, and Safety Promotion. These four main components comprise twelve subcomponents (ICAO, 2013). Under SMS, aviation service providers improve safety during
service delivery mainly through two operational components. These are safety risk
management and safety assurance, with safety policy and objectives as well as safety
promotion playing a supporting, yet important, role (ICAO, 2009).
An organizational safety effort cannot succeed just by the mechanic implementation
of the referred SMS components and procedures. An effective SMS is built taking due
account of the interaction between these components and the human element of aviation
operations (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011). A successful implementation and operation of
an SMS is highly dependent on organizational aspects such as individual and group attitudes,
values, competencies and patterns of behavior, which are frequently referred to as elements
of the organizational safety culture (Cooper, 2000; ICAO, 2009). A positive safety culture is
characterized by a shared awareness of organization’s personnel of the importance of safety
in their operational tasks
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Some collegiate aviation programs in the U.S, have on voluntary basis adopted
proactive safety initiatives such as SMS. These collegiate programs have allocated resources
and manpower to harness the inherent benefits of SMS, which is already being utilized in Part
121 air carriers, some Part 139 airports and Air Traffic Organizations (ATO) in the US (FAA,
2012; UND, 2012; FAA, 2015b). The FAA, as part of a proactive mandate, has been
providing technical assistance to these collegiate aviation programs on SMS (FAA, 2012;
FAA, 2015b).
There could be challenges for management of collegiate flight programs to ensure that
the SMS implementation within the organization positively influences the behavior of
personnel such as flight instructors and students (Cooper, 2000; Adjekum, 2014b). It is
important for senior level management of collegiate aviation programs to evaluate the
effectiveness of SMS implementation, since a lot of time and resources would have been
invested and returns on investments such as continuous improvements in safety performance
are critically desired (Adjekum, 2014a).
Conversely, the impact of variables such as beliefs, opinions and perceptions of
collegiate aviation personnel on transformational leadership attributes among senior level
management, personal self-efficacy and safety motivation on safety behavior needs constant
assessment. This assessment is essential because of the concomitant effects on safety
performance outcomes, such as incidents and accidents (Freiwald, 2013; Adjekum, 2014b;
Chen, 2014).
Problem Statement
The general aviation (GA) community of which training organizations such as
collegiate aviation is inclusive has been plagued by a historically high accident rates. The
preliminary estimate for Flight Year (FY) 2014 showed a fatal accident rate of 1.09 (1 per
100,000 flight hours) with 251 GA fatal accidents and 434 resulting fatalities (FAA, 2015). In
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an era of competition between constrained resources and increased propensity for
productivity, SMS initiative may help to reduce losses due to undesirable safety occurrences,
some of which are primed by the attitudes and behaviors of personnel at the “sharp end’’
(ICAO, 2013).
Effective SMS implementation has been shown to have a positive effect on the safety
perceptions of front line personnel in high reliability organizations such as aviation, and
improved safety behaviors (von Thaden, 2008; Adjekum et al., 2015). Chen (2014) in a study
among pilots in Taiwanese airlines suggested significant effects within the interactions
between perceptions on SMS practice, safety leadership, self-efficacy, and safety behavior
with safety motivation as a mediating variable. Other studies in occupational safety have also
examined the role perceptions of personnel on safety climate in various organizations
influence safety behaviors (DeJoy, Schaffer, Wilson, Vandenberg, & Butts, 2004; Griffin &
Neal, 2000; Mearns, Whitaker, & Flin, 2003; Zohar & Luria, 2004).
Transformational safety leadership is another variable that has been suggested to
influence safety behavior and invariably safety related outcomes like violations, incidents and
accidents. In studies by Zohar (2002), for example, the role of leadership has been
emphasized as a factor in improving safety. Additionally, studies by Barling, Loughlin, and
Kelloway (2002) have focused on the effects of transformational leadership on safety
promotion.
A challenge and gap in research is establishing a coherent and cogent relationship
between these variables using a comprehensive triangulation approach in aviation and
specifically collegiate aviation program in the US. This current approach will provide a
holistic analysis of quantitative surveys, documentary artifacts and semi-structured interview
of senior level management to build a three-dimensional framework of the safety status
within a collegiate aviation program in the U.S.
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This approach will also afford a clearer picture of gaps both laterally and horizontally
within the collegiate aviation safety program. The identification of these disjoint between
senior level management view of safety and the operational level personnel view of the safety
status of the collegiate aviation program will provide the information needed for the
development of safety purpose, realignment and controls to fix these gaps (Patankar, 2003).
Purpose of the Study
The intent of this concurrent triangulation mixed methods study was a follow up on
recommendations for further studies on previous works by Freiwald (2013) and Chen (2014).
These two researchers recommended further studies on the inter-relationships between SMS
initiatives, safety leadership, safety climate, self-efficacy, safety motivation and safety
behavior among demography in health and aviation. In terms of specificity of demography,
this study builds up on recommendations from previous studies in collegiate aviation safety
culture and safety behavior by Adjekum (2014b) and Adjekum et al. (2015).
The study aims to fill a gap in research on SMS initiatives in collegiate aviation
programs, reduce the paucity of existing literature, and establish a coherent relationship
between these variables using a comprehensive triangulation approach in a collegiate aviation
program in the US. The study also establishes a proactive operational safety benchmarks for
continuous monitoring and improvements in SMS implementations within collegiate aviation
programs.
In this study, a quantitative survey instrument was used to examine the relationship
between the perceptions of collegiate aviation flight personnel (Flight students including
those with certified flight instructor ratings employed in the program) on Safety Management
System (SMS) initiatives, transformational safety leadership (TSL), self-efficacy (SE), and
self-reported safety behaviors while mediating with safety motivation. Safety behavior was
measured by safety compliance (SC) and safety participation (SP).
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Path Models (PA) and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) technique were used to
establish paths and determine the strengths of relationship of these variables. The study also
compared a proposed theoretical measurement model with a final measurement model. The
analysis would also look at the magnitude of interactions of variables. The relationship
between these indicators of safety and safety outcomes (safety behavior and self -reported
safety events) will be also be explored.
Concurrently, the strategic perspectives of a selected group of senior level
management personnel of the collegiate aviation program (An accountable executive, two
functional department heads/process owners and a faculty member with management
oversight) on the state of the SMS initiative in the program was assessed through semistructured interviews. The final triangulation process to integrate the quantitative data,
qualitative data and document analysis included a review of documented aggregate data
(statistics) of safety performance indicators since the implementation of the SMS initiative in
the aviation program of the university.
The forty-six survey items (Appendix A) representing the seven constructs for the
quantitative section of this study and six demographic variables are fully described in Chapter
IV and are outlined below:
a) SMS initiative- Chen and Chen (2012), Chen (2014), Transport Canada (2005).
b) Self-efficacy – Schwazzer and Jerusalem (1995).
c) Safety motivation- Neal and Griffin (2006).
d) Safety behavior (Safety compliance and Safety participation) - Neal, Griffin, and Hart
(2000), Neal and Griffin (2006).
e) Transformational safety leadership – Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL)
developed by Edwards, Knight, Broome and Flynn (2010).
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f) Safety- related events – Collegiate Aviation Perception of Safety Culture Assessment
Scale (CAPSCAS) developed by Adjekum (2014).
The required permissions were sought from the copyright owners of these
instruments. Some items from these validated instruments were used in their entirety, albeit
in a randomized order. Slight modifications to some instrument items; to cater to the unique
demography of collegiate aviation respondents were made. A beta testing of the composite
instruments was done through a pilot study, using a selected sample of respondents within the
collegiate aviation program. The composite instrument has been outlined in the Appendix.
Research Questions
The quantitative aspect of this research, which involved a survey instrument
administered to flight students and flight instructors in the collegiate aviation program sought
to answer the following questions:
1. What are the factors that measure the latent construct of SMS initiative?
2. What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS initiative,
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety
participation?
3. What is the effectiveness of a proposed measurement model as compared to
that of a final measurement model that assesses the relationships between
SMS initiative, transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety
participation, when mediated by safety motivation?
4. What are the strengths of the relationship between Safety behavior (Safety
participation and Safety compliance) and Safety-related events?
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5. What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables
(years in program, age group, SMS training status, and flight certification) on
safety behavior and self-reported safety events?
Semi-Structured Interview Questions
The following questions was posed to selected senior management personnel during
the semi-structured interview in order to find out the leadership perspective on levels of
implementation of the SMS initiative and the current safety performance of the collegiate
aviation program:
1. What roles have leadership played in the safety policy implementation and
expectations of the SMS program?
2. What are the effects of SMS implementation on the operational performance
(number of unstable approaches captured in flight data monitoring (FDM),
runway incursions, ground collision events, flight holds due to alcohol, number of
voluntary safety reports filed and participation in safety meetings) of the aviation
program?
3. What have been some of the challenges in the implementation process of SMS in
the aviation program?
4. How are continuous monitoring and improvement of the SMS, sustained in the
aviation program?
5. What recommendations do you have for collegiate aviation programs that intend
to implement or are in the process of implementing SMS?
The final phase of this research was a discussion and recommendation section that
involved a concurrent –triangulation of the quantitative findings, qualitative findings and
artifact/document analysis to identify degrees of convergence or divergence on the overall
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SMS initiative status of the collegiate aviation program. A hypothetical model as shown in
Figure1 provides a relational path way between the variables that were measured.

TSL
Safety
Compliance

SMS
Initiative

Safety
Motivation
SMS

Safety
participation

SelfSelfEfficacy
Efficacy

Figure 1. Hypothetical model of the relationship between transformational safety
Figure 1. A hypothetical model showing the relationship between Transformational
safety leadership, SMS initiative, Self-efficacy, Safety motivation and Safety behavior
(Safety compliance and Safety participation).
Statement of Hypotheses
SMS Initiatives, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior
On the basis of existing literature (Neal, Griffin & Hart, 2000; Neal & Griffin, 2006;
Freiwald, 2013; Chen, 2014) this study predicted that a better perception of the SMS
initiative implemented in their collegiate aviation programs, by pilots will provide a stronger
motivation to engage in proactive safety behaviors. This study also predicted that there
existed a relationship between SMS initiative and safety behavior (safety compliance and
safety participation). This study hypothesized that safety motivation will mediate the
relationship between SMS initiative and pilots’ safety behaviors (safety compliance and
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safety participation). The direct and indirect effects of SMS initiative on these variables were
hypothesized, as follows:
H1: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS initiative are related
to their safety motivation.
H2: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS initiative are related with to
safety compliance.
H3: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS initiative are related with to
safety participation.
H4: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their collegiate SMS initiative and safety compliance.
H5: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions of
their collegiate SMS initiative and safety participation.
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior
Extant literature suggested that a higher level of transformational leadership would
motivate subordinate personnel to put more effort into their work and go above and beyond
the call of duty for their leaders (Barling & Kelloway, 2002). Consistent with the suggestion
of prior research that transformational leadership is positively related to flight crew’s
operational safety behavior (Chen, 2014), it was hypothesized that collegiate aviation
program flight supervisory management’s transformational safety leadership styles would
motivate flight students and instructors to exhibit acceptable safety behaviors with greater
diligence. The hypotheses outlined below explored the relationships and the mediating effect
of safety motivation on these relationships:
H6: Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to
pilot’s safety motivation.
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H7. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to
pilot’s safety compliance.
H8. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to
pilot’s safety participation.
H9. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to
pilot’s safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation.
H10. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related to
pilot’s safety participation when mediated by safety motivation.
Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior
This study explored the relationships between pilots’ perceived self-efficacy, safety
motivation and safety behaviors. The related hypotheses proposed are as follows:
H11: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related with their safety
motivation.
H12: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety
compliance.
H13: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their safety
participation.
H14: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between
perceived self-efficacy and safety compliance.
H15: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between
perceived self-efficacy and safety participation.
Safety Behavior, Safety –Related Events and Safety Motivation
In this study, the relationship between safety behavior (safety compliance and safety
participation) and safety-related events was examined. Finally, the relationship between
safety motivation and safety behavior was explored. The related hypotheses are stated below:
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H16: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety motivation is related to safety participation.
H17: Collegiate aviation pilot’s motivation is related to safety compliance.
H18: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation.
H19: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation
when mediated by safety –related events.
H20: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety –related events.
The hypothesized SEM-PA models of all the study variables and their interrelationships are shown in Figures 2 and 3.

Figure 2. SEM-PA of hypothesized measurement model of relationship between SMS, TSL,
SE, SM, SP and SC.
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Figure 3. Hypothesized Path Model for Relationship between Safety Compliance,
Safety Participation and Safety-Related Events.
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach
A concurrent triangulation strategy of mixed-methods design was used to collect
quantitative, qualitative and documentary/artifactual data. A comparison of the three
databases was done to determine whether there exists convergence, divergence, or some
combinations. This approach has been found helpful in comparing and cross-validating
multiple-source findings. This approach generally uses separate quantitative and qualitative
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methods as a means to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with the strength of the
other (Creswell, 2009).
The quantitative method can also add to the strength of the qualitative method and in
this approach, data collection was done concurrent, happening within the same collection
phase of the other. Using this approach, normally the weight is generally equal among the
methods, even though after the collection of data, there might arise some skewness in favor
of one over the others (Plano Clark & Creswell, 2008). The findings from the data were
integrated and further analyzed during the discussion and recommendation section of this
study.
Rationale for Method
This approach was particularly selected for this study because in collegiate operations
safety while quantitative evidence may depict a specific state of safety, the qualitative data,
may reveal a more comprehensive and holistic understanding of why that state existed. Also
the qualitative data from senior level leadership on safety within an organization presumably
added strategic and corporate level insight to the normal operational safety details available
through the artifacts and perceptions of personnel.
The advantages of this approach were rooted in the fact that it was cost effective and
familiar to the researcher (Creswell, 2009). This approach also resulted in well-validated and
substantiated findings and helped to triangulate diverse information to provide evidence for
the effectiveness of a process or policy in an organization (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2007).
The approach also helped to align gaps of safety within the collegiate aviation program
(Patanker, 2003). It also had a shorter data collection period, since all the data were collected
at the same time and within the same organization.
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Limitations of the Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach
The approach required great effort and expertise in attempting to conduct an enquiry
with separate methods. The other challenge faced was comparing the results of analysis from
different methods. Resolving discrepancies that arose during the comparative analysis of the
findings was also a challenge and some adapted remedies included a thorough overview of
the both qualitative and quantitative database to clarify the disparity in the data (Creswell,
2009).
Research Assumptions and Limitations
The proposed path model for this study was subjected to critical testing for goodnessof-fit to estimate relationships among the constructs, resulting in a final path model that
aimed at adequately representing the constructs under investigation. Another limitation was
the use of factor analysis (Exploratory and Confirmatory) as a data reduction tool and that
resulted in a series of modifications of the final path model relative to the proposed model.
The concepts of transformational safety leadership and self-efficacy are highly
subjective and were measured as the perceptions of the respondents. Neither the instrument
nor the study differentiate among levels of management relative to the respondents, as they
may come into various contacts with diverse people, who at any particular time may
represent operational safety leadership. Even though all the respondents in this study were
flight students, there may have been respondents who may have acquired additional
aeronautical experience outside the confines of the program and that experience may have
affected their safety behavior.
Cross-sectional studies, unlike longitudinal studies, may be constrained in
determining cause and effect relationships. The method was also limited to a snapshot of
perceptions of SMS initiative implementation within the study period and may not have
reflected the general trend over a long period. The dynamic nature of flight operations and
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the real-time occurrence of a safety –related event during the study period may have
unfavorably skewed the perceptions of respondents.
Scope of Research and Exclusive Criteria
This study did not attempt to address all possible safety behaviors or safety events that
were likely to be observed in the collegiate aviation operational environment. Although not
every possibility could be examined, the prevalent conditions evaluated were hypothesized to
be representative of the constructs under examination. This study was limited to respondents
from the collegiate aviation program. Data collection was purposefully limited to a threeweek period of the 2016 fall academic semester.
Non-flight students, graduate students, management pilots, faculty and staff were
excluded from the survey instrument phase of this study. Details of the populations are
addressed in Chapter IV. Finally, due to the scope of this study, factual safety performance
data from the collegiate program were compared to self-reported data, even though the
ultimate value existed in the relationship between the self-reporting of safety events and
individual respondents’ perception of SMS, self-efficacy, safety transformational leadership,
safety motivation, and safety behavior.
Acronyms
AMOS- IBM® SPSS® AMOS Version 23 SEM software package
CFI -Comparative Fit Index
CMIN -Minimum Discrepancy or Model Chi-Square
GFI- Goodness of Fit Index
IFI -Incremental Fit Index
MI -Modification Indices
ML -Maximum Likelihood Estimation
NFI- Normed fit index
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PA- Path Analysis
PCFI- Parsimony Comparative Fit Index
PNFI- Parsimony Normed Fit Index
RMSEA- Root Means Square Error of Approximation
SE – Self –Efficacy Scale Items
SEM -Structural Equation Modeling
SEV – Safety Events Scale Items
SC - Safety Compliance Scale Items
SM – Safety Motivation Scale Items
SMS- Safety Management System
SMS Initiative - SMS initiative Scale Item
SMSPol.Imp- SMS Policy Implementation Scale Items
SMSPro.Eng- SMS Process Engagement Scale Items
SP – Safety Participation Scale Items
TLI -Tucker Lewis Index
TSL - Transformational Safety Leadership Scale Items
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CHAPTER II
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) CONCEPTS AND IMPLEMENTATION
The FAA has outlined four basic components for the SMS structure. These
components are safety policy, safety risk management, safety assurance and safety promotion
(FAA, 2015a). All the four components must exist and be implemented in order to have a
fully effective and functional SMS. A basic understanding of the role of each component is
crucial to any aviation service provider’s SMS implementation drive and sustainability. The
four components must be implemented on the baseline that there would be the highest
leadership commitment and support in providing the necessary financial, human and material
resources required for the implementation process (ICAO, 2009; FAA, 2015b).
Safety Policy
The foundation and bedrock on which any SMS stands is its policy. An organizational
management system must clearly define policies, procedures and structures to be able to
attain its stated goals (IATA, 2011). The policy statement for any SMS must explicitly
describe core responsibility, authority, lines of accountability and pursuable targets. Safety
must assume a core value and a requisite business management function within the
organization (Wood, 2003). The roles, responsibility and relationship outlined in safety
policies of collegiate aviation programs can have a manifold effect on the sustenance of high
operational safety standards. These roles must be clearly defined for an effective SMS
implementation (ICAO, 2009).
The SMS policy statement must originate from the highest echelon of authority in the
organization and have ample evidence of top leadership initiatives, commitment and support
for the implementation drive (FAA, 2015b). The safety policy statement must be documented
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and enshrined in the core mission and vision statement. The safety policy must be visible,
communicated wide across the structures of the organization, and must be widely known and
accepted by all employees as a bona-fide safety policy (Wood, 2003; IATA, 2012). The
policy must be explicit on the personal and material involvement of top leadership in safety
activities.
The safety policy statement should outline the key safety goals and objectives, which
must be attainable and pragmatic (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008). The safety goals must be
included in the overall corporate strategic plan. The safety goals should be subjected to
periodic management review. Policy documentation should include guidelines and
requirement for all departments to document their procedures, controls, training, processes,
and measurement and change management systems. (ICAO, 2009). Even though the safety of
any aviation operation depends on a collective responsibility of all employees, the ultimate
accountability for safety in collegiate aviation operation is the preserve of the top leadership
and cannot be delegated (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).
Safety Risk Management
In order for an implementation of an SMS in collegiate aviation operations to be
effective, there should be a well-designed safety risk management (SRM) system that
describes operational processes across departmental and unit boundaries, identifies key
performance indicators and periodically measures them (IATA, 2011). A formal hazard
identification and risk management is essential to bring inherent high risk of flight training
operations to a level that is tolerable for the collegiate program (Transport Canada, 2005)
Hazard identification falls under risk management. Once the process is well
understood, inherent hazards associated with any operation and in the system can be
identified, documented and controlled (ICAO, 2009). The identification of every possible
hazard in collegiate aviation operations may be impractical, but the onus lies on program
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management to make every effort to identify significant and reasonably predictable hazards
related to their operations (Adjekum, 2014b).
Collegiate aviation operators should create a system for risk analysis and assessment.
These are very important aids to decision making when accepting risk. Risk is inherent in
every aspect of flight operation. The systematic and consistent process of acceptance criteria
needs to be lined with a designation of authority and responsibility for risk management
decisions (ICAO, 2009). Top management of collegiate aviation programs juggles the merits
of efficient productivity and the essential need to protect assets through effective safety
management systems (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008).
The rationale for safety management as a core business function can be extended into
one final argument that bears considerable relevance to the processes underlying hazard
identification and safety risk management. This rationale underscores the need for effective
risk identification and analysis. After the process of identifying the risk and conducting
analysis, there would be the need for control measures (FAA, 2012). Risk management
should aim at providing a proactive and predictive safety approach and environment (FAA,
2012). Risk management can be an effective means of auditing, analyzing and reviewing the
results of a safety program (ICAO, 2002; Transport Canada, 2005).
Safety Assurance
Safety assurance is that component of SMS that validates the effectiveness of the
stated safety goals in any collegiate aviation SMS implementation (FAA, 2015c; IATA,
2012). The establishment of policies, procedures, measures, assessment and controls will
require periodic organizational management review to assure the top management that safety
goals are being achieved and are in line with the overall strategic corporate benchmarks of
productivity and safety (FAA, 2015b; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).
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There are various means of implementing safety assurance program in collegiate
aviation operations and notably are safety performance monitoring, internal audits and
external audits (ICAO, 2009). Internal audits are normally the preserve of the line managers
and process owners (Transport Canada, 2005). They normally have domain technical
experience in the aviation operations and are more versed with the technical intricacies of the
processes involved (ICAO, 2002). Line managers should therefore be assigned the
responsibility for monitoring their own process. (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008).
The aim of any safety evaluation is to ensure that the processes and procedures
outlined in the safety policy and plan are accomplishing the collegiate aviation operational
goals (ICAO, 2002). A safety evaluation program gives top management the information for
decision-making required to sustain the overall SMS (IATA, 2012). All the various assurance
systems and the relevant oversight system should be subject to periodic management review
(IATA, 2011). An external audit can also provide a collegiate aviation operator an objective
and unbiased evaluation of safety processes from a third party source (ICAO, 2002). There is
the need to continually monitor the operational environment to assess new threats. The safety
assurance component in the SMS must provide the assessment on a routine basis (FAA,
2015b).
Safety Promotion
Safety promotion is a major component of the Safety Management System (SMS)
(ICAO, 2009) and together with the collegiate aviation safety policy and safety objectives are
important enablers for continuous safety improvement. Safety promotion sets the tone that
predisposes both individual and organizational behavior and fills in the blank spaces in the
organization’s policies, procedures and processes, providing a sense of purpose to safety
efforts (IATA, 2011). Through safety promotion, a collegiate aviation operator adopts a
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culture that goes beyond merely avoiding accidents or reducing the number of incidents,
although these are likely to be the most apparent measures of success (Wood, 2003).
Safety Promotion supports and advocates positive safety culture, communication,
dissemination of lessons learnt and enables a continuous improvement in the safety process
(FAA, 2010). Safety promotion initiatives should include all efforts to modify structures,
environment, attitudes and behaviors aimed at improving safety. Safety Promotion should be
geared toward matching competency requirements to system requirements (FAA, 2012).
Finally, an important aspect of safety promotion is training in SMS. Collegiate aviation
programs must endeavor to include SMS training as part of their academic curriculum and
have students and personnel grounded in the core principles and basics of SMS (Adjekum et
al., 2015). Figure 4 shows all the SMS components in a single frame.
•Senior management
Commitment to
continuous
improvement of
safety
•Defines Process
•Methods
•Organizational
structure
•Needed to meet
safety goals

•Determine need for
adequacy of new or
revised risk controls.
•Hazard Identification
and assessment of
acceptable risk.

Safety Policy

Safety Risk
Management

Safety
Promotion

Safety
Assurance

•Training
•Communication.
•Activities to create a
proactive and
positive safety
culture in all levels
of organization

•Evaluation of the
effectiveness of
implemented risk
control strategies.
•Supports ID of new
hazards

Figure 4. The SMS Components adapted from FAA Model (FAA, 2012).

23

Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation Methods
There are basically three types of safety management system implementation methods
available to collegiate aviation programs in the US. These are Reactive, Proactive and
Predictive methods (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008; ICAO, 2013). It is the responsibility of
every aviation service provider to utilize any of these methods to assure both the regulator
and customers of the capacity to deliver safe services and products. All aviation service
providers retain the responsibility for safety management and for integrating SMS into their
business model (IATA, 2012).
Reactive Method
Reactive safety management makes use of investigatory tools to find out the
contributory factors that caused the problem in the aftermath of an accident or incident. It is
forensic in nature and scientific methods are applied to understand the relevant factors.
Accident and incident investigations, incident analysis, and the determination of contributory
factors and findings as to risk are all examples of reactive methods (ICAO, 2013).
Proactive Method
This method aims at actively probing a system for potential safety problems, before
they actually happen. The major examples are trend analysis, hazard analysis; operational
monitoring, surveys and safety audits are effective. In airline operations statistical analysis,
visualization and reporting programs have contributed to improving safety (FAA, 2011).
Some viable and effective proactive safety management methods among aviation service
providers such as Part 121 airlines in the US are Flight Operations Quality Assurance
(FOQA), Line Operation Safety Audits (LOSA), and Aviation Safety Action Program
(ASAP).
Other proactive safety initiatives are Internal Evaluation Program (U.S Federal
Register, 2015). Line Operational Safety Audits (LOSA) has gained worldwide use. In 1999
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ICAO endorsed LOSA as the primary tool to develop countermeasures to human error in
aviation operations and made LOSA the central focus of its Flight Safety and Human Factors
Program for the period 2000 to 2004 (ICAO, 2002). The techniques of LOSA can easily be
adopted in collegiate aviation programs (Adjekum, 2014b).
Predictive Method
In the complex and technologically advanced environment that aviation service providers
operate, there would be the need for the highest form of safety. Safety improvements and
accident rates for airlines have reduced drastically, however that for general aviation (GA)
has not been very good (FAA, 2015c). Since collegiate aviation operations fall under GA,
new and sophisticated tools for safety trend analysis are required (Adjekum, 2014b). The
advantage of predictive safety methods is that it pushes the bar higher by using probabilistic
tools and models to analyze complex systems and predict where the failures will manifest
(FAA, 2015a). Predictive safety enables safety analyst to find those failure points and
eliminate them. Monte- Carlo Simulations, Stochastic models, Probabilistic Risk Assessment
and Data Mining are examples of predictive methods. (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008,
ICAO, 2013).
Phased SMS Implementation Approach
The three implementation methods that have been highlighted are the building blocks
for a phased or level-based SMS implementation recommended by both ICAO and FAA to
ensure an effective and sustainable safety initiative. These implementation levels also ensure
that metrics and acceptable benchmarks are monitored and attained (FAA, 2015a; IATA,
2011; ICAO, 2013). The implementation levels also provide aviation service provider such as
airlines, the flexibility to implements the SMS in a step-wise pattern according to the scale
and complexity of operations (FAA, 2015b).
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FAA SMS Implementation Level One - Planning and Organization
Level one begins when a service provider’s top management commits to providing the
resources necessary for full implementation of SMS throughout the organization (FAA,
2015a; FAA, 2015b; ICAO, 2013). Level one includes a thorough understanding of the
service provider’s organizational structure and a comparison (gap analysis) between the Part
5 requirements and the service provider’s organizational structure (FAA, 2015a). The service
provider will develop an implementation plan to bridge identified gaps. The final
implementation plan must be approved by a Certificate Maintenance Team (CMT) (FAA,
2015b).
The first step in developing an SMS is for the service provider to analyze its existing
programs, systems, and activities with respect to the SMS functional expectations found in
the SMS Framework. This analysis is a process and is called a “gap analysis”. The “gaps” are
those elements in the SMS Framework that are not already being performed by the service
provider (IATA, 2012). The Gap Analyses process would consider and encompass the entire
organization (e.g., functions, processes, organizational departments, etc.) to be covered by the
SMS (ICAO, 2009). The Gap Analysis should be continuously updated as the service
provider progresses through the SMS implementation process (FAA, 2015b).
Once a gap analysis has been performed, an implementation plan is prepared. The
implementation plan is simply a “road map” describing how the service provider intends to
close the existing gaps by meeting the objectives and expectations in the SMS Framework.
The service provider organizes resources, assigns responsibilities, sets schedules and defines
objectives necessary to address all gaps identified. It should be noted that at each level of
implementation, top management’s approval of the implementation plan must include
allocation of necessary resources (FAA, 2015a, 2015b; ICAO, 2013).
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FAA SMS Implementation Level Two- Basic Safety Management
At level two, the service provider develops and implements a basic SRM process and
plan, organize and prepare the organization for further SMS development. Information
acquisition, processing, and analysis functions are implemented and a tracking system for risk
control and corrective actions are established (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011). At this
phase, the service provider corrects known deficiencies in safety management practices and
operational processes and develops an awareness of hazards and responds with appropriate
systematic application of preventative or corrective actions (FAA, 2015a). This allows the
service provider to react to unwanted events and problems as they occur and develop
appropriate remedial action. For this reason, this level is termed “reactive.”
FAA SMS Implementation Level Three: Fully-Functioning SMS
The SMS Framework expects Safety Risk Management to be applied to initial design
of systems, processes, organizations, and products, development of operational procedures,
and planned changes to operational processes (Wood, 2003; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia,
2008). The activities involved in the SRM process involve careful analysis of systems and
tasks involved; identification of potential hazards in these functions, and development of risk
controls (FAA, 2015a). The risk management process developed at level two is used to
analyze, document, and track these activities. Because the service provider is now using the
processes to look ahead, this level is termed “proactive”. At this level, however, these
proactive processes have been implemented but their performance has not yet been proven
(ICAO, 2013)
FAA SMS Implementation Level Four: Continuous Improvement
The final level of SMS maturity is the continuous improvement level. Processes have
been in place and their performance and effectiveness have been verified. The complete SA
process, including continuous monitoring and the remaining features of the other SRM and
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SA processes are functioning (Transport Canada, 2005). A major objective of a successful
SMS is to attain and maintain this continuous improvement status for the life of the
organization. Figure 5 shows the FAA recommended implementation levels.

Continous
Monitoring and
Improvement
Fully Functional
SMS
Basic Safety
Management

Planning and
Organization

Figure 5. Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation Levels (FAA, 2015a).
Safety Management System Voluntary Programs (SMSVP)
As part of an effort to encourage service providers, who do not fall under the
mandatory requirements of the Part 5 SMS program to voluntary initiate and implement SMS
programs, the FAA has a program that provides assistance to such service providers (FAA,
2015b). Most of the collegiate aviation programs implementing an SMS program in the US
fall under this category (UND, 2012). Collegiate Aviation programs as certificate holder
should continue following existing regulations and certificate requirements and once the FAA
recognizes their SMS initiative; their certificate maintenance office will monitor ongoing
conformity with the SMSVP Standard (FAA, 2015a)
These voluntary participants such as collegiate programs are expected to make steady
progress towards full SMS implementation and continual improvement. The entire process is
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coordinated by a Certificate Maintenance Team (CMT) which is responsible for validating
the certificate holder’s management system applications during both the implementation
process and after full implementation (FAA, 2015a; FAA, 2015b). The CMT also gets
guidance from the SMS Program Office (SMSPO) whose primary objective is to assist CMTs
in validating SMS development and certificate holders maintain their “active conformance”
status. The SMSPO also has sole authority to authorize or withdraw recognition of a
certificate holder’s SMS (FAA, 2015b).
The following categories denote the progress expected from the SMSVP participants
and the implementation phase is different from certificate holders under the SMS Part 5 Rule.
The implementation stages for the voluntary programs are as follows:
1. The first level of SMSVP Active Applicant is when the certificate holder and
CMT have committed to sufficiently support the SMS implementation and
validation processes.
2. The second phase of SMSVP Active Participant is the actual level, where the
certificate holder officially begins and maintains its implementation efforts.
3. The third level of SMSVP Active Conformance is attained when the CMT and
SMSPO acknowledge full implementation of the certificate holder’s SMS. By
this stage, the certificate holder is expected to use and continually improve its
safety management processes.
When a certificate holder fails to meet SMSVP standards, it becomes an SMSVP Non
Active Participant. One of the important phases of the preliminary implementation process is
the use of Job Aids by the CMT to track progress. Some of the important Job Aids are the
Design Job Aids which will be used to evaluate certificate holder’s documentation describing
its SMS applications. The Design Job Aids encompass the operational SMSVP conformance
requirements. These Job Aids are considered the minimum performance validation activities
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to be used during the design validation phase (FAA, 2015b). Figure 6 shows the SMSVP
implementation levels.

Active Conformance
Active Participant
Active Applicant
Figure 6. SMSVP Levels of Implementation (Based on FAA, 2015b).
Another very important requirement in SMSVP is the use of Performance Job Aid
which is used to evaluate the certificate holder’s safety management performance. Where
actual field performance cannot be assessed (e.g., emergency response plans), the CMT is
permitted to use simulated processes (sometimes called “table top exercises”) allowing CMT
to evaluate the certificate holder’s capabilities without an actual performance demonstration.
Once a certificate holder has satisfied all the requirements for validation and implementation
and SMS has been integrated into every facet of operations of the certificate holder, the CMT
manager would request for recognition of the SMS by the SMSPO.
The SMSPO would conduct a review of the request and upon satisfactory review; the
SMSPO will change the certificate holder’s status from “SMSVP Active Participant” to
“SMSVP Active Conformance” and issue the certificate holder a current status letter. The
SMSPO will post a record of the certificate holder’s “SMSVP Active Compliance Status” on
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the internal FAA SharePoint® site. This will constitute evidence of “state recognition” of the
certificate holders SMS (FAA, 2015b).
The challenge for the certificate holder is the Continuous Operational Safety (COS)
phase. This stage is basically continuous monitoring and surveillance of the certificate
holder’s technical processes and the responsibility now falls on the CMT to broaden the
scope of its normal surveillance activities to include safety management assessment (FAA,
2015b; ICAO, 2013).
Collegiate Aviation Programs and Safety Management System (SMS) Implementation
An important facet of a positive safety culture is geared toward the nurturing of good
safety behavior and practices (von Thaden, 2008). A strong positive safety culture is also
essential to a collegiate aviation program because it is one of the most effective and
systematic ways to reduce accidents and incidents within the flight training organization
(ICAO, 2009). There has been an imperative need to control risk through an assessment of
the prevalent safety culture inherent in such collegiate flight programs (Patankar, 2003).
Evans, Glendon & Creed (2007) suggested that a safety culture assessment could also provide
the needed data and feedback to build a predictive model aimed at continuously improving
safety and ensuring an integrated system wide safety net for training organizations.
In trying to generate an organizational framework to effectively manage safety and
serves as the structure that generates a positive safety culture (von Thaden, 2008), the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)
has recommended that aviation service providers should adopt Safety Management Systems
(SMS). Safety Management System is a structured and systematic quality based management
approach to aviation safety (FAA, 2008; ICAO, 2009). Safety Management Systems would
provide an organized approach to safety procedures, processes and performance management
(von Thaden & Gibbons, 2008). Safety Management System has the potential to reduce the
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safety risk of flight operations to a level that is tolerable for sustainable and productive
operations (ICAO, 2009).
Safety Management System frameworks has been effective when adopted as part of a
core business function by aviation service providers (FAA, 2008). Even though presently
Safety Management System (SMS) and SMS components such as safety culture assessment
are not a regulatory requirement in the United States for collegiate aviation programs (Part
141) and Part 61 flight training schools (FAA, 2015a), a number of SMS voluntary programs
are being run by some proactive university aviation departments due to the immense positive
benefits it has provided (UND, 2012; FAA, 2015a).
Benefits of SMS Implementation in Collegiate Aviation Programs
Some of the benefits of SMS have been the enhancement of a good safety culture and
collection of real time safety information. The collection of safety information has been
through non-punitive safety reporting mechanisms, voluntary safety reporting system and
flight data monitoring system (FDM). The safety information system has identified risky
operational trends and helped to proactively mitigate the risk due to such unsafe conditions
and actions to a level acceptable for operation (UND, 2012; Adjekum, 2014a).
Other benefits have included students’ confidence in the operational safety of the
flight program. A Safety Management System and a positive safety culture would be
advantageous to collegiate aviation because they perform standardized activities towards
established goals (FAA, 2013). Finally, proactive and corrective measures have saved flight
schools the detrimental cost of accidents that can result in, loss of students, aircraft and
reputation (Adjekum, 2014a; CBS, 2014).
Evaluation of the effectiveness of SMS Initiative in Collegiate Aviation Programs
With the adoption of Safety Management System by collegiate aviation programs, it
would be important to evaluate how effective the espoused benefits have been to personnel.
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That will fall within the level four of the implementation hierarchy recommended by the
FAA. One of the means for evaluation is through perceptions on the merits of this safety
initiatives and how it has influenced the safety attitudes and behavior of personnel. Studies on
the perceptions of operational personnel of collegiate aviation related to the safety culture
within their programs would provide an end users perspective on the effectiveness of the
organizational management of safety (von Thaden, Kessel & Ruengvisesh, 2008; Adjekum,
2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015).
Previous safety culture assessment studies carried out by Patanker (2003) and the
Australian Transportation Safety Bureau (2004) on aviation maintenance organizations
suggested that a good indicator for organizational safety culture required the identification,
analysis, and prioritization of information to mitigate hazards and risks. As aviation
organizations like collegiate aviation become diversified to include contract training for
foreign airlines and international students (Patankar, 2003; Australian Transportation Safety
Bureau, 2004) safety initiatives assessments should become routine and consistent.
The increased risk of safety occurrences in an environment of high tempo flight
training of domestic US students and international flight student in US collegiate aviation
programs, has made it imperative to find the effect of how SMS and variables such as ethical
leadership, self-efficacy, and safety motivation interact to influenced the safety behaviors of
these students.
Challenges and Perceptual Gaps in SMS Implementation in Collegiate Aviation
When promoting SMS, in collegiate aviation programs, the critical issues that may
emerge are how senior-level policy makers would identify with, and provide support for the
key components of the SMS. Other thorny areas are how inter-mediate and supervisory level
managers weigh the importance of its various dimensions and steps, and how front-line
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employees are taught to evaluate the effects of their safety behaviors and practices (Adjekum,
2014; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013; Chen, 2014).
Previous studies have indicated that occasionally, there exist perceptual gaps in
regards to the successful implementation of the SMS initiative and safety culture between top
level managers and operational personnel in the aviation industry (Patankar, 2003; von
Thaden, 2008; Chen & Chen, 2011; Adjekum, 2014a; Adjekum et al., 2015). It is therefore
very important to continuously evaluate and monitor any SMS initiative for gaps and provide
the necessary controls to close those gaps especially within collegiate aviation programs that
are currently part of the FAA voluntary SMS initiative (Patankar, 2003; FAA, 2015b).
Another challenge that collegiate aviation programs may face is the constant
balancing act between resources for training/operational activities and safety initiative
implementations (ICAO, 2009). Most collegiate aviation programs are expected to comply
with regulatory operational safety standards (14CFR Part 141 and other relevant Federal
Aviation Regulations). These standards are the safety baseline/threshold and are mandatory.
Any form of non-compliance by these collegiate programs may result in enforcement actions
such the revocation of operational certificates or punitive fines by the FAA.
Safety initiatives such as SMS aim at ensuring that the certificate holder meets and
exceeds the minimum regulatory safety compliance requirements (FAA, 2015b). The aim is
to keep operational activities within the safety risk tolerability region, where hazards have
been identified and associated risk to flight operations have been subjected to effective
mitigations and controls (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011; ICAO, 2013). The residual risk is
deemed tolerable and as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) for operations (ICAO, 2013).
Another important aspect of the SMS initiative in collegiate aviation program is the
need for continuous monitoring when the active compliance level is attained. There may be
periods when the Perceived Level of Safety (PLoS) as depicted in safety policies and
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proposals may differ from the Actual Level of Safety (ALoS), within the program. The use of
safety assurance tools for periodic evaluation of safety performance can reveal these
perceptual gaps (SMS performance gaps). Remedial tools such as policy reviews, changes in
procedures, process control managements, and training can be used to align and bridge the
gap (Patankar, 2003).
There may also be periods, when the congruence of high tempo flight operational
demands and limited resources may adversely constrain investments in safety. Allocation of
resources for sustaining proactive safety measures and defenses may stagnate or even decline.
This management level decision can easily lower the safety margins by creating latent unsafe
conditions that pre-disposes the program to potential safety occurrences (Reason, 1997).
The latent conditions can increase the probability of more active failures of front -line
operational personnel such as flight students and instructors through the promotion of errors
and violations. The active failures of frontline personnel are able to create gaps through
existing safety defenses such as Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). The latent conditions
can also aggravate the severity of the unsafe act by the adverse effects on the already
weakened system defenses, barriers and safeguards (Reason, 1997; Dekker, 2014).
When a collegiate aviation program determines that there are increases in safety noncompliances and violations, it may be a signal that there is operational safety slack and the
accident potential is high (Adjekum, 2014b). It may also indicate that the program is in the
safety risk vulnerability region. Figure 7 shows a plot of safety initiative and operational
activities interaction.
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Figure 7. Interaction between Safety Initiatives and Productive/Operational
Activities (Self designed from ideas adopted from ICAO, 2013).
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CHAPTER III
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter describes the review of literature related to the study, including SMS
initiatives, the effects of transformational safety leadership on safety behavior, self-efficacy,
safety motivation, safety compliance, and safety participation. The chapter also explores the
literature that grounds how these constructs are related to self-reported safety events. The
theoretical construct presented in Figure 1 shows the relationships between transformational
safety leadership, perceptions of SMS initiative, self-efficacy, safety motivation, safety
behavior, and safety events. These relationships in collegiate aviation operations have not
been explored in existing literature. The mediating role of safety motivation and the other
endogenous variables such as SMS perceptions and self-efficacy on safety behavior are of
particular interest in the construction of a model for the evaluation of the effects of the
perceptions of SMS constructs on safety behavior and events.
Theoretical Foundation
Safety Management System Initiatives, Implementation and Practices
Safety Management System initiative, implementation, and practices are the policies,
strategies, procedures and activities implemented or followed by the management of an
organization targeting safety of their personnel (ICAO, 2013). These practices are the
essential elements permitting an effective management of safety in organizations and are
designed to comply with the existing legislations applicable to the organization. Nominally
safety management has focused on prescription- based regulation compliance, and
accordingly the main tool used for safety improvement is guaranteeing compliance with
prescriptive regulations (ICAO, 2009; FAA, 2013).
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This mode of safety management approach using prescriptive regulations can be
defined as the “regulatory compliance-based approach”. Prescriptive regulations undoubtedly
play an important role in improving aviation safety and normally mandate controls in
response to hazards in the aviation system (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008). They are
important since they ensure that a fundamental set of hazards is addressed. On the other hand,
prescriptive regulations are general tools that cover all relevant service providers at the
national, regional and international level (ICAO, 2013). Consequently, prescriptive regulation
may not address all the specific hazards that are likely to exist in different aviation
organizations and contexts, and may not be effective enough against certain specific hazards
and risks that may arise specific to a context in organizations, each of which may be
considered a socio-technical system (Reason, 1997; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2008; Dekker,
2011).
Therefore, although regulatory compliance is achieved, organizational and contextual
factors may cause people to make errors and thereby imperil organizational safety (Reason,
1997). Reflecting on this approach, it may suffice that personnel within a normatively welldesigned system can always carry out operational duties required within the organization
safely under all contextual conditions (Reason, 1997).
Performance -Based Safety Management System Approach
There has also been a contemporary advocacy by ICAO, for a shift from prescription based safety management to a performance- based management of safety, where the goal is to
achieve safety performance metrics, such as higher frequency of personnel safety training and
awareness will exceed the requirements of existing regulations (FAA, 2012; Remawi, Bates
& Dix, 2011; ICAO, 2013). The extent to which these practices are implemented in an
organization will be manifested through various actions and programs of the management and
will be clearly visible to an insider like an employee. Safety Management System (and its
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practices) can be regarded as an antecedent of an organization’s safety culture (Stolzer,
Halford & Goglia, 2008; FAA, 2012; Adjekum, 2014b).
A performance-based approach combines prescribed standards with performance
standards. What is essentially expected from companies is a continuous improvement in
safety performance, as well as compliance with regulations (ICAO, 2013). Companies use
proactive tools such as hazard identification and risk analysis, safety measurement, safety
performance monitoring and prediction in order to fulfill these expectations. Aviation
organizations demonstrate that they know and manage their own customized hazards and
risks in a contextual dynamic environment, and the regulatory authority oversees the
effectiveness of the service provider’s SMS (FAA, 2012; ICAO, 2013).
Performance-based safety approach is predicated on the notion that regulations should
focus on the achievement of regulatory objectives and that regulated entities should be left to
determine how best to achieve them. The performance-based approach may bring about
organizational, as well as effective context-specific solutions, for hazard identification and
safety risk mitigation (May, 2010).
In furtherance of the performance -based safety approach, currently in the U.S, a final
rule on SMS implementation (Part 5) requires air carriers operating under 14 Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) Part 121 to develop and implement a safety management system (SMS) to
improve the safety of their aviation-related activities (U.S Federal Register, 2015). Air
carriers authorized to conduct operations under Part 121 must develop and implement an
SMS within three years of the effective date of the final rule.
To demonstrate that the air carrier’s SMS will be fully implemented by the end of
this three-year period, the air carrier will be required to submit an implementation plan within
6 months of the effective date of the final rule. The implementation plan should include any
existing programs, policies or procedures the air carrier intends to include in its SMS, such as
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continuing analysis and surveillance systems, aspects of quality management systems, and
employee reporting systems. As part of the new rule, this implementation plan must be
approved by the FAA within 12 months of the effective date of the final rule (U.S Federal
Register, 2015; FAA, 2015a).
SMS Implementation Cost Concerns
One of the principal concerns among aviation service providers about the
implementation of SMS in the US is the cost related to initiating and implementing SMS
even though the FAA suggests through cost-benefit analysis that one of the expectations of
the requirements of the rule is to help airlines identify safety problems (FAA, 2015b). It has
also been suggested that if airlines take steps to mitigate these safety problems, there could be
estimated benefits from that mitigation ranging from $205.0 and $472.3 million over 10 years
($104.9 to $241.9 million present value at 7 percent discount rate) (US. Federal Register,
2015). However, the costs of the rule’s provisions (excluding any mitigation costs, which
have not been estimated) are estimated to be $224.3 million ($135.1 million present value at
7 percent discount rate) over 10 years (U.S Federal Register, 2015).
Global Application of SMS in other Allied Industries
Interestingly, SMS has not only been limited to the aviation industry. SMS has also
found wider acceptance in a variety of industries, such as the chemical, oil, construction,
occupational health, food, highway, electrical, fire protection, and other industries to improve
safety (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás, 2007; Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011;
Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011, Dekker, 2014). SMS has been a key tool used for the
management of safety by high reliability organization (HROs), where the consequences of
accidents and incidents can lead to high fatality rates (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).
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Review of some SMS related Studies
Within the collegiate aviation operational environment in the United States, the
number of studies related to the SMS is relatively limited (Adjekum, 2014b) and most of the
reviews would be on the broader perspective of SMS in high reliability organizations,
inclusive of aviation. McDonald et al. (2000) proposed a self-regulatory model to examine
how different organizations manage safety. However, their study was aimed mainly at
exploring the relationship between different aspects of safety culture and safety management
systems, not exploring the critical success factors of the SMS or the problems related to its
implementation.
Gill and Shergill (2004) studied employee perceptions of safety management and
safety culture in New Zealand’s aviation industry and tried to develop a scale to assess the
management of safety. Their study also focuses on safety culture. Furthermore, rather than
define what the components and elements of a successful safety management system are, the
scale took into consideration the organizations’ current approach to safety management in a
general manner.
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) found out that there have
been various studies that emphasized the importance of Safety Management Systems (SMS),
and how to implement them, but there are very few works providing a specific tool to
measure the degree of implementation of the policies and practices making up this
management system in organizations. The authors conceptualized SMS, followed by a risk
management process that described the essential elements making up the SMS. This
management process provided the basis for identifying, in turn, a set of variables that would
be used to develop an instrument to measure the degree of implementation of such a process.
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) constructed a scale made up
of 29 items structured in eight first-order factors; policy, incentives, training, communication,
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preventive planning, emergency planning, internal control and benchmarking techniques. A
second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) confirmed that the dimensions preventive
planning and emergency planning, internal control and benchmarking and converged on two
factors, labelled planning and control, respectively.
Finally, a third-order CFA confirmed that the measurement dimensions: policy,
incentives, training, communication, planning and control do indeed underlie a single major
dimension: The Safety Management System. The results of the study suggest that SMS, apart
from improving the working conditions of personnel, has a positive impact on their safety
behavior. The results also suggested that the organization’s accident rate is reduced, both
directly and indirectly, through the reduction in unsafe worker behavior, minimizing the
human and material losses associated with accidents.
In a study on the effect of employee perceptions on six SMS practices and selfreported safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation,
Vinodkumara and Bhasib (2010) conducted a survey using questionnaire among 1566
employees belonging to eight major accident hazard process industrial units in Kerala, a state
in southern part of India. The researchers found out that the reliability and unidimesionality
of all the scales were acceptable.
In that particular study, path analysis using AMOS-4® software showed that some of
the SMS practices had direct and indirect relations with the safety performance components,
namely, safety compliance and safety participation. Safety knowledge and safety motivation
were found to be the key mediators in explaining these relationships. Safety training was
identified as the most important safety management practice that predicted safety knowledge,
safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation.
Within a framework of assessing the impact of SMS implementation in aviation,
Remawi, Bates and Dix (2011) measured the extent to which the introduction of SMS at an
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international airport in the Middle-East would influence the safety attitude and culture of
employees. A Safety Culture Survey was used as the pre and post-test measure over a 12month period to determine the extent of influence of the introduction of the SMS at Sharjah
Airport, United Arab Emirates. The average score reported by participants at Sharjah Airport
increased significantly from pre-test measure to post-test measure in relation to
communication, safety rules, supportive environment, personnel risk appreciation, work
environment, and involvement.
The results from the study indicated that participants at Sharjah Airport recorded a
significant positive shift in attitude to the safety factors covered in the Safety Culture Survey,
whilst at the same time responses from a second airport (control without SMS) showed no
such shift in attitude. The second airport showed neither decline nor improvement in
responses and the results suggested that the introduction of an SMS at Sharjah Airport has
effected positive changes not observed at the second airport.
There have also been several academic studies aimed at identifying the critical
components and elements of the SMS, such as Liou and Chuang (2010) who mapped out
structural relationships among diverse components of SMS and identified key factors in their
model. A similar study was conducted by Hsu, Li and Chen (2010) to develop an analytical
framework for defining the key components and dimensions of an airline SMS and their
interaction.
Chen and Chen (2012) developed a customized SMS evaluation scale for the airline
industry based on the perceptions of aviation experts and airline managers, since their earlier
exploratory qualitative research (Chen & Chen, 2011) showed that there is a clear perception
gap regarding the implementation of the SMS between managers and hands-on employees in
the airline industry.
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One of the keys to achieving successful implementation of an SMS is to ensure that
every employee participates in the system and fulfills their designated roles, as Galotti et al.
(2006) noted that such a ‘‘system’’ represents the concept of an integrated set of processes
which manage safety across intra-departmental boundaries. When promoting SMS, especially
in the collegiate aviation environment, some of the critical issues are how program policymakers can identify the key components of the system, how managers weigh the importance
of its various dimensions and steps, and how personnel are taught to evaluate the effects of
these safety practices.
Pilots’ evaluations of their collegiate program SMS initiatives may thus be interpreted
as their perceptions of how greatly the program values safety and the effects of adopting such
a proactive safety model at an organizational level. This study will investigate the effects of a
collegiate aviation actual SMS initiative on pilots’ safety behaviors for two reasons. The first
is that even though SMS is gradually becoming an industry accepted benchmark for safety
and reliability and is getting a lot of advocacy from both the FAA, industry and, ICAO), there
is still limited research examining SMS related issues (Adjekum, 2014b; Chen, 2014).
The second reason is that the success of any SMS initiative depends on a continuous
action of improvement and a better understanding of personnel perceptions regarding the
particular system their organization adopts. Previous studies verify the relationship between
the implementation of an SMS and the attitudes of employees toward safety behaviors in
aviation (Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011).
It will also be insightful to have a comprehensive understanding of the
implementation framework as outlined for service providers by regulatory agencies such as
the FAA. This understanding of the implementation framework will provide organizations
and service providers such as collegiate aviation programs, who are voluntary participants in
SMS initiatives, the necessary tools and resources for successful SMS implementation as
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outlined in the revised Safety Management System for aviation service provider’s manual AC
120-92B and Safety Management System Voluntary Program Guide (AFS-900-002-G201)
(FAA, 2015).
Paucity of Literature in Collegiate Aviation SMS Initiatives
Generally, there has been a paucity of literature and studies on SMS in collegiate
aviation, due to only few programs implementing the voluntary FAA SMS initiative, since it
is not a mandatory regulatory requirement in the US (FAA, 2015a; FAA, 2015b; UND,
2012). Some of the indirect studies on SMS in collegiate aviation have been targeted at safety
climate/culture assessments (Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum
et al., 2015; Freiwald, Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013).
In terms of validated survey instruments to conduct evaluations of SMS within the
aviation industry and specifically airlines, Chen and Chen, (2012) developed an SMS
measurement scale from the perspective of aviation experts and airline managers to evaluate
the performance of airline’s safety management system. The results revealed a five-factor
structure consisting of 23 items. The five factors included documentation and commands,
safety promotion and training, executive management commitment, emergency preparedness
and response plan, and safety management policy.
Chen (2014) examined the effects of pilots’ perceptions of Safety Management
System (SMS) practices, fleet managers’ morality leadership and pilots’ self-efficacy on
flight crews’ safety behaviors through the mediation of safety motivation. Using a sample of
239 Taiwanese commercial pilot participants, and Structural Equation Modeling (SEM)
technique, the results indicated that both perceptions of SMS practices and self-efficacy have
direct, positive effects on pilots’ safety behaviors (safety participation and safety
compliance), while the effect of fleet managers’ morality leadership on such behavior was
fully mediated by pilots’ safety motivation.
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Leadership and Organizational Safety Performance
A substantial number of studies has investigated leadership, both as a construct and as
a concept, which plays an important role in successful organizational change and is one of the
key driving forces for improving safety performance (Zohar, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, &
Francis, 2006; Kapp, 2012; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón & Vázquez-Ordás, 2014;
Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016). It can rather be a challenge to define
leadership out of context, and there have been many definitions based on varying fields of
studies. Greenberg (2013) defines leadership as “A process whereby one individual
influences other group members in a non-coercive manner towards the defined group or
organizational goals, pg. 335).
Burns (1978) notes that although leadership concepts and theories richly abound in
extant literature, no central concept of leadership has emerged, because scholars are working
in separate disciplines to answer specific questions unique to their specialty. Burns asserts
that due to the influence of research conducted in the field of humanistic psychology, it may
be possible to make generalizations about leadership across cultures and time. According to
Burns (1978), the concept of leadership must be aligned with a collective purpose and
effective leaders must be judged by their ability to make social changes.
Burns further suggests that the role of the leader and follower be united conceptually
and that the process of leadership is the interplay of conflict and power. Burns delineates two
basic types of leadership: transactional and transformational. Transactional leaders approach
followers with the intent to exchange one thing for another, for example, the leaders may
reward the hard-working employees with an increase in budget allowance. On the other hand,
“The Transforming leader looks for potential motives in followers, seeks to satisfy higher
needs, and engages the full person of the follower” (p. 4).
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The result of this leadership is a mutual relationship that converts followers to leaders
and leaders into moral agents. The concept of moral leadership is proposed as a means for
leaders to take responsibility for their leadership and to aspire to satisfy the needs of the
followers. Finally, Burns posits that leaders are neither born nor made but rather evolve from
a structure of motivation, values, and goals. Martínez-Córcoles, Gracia, Tomás and Peiró
(2011) conducted a review of the definitions of leadership and concluded that ‘‘a common
element is present in all of them, namely, that the leader does by means of others or induces
others to perform activities that they would not carry to completion if this influence were not
present in the first place’’.
Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg and Johnsen (2012) suggest that existing safety
leadership studies published in a variety of academic journals, books and policy documents
have focused on either transformational–transactional leadership or leader–member exchange
(LMX). Most of these safety leadership behaviors have been inferred from the reports given
by subordinates through quantitative survey instruments and both transformational and
transactional leadership styles are often assessed by completing the MLQ survey developed
by Avolio and Bass (2004).
The MLQ measures a broad range of leadership types from passive leaders, to leaders
who give contingent rewards to followers, to leaders who transform their followers into
becoming leaders themselves and has been adapted to focus on safety by researchers such as
Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway (2002). Studies by Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis (2006) and
Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke (2009) examined the relationship between leadership
and safety and suggested that safe behavior had an effect on reducing organizational
accidents. These studies also suggest that leader and sub-ordinate relations has a vital effect
on the personnel actions.
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Christian, Bradley, Wallace & Burke (2009) further suggest that generally, front line
personnel who have high-quality relationships with their leaders are more likely to have more
positive safety behaviors because the leader and the personnel would have connected to solve
problems together. They also suggest that personnel who have positive interactions with their
leaders are more likely to respond to their leaders positively than their colleagues who do not
have such positive interactions.
Within the earlier concepts of systems safety and accident prevention strategies, there
has been a focus on shared leadership. Shared Leadership is another management strategy
that reﬂects the change from a top-down management approach to a shared leadership.
Normally in the regular top-down setting, the individual at the top of an organization or an
organization unit is the leader and plans, organizes, and directs. The idea of shared leadership
invites other members in a group to contribute ideas for safety improvement within an
organization and to take responsibility for leading the rest of the group in certain aspects of
the productive activities (Brauer, 2006).
As a result, the roles of people in the group vary, depending on who is leading a
particular activity. In one activity, a person may have a leadership responsibility and in the
next be a participant. Leadership is not limited to only one person. This however may be at
variance with much more modern concepts, where there is shared responsibility and
accountability for safety at various levels in the organization but ultimately within the
organization, there would have to be an accountable executive, who will be the final authority
when it comes to responsibility and accountability for extremely high risk decision making
within the organizational hierarchy (ICAO, 2013).
Effects of Transformational and Transactional Leadership on Safety Performance
There has been several studies and disparate discourse over which style of leadership
is best suited for safety performance in organizations (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Lowe,
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Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; DeGroot, Kiker & Cross, 2000; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, &
Shamir, 2002; Zohar, 2002; Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006; Avolio, Walumbwa &
Weber, 2009; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Kapp, 2012; Fernández-Muñiz,
Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás, 2014).
Bass and Avolio (1994) suggest that transformational leadership motivates followers
to improve performance by transforming followers’ attitudes, beliefs, and values as opposed
to simply gaining compliance. Other the contrary Zohar (2000) suggests that transactional
leadership helps organizations achieve their current objectives more efficiently by linking job
performance to valued rewards and by ensuring that employees have the resources they need
to carry out their work.
Several studies have found relationships between safety-specific transformational
leadership (i.e. Transformational leadership specifically focused on enhancing individual and
organizational safety) and safety-related outcomes, including perceived safety climate, safety
events, safety consciousness (Kelloway, Mullen, & Francis, 2006), and safety citizenship
behavior (Conchie & Donald, 2009). Empirical evidence suggests that transformational
leadership predicts positive performance outcomes in field experiments, field studies,
laboratory studies, and meta-analytic studies (Hater & Bass, 1988; Keller, 1992; Howell &
Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Fuller, Patterson, Hester & Stringer, 1996;
Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1996; Lowe, Kroeck, & Sivasubramaniam, 1996; DeGroot, Kiker &
Cross, 2000; Dvir, Eden, Avolio, & Shamir, 2002).
According to Judge and Piccolo (2004), more than 87 studies report positive
relationships among transformational leadership and organizational outcomes such as safety
behaviors. Transformational leadership has received considerable conceptual and empirical
attention in recent times. In focusing on the scope of this research, transformational
leadership is defined as “leader behaviors that transform and inspire followers to perform
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beyond expectations while transcending self-interest for the good of the organization”
(Avolio, Walumbwa & Weber, 2009, pg. 243).
According to Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson and Denyer (2016) citing earlier works of
Bass and Riggio (2006), transformational leadership comprises of four leader behaviors.
Idealized influence is when leaders demonstrate high standards of moral conduct in their own
behavior. Inspirational motivation occurs when leaders communicate a positive, value-based
vision for the future state of the organization and its employees. Intellectual stimulation is
when leaders encourage employees to challenge organizational norms and think creatively.
Lastly, individual consideration is when leaders recognize the unique needs of followers.
In contrast, Zohar (2002) suggested that transactional leadership is based on nonindividualized hierarchical relationships and comprises three dimensions (constructive
leadership, corrective leadership and laissez-faire leadership). Constructive leadership offers
material rewards (e.g. increased salary, promotion, job security) contingent upon satisfactory
performance and requires clear communication between leader and follower.
Zohar further stated that some understanding of the individual needs and abilities is
needed in order to offer motivationally relevant rewards. Corrective leadership (or active
management by exception) monitors individual performance against standards, detecting
errors and correcting them. Laissez-faire leadership (passive management by exceptions)
disowns all leadership responsibility and only engages with subordinates in an emergency.
In adopting a transactional leadership style for safety, leaders typically establish
appropriate safety goals, monitor performance towards these goals and reward behaviors that
sustain or improve safety practices (Zohar, 2002; Kapp, 2012). In contrast, leaders adopting a
transformational leadership style for safety demonstrate these actions, as outlined in the
Kelloway et al. (2006) study. These include: expressing satisfaction when jobs are performed
safely; rewarding achievement of safety targets; continuous encouragement for safe working;
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maintaining a safe working environment; suggesting new ways of working more safely;
encouraging employees to openly discuss safety at work; talking about personal value and
beliefs in the importance of safety; behaving in a way that demonstrates commitment to
safety; spending time to demonstrate how to work safely; and, listening to safety concerns.
Bass and Avolio (1994) had earlier suggested that transformational leaders, by
strongly promoting leader–member exchange, make their followers aware of the importance
of the results obtained, improve their employees’ innovative and creative behaviors, seek new
ways of working, seek opportunities in the face of risk, prefer effective answers to efficient
answers, and are less likely to support the status quo. Transformational leaders generate trust
and respect among their followers, who are motivated to achieve more than was originally
expected and move their followers beyond their own self-interests for the sake of the group,
organization or society (Kapp, 2012).
The transformational style tends to be considered broader and more effective than the
transactional style (Avolio and Bass, 2002; Bass and Riggio, 2006). But Stewart (2006) in a
review of the works of Burns, Bass and Avolio argues that transformational leadership is
likely to be ineffective in the total absence of a transactional relationship between a leader
and subordinate. Stewart further advocates that both styles can be combined to achieve the
desired aims and so can be seen as complementary rather than polar constructs in order to
achieve their organization’s objectives and goals.
Transformational leadership can motivate superior employee task and extra role
performance by creating a positive vision of the organization’s future, empowering
employees, and placing importance on their needs (Conger & Kanungo, 1998; Avolio and
Bass, 2002; Bass and Riggio, 2006). Zohar (2002) found out that personnel in a factory who
were exposed to transformational safety leadership had higher levels of safety compliance (as
measured by earplug use) when compared with a control group.
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Clarke and Ward (2006) also found out that transformational leadership was
positively related to employee safety participation. Transformational safety leadership exerts
the same effects on safety-specific performance, such as following rules and helping improve
sub-ordinates safety behavior, by generating motivation to achieve positive change and
prioritizing employee well-being (Judge & Piccolo, 2004).
Challenges of Transformational Safety -Specific Leadership
However, several issues remain with transformational safety-specific leadership. First,
the salience of safety as an important outcome in the presence of safety-focused leaders is
understandable; there has been long standing research (Cohen, 1977; Zohar, 1980) showing
that organizations in which leaders take an active role in promoting safety enjoy better
organizational safety records. Transformational safety-specific leadership, when used as the
sole predictor of safety outcomes may confound safety performance and transformational
leadership. The possibility remains that a safety climate (Wallace & Chen, 2006; Zohar,
2002) rather than transformational leadership behaviors per se explains variance in employee
safety performance.
Secondly, item content is shared across measures of transformational safety-specific
leadership (e.g., Barling, Loughlin, & Kelloway, 2002) and employee safety performance
(Neal, Griffin, & Hart, 2000) when predictor and criterion variables are collected from the
same source (i.e., employees), all of the scales contain derivatives of the word safety in every
item potentially inflating the relationship between predictor and criterion.
Empirical strength of Transformational Safety-Specific Leadership
In the Barling, Loughlin and Kelloway, 2002 study, the authors developed, tested, and
replicated a model in which transformational safety-specific leadership predicted
occupational injuries in 2 separate studies. Data from 174 restaurant workers (M age=26.75
years, range=15-64) were analyzed using structural equation modeling and provided strong
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support for a model whereby transformational safety-specific leadership predicted
occupational injuries through the effects of perceived safety climate, safety consciousness,
and safety-related events.
A second study replicated and extended this model with data from 164 young workers
from diverse jobs (Mean age=19.54 years, Range=14-24). Transformational safety-specific
leadership and role overload were related to occupational injuries through the effects of
perceived safety climate, safety consciousness, and safety-related events. Another study
(Mullen & Kelloway, 2009) tested the relative effects of safety specific and generalized
transformational leadership training on employee safety performance, and found an increase
in transformational safety-specific leadership behaviors in the safety-focused training group.
However, it was less clear whether there was an increase in generalized transformational
leadership in either training group, and the relationship between generalized transformational
leadership and employee safety outcomes was not reported.
Using focus groups, factor analysis, and validation instruments, Edwards, Knight,
Broome and Flynn (2010) developed and established psychometrics for the Survey of
Transformational Leadership (STL). Their study evaluated clinical directors on leadership
practices by using 214 counselors within 57 programs in four U.S. regions. Nine themes
emerged: integrity, sensible risk, demonstrates innovation, encourages innovation,
inspirational motivation, supports others, develops others, delegates tasks, and expects
excellence. Reliability for all first-order confirmatory factor analysis STL factors met or
exceeded Nunally’s (1978) recommendation of (α =.70) for newly developed scales. The
alpha coefficient (internal consistency) scores ranged from (α =.78, for Supports Others) to (α
=.97, for Inspirational Motivation). The criterion validity showed Cronbach alphas for the
validated factors ranged between (α =. 88) and (α =.94).
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Freiwald (2013) did a comprehensive investigation of the effects of leadership (ethical
aspect) on measurable safety outcomes such as safety behavior and work place related
injuries among aviation and healthcare organizations. Freiwald suggested that as the adoption
of safety management systems becomes mandatory in more areas of aviation, safety
outcomes will be measured and reported to regulatory agencies for organizations of all sizes
and types for the first time. Friewald further suggested a strong positive relationship between
ethical leadership and sub-ordinate safety behavior.
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) in an extensive study on
Safety leadership, risk management and safety performance in Spanish Firms, found out that
transformational safety leadership directly influenced employee satisfaction. The results of
the study suggested that transformational leadership transmits to the employees the idea that
their managers are really concerned about their safety and well-being in the workplace and
that leads to a reduction in workers’ complaints about working conditions, greater employee
satisfaction, and consequently, lower turnover in the organization.
Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) also found out that,
transformational safety leadership indirectly affected safety behavior via the proactive risk
management and safety outcomes via safety compliance. This result was in line with Zohar
(2002), who, using the transformational leadership model to examine safety management,
showed that leadership predicts the injury rate through the mediation of safety climate.
The Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014), in contrast, suggested
that the transactional leadership style did not have a direct effect on safety performance even
though it had a direct effect on the proactive risk management. The findings also suggest that
transactional leadership can affect safety outcomes and employee satisfaction, but this effect
is mediated by the proactive risk management which has an influence on safety participation
and safety compliance.
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Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2014) finally suggest that although
both styles are not incompatible, the study suggested that the most effective leadership style
for reducing accidents and injuries and improving employee satisfaction is transformational
leadership, because this leadership style has a direct effect on safety behavior and employee
satisfaction. Interestingly, these findings of Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás
is starkly at variance with an earlier study by Inness, Turner, Barling and Stride (2010) which
suggested that transformational leadership was not related to safety compliance and
suggested that transactional leadership may encourage safety compliance more among
personnel.
In terms of the existing methodologies for assessing leadership styles in organizations,
Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson and Denyer (2016) in an extensive review of different safety
leadership styles from existing literature found out that the majority of studies investigating
safety leadership utilized scales that provided a quantitative assessment of the leaders’
behavior from the perspective of the follower (in this case the employee). Pilbeam et al.
suggest that this is a clear limitation in understanding of safety leadership. Pilbeam et al.
argue that such methods rely on both a pre-determined articulation of leader behaviors which
may not be applicable always and rather provides a retrospective, and necessarily subjective,
perception of employees to describe leader behaviors, which is often de-contextualized.
Pilbeam et al. suggest that new research should focus directly rather than indirectly
on the leader and their actions and understanding of leadership, examine leadership ‘in the
moment’ and take account of context, including relationships with others. They argue that
may provide deeper insights into the important role of leadership in enhancing organizational
safety performance indicators, such as safety compliance and safety participation. This
position of Pilbeam et al. echoes similar suggestions by Eid, Mearns, Larsson, Laberg, &
Johnsen (2012).
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Based on the existing literature and the premise that there has to be a choice of
leadership type a researcher needs to measure within the scope of a study, transformational
leadership may suffice for this research in collegiate aviation operations. Empirical findings
support the relationship between transformational leadership and enhanced task performance
and safety behavior (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway, 1996; Zohar,
2002; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, VázquezOrdás, 2014; Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016).
These studies provide ample support of the rationale to determine the effect of
transformational leadership on the level of safety compliance and safety participation of
operations personnel such as flight students and instructors, within the collegiate aviation
environment. Safety leadership can potentially influence proactive and cost- effective
intervention in aviation operations, resulting in positive safety outcomes. It is would therefore
be insightful to explore the relationship between transformational safety leadership as
demonstrated by both senior level management and supervisory level managers in collegiate
aviation programs and the resultant safety behavior of operational personnel.
Senior Leadership Attitudes to Safety and Safety Culture Perceptions of Personnel
Within an organization, an individual’s perception of senior managers’ attitudes
toward safety has been proposed as an important predictor of the organization’s safety culture
(Zohar, 1980; Seo, Torabi, Blair & Ellis, 2004; Hall, 2006; Fogarty & Shaw, 2009). Hence,
safety culture studies have highlighted the importance of top management’s attitudes and
leadership commitment toward safety. In an empirical study, Helmreich and Merritt (2001)
surveyed pilots working at two airline companies to observe the variance in perceptions of
leadership attitudes toward safety. While 84% of pilots working at one company were
confident that top-level leadership never compromised safety, only 12% of pilots working at
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the other company believed in the leadership’s commitment to safety (Helmreich & Merritt,
2001).
The authors emphasized that leadership attitudes influenced pilots ‘attitudes regarding
safety practices and norms. Indeed, 68% of pilots working at the first company believed that
management would seriously consider their safety suggestions, compared with 19% of the
pilots working at the second company (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). The study found out that
the causal mechanism of management attitudes influence on pilot behavior could be
explained by the second company’s environment.
The study also found out that up to 88% of pilots working at the second company
believed that the management compromised safety for the sake of profit. Moreover, they
believed that high level management ignored their suggestions to improve the organization’s
safety processes. The study suggested that demoralized and cynical pilots are more likely to
deviate from safety procedures and norms (Helmreich & Merritt, 2001). In other words, pilots
develop an attitude favoring low safety standards, because it is difficult to maintain high
safety standards when perceiving high level management to have low standards.
A key indicator of senior management’s commitment to safety is the adequacy of
resources, including financial support and active involvement in safety initiatives by senior
management (Simon, 2009). Schiff (2006) suggests that a bottom-up support and
participation from operational level personnel is equally critical for the success of any safety
program. Adjekum (2014b) also posits that senior level management commitment to safety is
normally reflected in three major areas: Safety Values (SV) which are attitudes and values
regarding safety expressed, in words and actions, by senior level leadership; Safety
Fundamentals (SF) which deals with the compliance with regulated aspects of safety such as
training requirements, manuals, etc.; and Going Beyond Compliance (GBC) wherein priority
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is given to safety in the allocation of company resources (e.g., equipment, personnel time)
even though they are not required by regulations.
In a study of challenges to the success of the Safety Management System (SMS) in
aircraft maintenance organizations in Turkey, Gerede (2014) found out that SMS experts and
managers in rating the success of implementation of SMS initiatives underscored the
importance of senior management support for the SMS and a real commitment by senior
management to enhance safety. Qualitative data were collected from thirty participants
through an open-ended questionnaire. Both inductive and deductive methods were used for
the data analysis.
The study suggested that the SMS entails a cultural transformation and is likely to
bring about certain challenges because of its new and different characteristics. The study
suggested that senior management holds the major responsibility in safety assurance and are
authorized to decide on goals and objectives, and the allocation of resources in the
organization. The results also buttressed the assertion that senior management leadership
capabilities and commitment to safety play a major role in the reinforcement of a positive
safety culture.
While senior management plays a role in the emergence of problems related to a “Just
Culture”, the same senior management holds the power and resources to solve these
problems. Senior level management is also responsible for promotion of the safety initiative
in an organization, since a “visible” safety program helps to set the stage for improved
employee attitude (Transport Canada, 2008). Periodic safety related training and inspections
by top management help to convince personnel that the program is not merely administrative
program of the month, but is an item of real concern.
When personnel participate in safety initiatives, the safety program evolves into an
active force in the organization (Patankar, 2003) and these employees subconsciously
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develop the habit of planning ahead and examining the safety, production, quality, and cost
aspects of the task before them (Roughton, 2002). Although the physical safe-guarding of the
workplace is a real factor in safety, the mental attitude of the employee is the ultimate key to
avoiding incidents (Roughton, 2002).
The quality of leadership provided by senior level management personnel within
collegiate aviation programs is believed to have a significant influence on flight students and
instructors’ behaviors, as there is considerable evidence to support the causal relationship
between the leadership styles or types and the performance of subordinates (Barling &
Kelloway, 2002; Jong & Hartog, 2007).
Within collegiate aviation operations, the flight operational leadership consists of the
director of flight operations, chief flight instructors and assistant chief flight instructors.
These are the senior level management leadership that provides operational control.
Therefore, examining whether these program managers’ transformational leadership style
enhances pilots’ motivation to acceptable levels of safety behaviors may provide crucial
insights into the underlying factors linking leadership and employee behaviors.
Underlying Theories- Safety Motivation, Safety Behavior and Safety Performance
Research has shown that people’s perceptions affect their behavior. More specifically,
perception of risk affects the likelihood to exhibit certain behaviors (Cooper, 2000; Hunter,
2006; Forgaty & Shaw, 2009; Dillard, Ferrer, Ubel, & Fagerlin, 2012). Some safety
professionals strongly advocate for a focus on safety behavior modification and behavior –
based safety (BBS) within organizations implementing SMS (Brauer, 2006; Cooper, 2009).
BBS is defined as "A process that creates a safety partnership between management and
employees that continually focuses people's attentions and actions on theirs, and others, daily
safety behavior and focuses on what people do, analyzes why they do it, and then applies a
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research-supported intervention strategy to improve what people do" (Geller, 2004; Cooper,
2009).
In general, behavior-based safety techniques focus on work processes. In analyzing
work processes, the workgroup identiﬁes behaviors that are critical to safe process
performance. They measure how well the group completes safe behaviors. Measurement
typically requires observation. Analysis of performance provides feedback to the participants.
Participants also identify and resolve other process elements that impact the ability to
perform safely as part of the continuous improvement process (Brauer, 2006).
To be effective, those in the workgroup need training on hazard recognition,
evaluation, and control as well as learning how behaviors that are part of the process can
contribute to the safety of the work. The participants may need to change their approach to
how safety is handled in the process. It requires a shift from a top-down management style. It
requires broad participation and collaboration among members of a work group (Brauer,
2006; Yates, 2015).
The aim of this organizational behavior modification approach is to ensure that a
proactive safety initiative such as SMS is based upon the hierarchy of hazard identification,
and safety risk mitigation strategies. However, such behavioral modification approach should
not be used in preference to the implementation of reasonably practicable safety measures
further up the organizational hierarchy (Krause, 2005; Cooper, 2009). Generally,
interventions and strategies that aim at positively influencing the safety behavior of personnel
within an organization should also have some strong theoretical bedrock of safety motivation
that will ensure that personnel’s safety performance will meet set safety goals and objectives
(Yates, 2015).

60

Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs Theory
Theoretically there are competing schools of thought on the effects of safety behavior
and motivations on safety outcomes and performance. Abraham Maslow introduced the
Hierarchy of Needs Theory (Maslow, 1970) to explain human motivations and needs. In this
theory, Maslow proposed that all human beings are motivated by unsatisfied needs and that
certain lower factors need to be satisfied before higher needs can be satisfied. Maslow
theorized that the lower needs have to be satisfied before the next need level serves as a
motivator. Furthermore, once the lower level need has been satisfied, it no longer serves as a
motivator.
Maslow’s Hierarchy Theory underpins the essence of identifying those underlying
potential motivational factors that can enhance proactive safety behavior in collegiate
aviation programs (McLeod, 2014). Collegiate flight student's cognitive needs, which affect
their decision making process and largely safety behavior, can be enhanced if their basic
physiological needs are met.
For example, a fatigued and hungry flight student may find it difficult to focus on
flight activities, which could be a precursor to an unsafe act. Flight students need to feel
emotionally and physically safe and accepted within their programs to progress and reach
their full potential. Maslow suggests that flight students must be shown that they are valued
and respected by their instructors and flight managers in order to create a supportive and safe
flight training environment.
McGregor’s Theory X and Theory Y
Douglas McGregor postulated two theories of organization management and
employee motivation, calling them Theory X and Theory Y (McGregor, 1960). Under Theory
X, McGregor states that leadership assumes the following: Motivation occurs only at the
physiological and security levels of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs. Most people are self-
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centered and as a result, they must be closely controlled and often coerced to achieve
organizational objectives. To summarize Theory X, McGregor believed that the main source
of most employee motivation is monetary, with security as a strong second and leaders can
manage safety behavior by coercion, threats, or micromanagement (Stewarts, 2010;
Sorenson, 2015).
In Theory Y, McGregor theorizes that employees are motivated primarily at the
esteem and self-actualization levels. Almost in contrast to Theory X, leadership in Theory Y
makes the following general assumptions that personnel will be self-directed and creative to
meet their work and organizational safety objectives if they are committed to them. Personnel
will be committed to their safety and productivity objectives if rewards that address higher
needs such as self-fulfillment are in place. This particular aspect of the Theory Y has
profound implications for personnel to have “buy-in” and participate in safety programs
initiated in collegiate aviation program.
Under Theory Y, the capacity for creativity spreads throughout organizations and
most personnel can handle responsibility because creativity and ingenuity are common in the
population. Under these conditions outlined by Theory Y, personnel will seek out
responsibility and an organization can decentralize control and reduce the number of
management levels required to operate safely.
Under Theory Y, the scope of work by personnel can be broadened, which adds
variety and opportunities, while engaging employees in the decision-making process.
Personnel are allowed to set performance objectives and participate in the process of
evaluating how well they were met (Sorenson, 2015). However, the drawback in these two
theories is that neither of these approaches are optimal and the best management method in
terms of safety motivation and behavior, may lie somewhere between the two approaches
(Sorenson, 2015).
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Frederick Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory)
Another important theory that underpins safety motivation and safety behavior is the
Frederick Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory). In this theory, Herzberg
attempted to explain factors that motivate individuals through identifying and satisfying their
individual needs, desires, and the aims pursued to satisfy these desires (Hines, 1973; Neil,
2007; Greenberg, 2013). Herzberg stated that motivation can be split into two major
categories: hygiene factors and motivation factors. The Hygiene factors affect the level of
dissatisfaction but are rarely noted as creators of job satisfaction. However, if these factors
are not present or satisfied, they can demotivate a person.
Herzberg’s Hygiene factors include the following: supervision, interpersonal
relationships, physical working conditions and salary. Job dissatisfaction, under normal
circumstances, is not normally attributed to motivation factors. However, when they are
present, they serve as motivational factors. Motivation factors include achievement,
advancement, recognition and responsibility.
The drawback of this theory and implication on safety behavior is that whenever there
is shortage of motivation factors present in the work environment, personnel may focus on
other factors, such as the hygiene factors and when there are unfavorable working conditions
and production pressures under limited resources resulting in job dissatisfaction, that could be
a recipe for unsafe behaviors and possible accidents (Schultz & Schultz, 2010).
Another limitation of the two-factor theory is the relatively explicit assumption that
well motivated and satisfied personnel will exhibit better safety behavior. This assumption
might not always be the case as an individual's expectancy that a given behavior will bring a
valued outcome may determine their choice of means and the effort they will devote to these
means (Neil, 2007; Mazur, 2013; Greenberg, 2013).
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Skinner’s Operant Learning Theory
According to the Operant Learning Theory, behavior is a function of the person's
environment and can be modified by rearranging the consequences of the behavior (Skinner,
1953). According to Skinner, behavior with positively reinforcing consequences (e.g.,
increased earnings or reductions in amount of effort required to do a task) tends to increase in
frequency, whereas behavior with punishing consequences (e.g., disciplinary actions) tends to
diminish in frequency.
The implications of this theory for operational safety, especially in a flight training
environment is that personnel may have a tendency to act safely, and follow training
guidelines and safety instructions since the outcomes are positive as compared to unsafe acts,
which may have adverse consequences. In reality this assertion may not always hold true,
since personnel may not know the outcome of certain actions, especially in novel situations
and would only get to know of the outcome in hindsight. Some personnel may also engage in
some operational activities in an unsafe manner, but due to the absence of other vital precursors of accident causation, such as unsafe conditions or just plain luck, nothing adverse
happen, creating an illusion of invulnerability (Reason, 2008).
Thorndike's Reinforcement Theory
The Thorndike's Reinforcement Theory states that behavioral responses to stimuli that
are followed by a satisfactory response will be strengthened, but responses that are followed
by discomfort will be weakened (Nevin, 1999). The theory essentially postulates that
behaviors that are rewarded are often repeated, and those behaviors that are not rewarded are
less likely to occur in the future. The Reinforcement Theory looks at the relationship between
behavior and its consequences. The defining factor of reinforcement theory is, of course,
reinforcement, which can be either positive or negative.
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The first component, Positive reinforcement uses favorable consequences that
reinforce the desired behavior as the correct behavior. In terms of safety behavior, when
personnel in an organization meet safety performance targets, such as incident free
production over a period of time (a desired behavior), safety awards and recognition are
given (positive reinforcement), making it more likely for personnel to repeat that same
behavior that resulted in the positive reinforcement (Nevin, 1999; Mazur, 2013). Other
examples of positive reinforcement may include pay raises and bonuses for flight instructors
who undertake incident –free training over a period of time, promotions, safety awards and
public recognition. In collegiate aviation, leadership can give free training hours to flight
students for exemplary safety operations and behavior. The use of positive reinforcement
could increase operational productivity and improve students and department morale.
Evidence suggest that the use of rewards such special parking slots and inexpensive
household items and special recognition for safe behavior of personnel can enhance
operational productivity and safety. In a polystyrene production company, personnel earned
safety points for accident-free productive activities within a time frame and were recognized
and rewarded. This action on the part of management actually raised the productivity of that
company by 16.5 percent, lowered error rates by 40percent and lowered accident rates by
43.7 percent (Greenberg, 2013).
The other component of the theory, Negative reinforcement, also referred to as
avoidance, rewards a behavior by removing negative or undesirable consequences, which
strengthens the probability of the behavior being repeated. Negative reinforcement, or
avoidance, is used by managers to show personnel what the consequences of unacceptable
behavior will be (Nevin, 1999; Neil, 2007). The goal of Negative reinforcement is to get the
employee to avoid the unacceptable behavior. If an employee does not engage in the
unacceptable behavior, then he or she will not experience the consequence. Both positive and
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negative reinforcement have the ability to increase the likelihood of a desired behavior being
repeated. However, in reality, both positive and negative reinforcement do not always work,
and create the path for the use of two other reinforcement strategies such as punishment and
extinction (Nevin, 1999; Mazur, 2013; Greenberg, 2013).
However, it may not be reasonable to assume that generally rewards and
reinforcements may correlate with desired safety performance. Generally, not all
organizations have had success with such behavior modification programs, since there may
be other confounding variables that could influence accident causation, such as unsafe
working environment and operational and productive pressures in a resource constrained
environment (Reason, 1998; Greenberg, 2013). Such reinforcements may prove ineffective,
as in the case of a worker who is pushed by production pressures or inflexible technology to
take risks or exhibit unsafe behaviors (ICAO, 2009).
These reinforcement theories could also create a situation where personnel may feel
reluctant or may simply not report near-misses, unsafe actions and hazards perceived to be
attributable to them, due to the fear of losing out on rewards or smearing a determined
unblemished safety performance record. That state of affairs in any organization could
adversely affect a proactive safety risk management process in an SMS.
Vroom's Expectancy Theory
Whereas Maslow and Herzberg look at the relationship between internal needs and
the resulting effort expended to fulfil them, Vroom's Expectancy Theory separates effort
(which arises from motivation), performance, and outcomes and assumes that behavior
results from conscious choices among alternatives whose purpose it is to maximize pleasure
and to minimize pain (Vroom, 1964; Bandura, 1986; Greenberg, 2013). Vroom realized that
an employee's performance is based on individual factors such as personality, skills,
knowledge, experience and abilities.
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The Expectancy Theory states that effort, performance and motivation are linked in a
person's motivation and the variables Expectancy, Instrumentality and Valence are used to
account for this (Greenberg, 2013; Yates, 2015). While Maslow’s Theory and other theories
do not allow for the same degree of individuality between people. This model takes into
account individual perceptions and thus personal histories, allowing a richness of response
not obvious in Maslow, who assume that people are essentially all the same.
The Expectancy Theory has implication for both personnel and leadership in an
organization in terms of safety motivation and behavior. Personnel would change their level
of effort according to the value they place on the bonus they receive from a process and on
their perception of the strength of the links between effort and outcome (Bandura, 1986;
Greenberg, 2013). Organizational leadership should use systems that tie rewards very closely
to safety performance and leaders should ensure that the rewards provided are deserved and
wanted by the deserving personnel (Greenberg, 2013). In order to improve the effortperformance tie, leaders should engage in training to improve their capabilities and improve
their belief that added effort will in fact lead to better performance.
Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB)
Another theoretical foundation to human behavior has been proposed by Ajzen (1991;
2005) in the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB). The theory explains the psychological
aspects of employee behavior and the principal assumption of the TPB has to do with the
intentions behind any human action. Ajzen posits that intentions to perform any kind of
behavior are guided by different considerations: attitude toward behavior, subjective norm,
and perceived behavioral control. The theory postulates that individuals’ intentions regarding
any kind of behavior can be predicted with a high degree of accuracy by their attitudes
toward behavior, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control constructs. Second, the
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predicted intentions, together with perceived behavioral control, can explain variances in
actual behavior
According to Fogarty and Shaw (2009), Ajzen introduced the intention variable to
strengthen the relation between attitudes and behavior, because attitudes sometimes fail to
become behavior due to many other factors preventing individuals from converting their
attitudes into behaviors. In other words, an individual’s own attitude toward behavior,
subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control can be used to predict intentions
regarding any safety issue. Intention can in this way be used to predict actual safety behavior
Error Management, Behavior-Based Safety and Safety Compliance Enforcement
There has been an ongoing debate among safety theorist and safety professionals on
the merits and demerits of using safety behavior modifiers inclusive of disciplinary actions
and other forms of punitive actions in error managements and other forms of non-compliance
with safety procedures and regulations (Reason, 2008; Cooper, 2009; Dekker, 2014; Yates,
2015). Within an SMS, the aim of enhancing a desired safety behavior among personnel is to
build a proactive safety culture, which has one of it tenets a Just Culture that balances
accountability with learning (Dekker, 2007).
Within the framework of safety behavior modification, proponents, such as Geller
(2004; 2005), Cooper (2009), and Goetsch (2010) advocates for a Behavior Based Safety
(BBS) model that consists of seven principles, namely: intervention; identification;
identification of internal factors; motivation to behave in the desired manner; focus on the
positive consequences of appropriate behavior; application of the scientific method,
integration of information; and planned interventions to control individual behavior in an
organization.
Even though BBS interventions have been quite effective in certain organizations in
modifying safety behaviors (Cooper, 2009), advances in BBS should not lead one to forget
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that behavior is only one factor in an interrelated web of safety and accident causation and
that engineering solution rather than punitive- based compliance strategies are sometimes the
most effective (Holden, 2009). Violations, work-arounds, shortcuts, and non-compliant
behaviors are real –time challenges and important topics in modern performance –based
safety management initiatives such as SMS (Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011; ICAO, 2013).
However, some organizational theorist and safety professionals believe that punitive
actions for errors and safety infractions are justified to ensure organizational safety
compliance (Cooper, 2009; Greenberg, 2013). Inness et al. (2010) even suggest that in order
to achieve safety compliance, formal control through rewards and punishments may be more
appropriate. These proponents place the burden of causality for errors and unsafe behaviors in
organizations on human traits and actions. Proponents of the Person-Centered Safety Theory
argue that if rewards can be used to systematically encourage desirable and precisely safe
operational behavior, then punishment can be used to discourage undesirable and unsafe
behavior (Cooper, 2009).
Person-Centered Safety Theory
An early proponent of the Person-Centered Safety Theory was Heinrich and his
Domino Theory of Accident Causation, which postulates that an accident occurs only as a
result of a personal or mechanical hazard (Hollnagel, 2009; Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). The
theory emphasizes, that personal and mechanical hazards exist only through the fault of
careless persons or poorly designed or improperly maintained equipment. Faults of persons
are inherited or acquired as a result of their social environment or acquired by ancestry and
that the environment is where and how a person was raised and educated. Heinrich advocated
that the unsafe behavior of personnel or the mechanical or physical hazard should receive the
most attention. These attentions may include the use of enforcement measures such as
punishment (Holden, 2009; Inness et al., 2010; Goetsch, 2010).
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Greenberg (2013) argues that an organization should have a systematic administration
of punishment and that the unpleasant outcome of the punishment in response to an unsafe
behavior would send a signal to the personnel involved in the safety non-compliant behavior
and other personnel that such behavior will not be tolerated and will curtail future incidents.
The challenges with these practice is how an organization uses punishment to moderate
behavior and how to effectively administer punishment.
Greenberg (2013) further recommends that levels of punishment should be graduated
and commensurate with the severity of the outcome of the actions, punishments should focus
on the personnel’s actions and not on the personality of the personnel, punishment should be
consistently applied to all personnel without any form of partiality and finally the reason for
punishments should be explicitly communicated to personnel, since that help to strengthen
the previewed connection between the undesired behavior and the consequences of the
actions.
Organizational and Systems-Centered Theory
On the other extreme are those who dismiss the Person –Centered Theory in favor of
the Organizational and Systems-Centered Theory (Reason, 2008; Holden, 2009; Hollnagel,
2009). These advocates opine that accidents are caused by multiple factors and occur due to
the complex interactions of numerous work system elements, human and non-human. Some
of these advocates against the Person-Centered Theory include Reason (1998; 2000; 2008)
and Dekker (2003a; 2007; 2011; 2014), who argue strongly against the unbridled use of
punishment as a safety behavior modification tool especially in high reliability organizations
such as aviation and healthcare.
Dekker (2007; 2011) posits that punitive actions and other attempts to keep people
accountable for human errors and unsafe behaviors are predicated upon person-centered
causality, reminiscent of fellow servant and contributory negligence rules of the not-so-
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distant past. Dekker strongly makes a case that blame and punishment comes from social
cognition research on accountability and that person-centered causal attribution of work place
accidents need not involve blame. Even though quite unconventional, Dekker advocates that
punishing of personnel for unsafe behavior protects false beliefs about basically safe systems
where humans are the least reliable components. Punishment emphasizes that failures are
deviant, that they do not naturally belong in the system and rather conditions others to not get
caught next time.
Bad Apple Theory
The Bad Apple Theory of safety management “identifies bad apples (unreliable
human components) somewhere in an organization, and gets rid of them or somehow
constrains their activities” and this is what safety scholars such as Dekker (2014), Reason
(2008) and Hollnagel (2009) describe as belonging to the “old view” of human error, which
states that the system in which people work is basically safe and success is intrinsic. The “old
view” of human error according to Dekker (2014) sees the major threat to safety as the
inherent unreliability of people and that progress on safety can be made by protecting the
system from unreliable humans through selection, proceduralization, automation, training and
discipline.
Person Attribution Theory
Reason (2000; 2008) posits that the Person Attribution Theory that has blame and
punishments as some of its components and is directed mainly at reducing unwanted
variability in human behavior may have associated counter-benefits. The methods under this
Theory advocates for appealing to people’s sense of fear, writing another procedure (or
adding to existing ones), disciplinary measures, threat of litigation, retraining, naming,
blaming, and shaming.

71

Human Factors Theory
The Human Factors Theory posits that accidents are entirely the result of human error
(Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). These errors are categorized broadly as overload resulting
from a task being beyond the capability of the worker, environmental factors (noise,
distractions, etc.), internal factors (personal problems, emotional stress) and situational
factors (unclear instructions, risk level). The theory posits that human error can be the result
of inappropriate and unsafe behavior and oftentimes, undertaking a task without the requisite
training can lead to accidents and injuries. The Human Factors Theory finally propounds that
unfamiliarity with equipment and procedures and misjudging the degree of risk associated
with the task are examples of unsafe activities.
Petersen’s Theory (Accident/ Incident Theory)
The Petersen’s Theory (Accident/ Incident Theory) is basically an extension of the
Human Factors accident causation model with additional elements such as ergonomic traps,
the decision to err, and system failures (Goetsch, 2010; Yates, 2015). Petersen stated that a
decision to err by an employee may be an unconscious and based on logic, or it could be a
conscious decision. Factors such as deadlines, peer pressure, and budget factors could make a
person decide to behave in an unsafe manner. One important factor in the Petersen Model
that causes a person to make a logical decision to disregard procedures is the “Superman
Syndrome.” The Superman Syndrome leads the person to believe that he is invincible or
bulletproof, simply because “it won’t happen to me or accidents happen to others who don’t
pay attention.”
The addition of system failure to the Petersen Model is an important step in
identifying the potential for causal relationship between management decisions or
management behaviors regarding safety. System failure helps establish and solidify
management’s role in the accident prevention process. It also helps identify the avenues in
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which the system can fail, such as clearly defining areas of responsibility, inspections,
measurements, training, and orientation of employees.
In the Petersen Model, management’s role is multilayered and responsible for setting
policies, placing responsibility, training employees, following up on training and enforcement
of policies with inspections to ensure compliance. Management is also charged with
enforcing standards with corrective actions.
Challenges of Behavior-Based Safety Approach and Error Management in SMS
Other safety scholars such as Van den Hoven (2001) suggest that personnel
sometimes engage in unsafe behavior because they lack the authority to make risk-based
decisions during productive activities that they are responsible for, especially when
constrained by goals other than safety. Klien (1998) also suggests that personnel may
sometimes engage in unsafe behavior because time and other resources for making sense of a
situation are lacking, information may not be at hand or may be ambiguous, and there may be
no neutral or additional expertise to draw on.
Helander (2006), in arguing for a systems approach to errors and unsafe behaviors,
writes “the notion that the operator should be punished or personally made responsible is
unwarranted, unless of course there is a clear violation of regulations” (p.340). Woods and
Cook (1999) also argue that undesired safety behaviors and violations are sometimes adaptive
and not irrational. When seen through the lens of local rationality i.e., given what the worker
knew at the time, what was the mindset, and what were the goals, most violations appear to
be reasonable or at least understandable.
Organizational leadership is faced with two major choices in dealing with violations
and non-compliant safety behaviors. Non-compliant safety behavior can be treated as the
behaviors of bad people, and mitigated with person-centered solutions, such as enforcement
and subsequent punishments or treat such behaviors as an indicator for better design of the
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system properties that necessitate violations (DeJoy, 2005; Reason, 2008). System design
should also include support systems that keep personnel safe when they have to go outside of
protocol or work around a flawed system (Dekker, 2011; 2014).
Although many safety professionals advocate for the latter approach, the former
person-centered approach appears to dominate in organizational set-ups, including some
aviation organizations (Dekker, 2007; 2011). Some companies will fire or demote employees
who are involved in accidents due to failure to follow safety procedures in an effort to show
their commitment to safety (DeJoy, 2005).
The downside of using this type of punishment is that it creates an adversarial
relationship between personnel and management and may also stifle personnel proactivity in
participating in safety initiatives or under-report safety occurrences and near-misses for fear
of punitive action. Such a safety climate can adversely affect the implementation of an SMS
initiative by stifling both safety participation and safety compliance (Neal, Griffin, & Hart,
2000; Stolzer, Halford & Goglia, 2011).
Relationship between Pilots’ Self-Efficacy, Safety Motivation and Safety Behavior
Research suggests that people with high levels of self-efficacy have greater beliefs in
their own capabilities to achieve certain goals and that pilots with higher perceived selfefficacy are likely to better resist pressure and devote more efforts to improving their workrelated and management performance (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Individual selfefficacy has been applied as the observed predictor in the number of studies that investigate
pilots’ work-related behaviors (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993; Prinzel, 2002).
Prior research demonstrates that self-efficacy has effects on the level of motivation,
learning and performance (Schunk and Pajares, 2001). Graham and Weiner (1995), for
example, stated that self-efficacy is a consistent predictor of behavior and behavioral change.
However, self-efficacy has been noted to be a double-edged sword which may lead to the
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concern that pilots with high self-efficacy may be more likely to take dangerous short-cuts
because of overconfidence (Prinzel, 2002). Within the collegiate aviation environment, that
may be worrisome.
As part of the SMS initiatives, some of the collegiate programs have implemented
proactive data monitoring systems such as flight data monitoring (FDM) on their fleet (UND,
2012). The aim of these proactive safety tools is to capture exceedances and excursions
outside the normal flight envelopes during flight training. The data accrued are monitored and
analyzed for trends that depict exceedances. Corrective actions in terms of changes in
procedures and gaps in training methods closed. Therefore, within practical limits,
overconfidence on the parts of either students or flight instructors which may creep in due to
high self-efficacy resulting in safe flight parameters exceedances can be picked up early and
controlled.
Relationship between Safety Behavior and Safety- Related Events (SRE)
Transformational safety leadership and the resultant commitment by senior level
management to safety may enhance operational safety performance. However, there is also a
relationship between personnel safety performance indicators such as compliance with safety
regulations, and safety related events (Zohar, 2002). Safety performance involves behaviors
that directly contribute to developing a safe work environment. Therefore, behaviors that are
characteristic of safety compliance will lead to fewer safety- related events in the workplace
(Griffin & Neal, 2000). For example, personnel who comply with established safety
regulations are less likely to experience safety- related events than those who do not comply
with established safety regulations.
The relationship between safety participation and safety related events is also
examined in this study. Studies on the effect of individual risk perceptions on participation in
health and safety programs illustrate that perceived risk directly predicts participation (Cree
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& Kelloway, 1997; Goldberg, Dar-el, & Rubin, 1991). Individuals who experience close calls
or safety related events, display higher levels of safety participation (Mullen, 2004). Cree and
Kelloway (1997) suggest that exposure to workplace accidents or safety related events
strongly influence an individual’s own perception of risk so that their perceived risk increases
as exposure to the events increases.
Mullen (2004) found that perceived risks associated with a job tended to be
heightened when an individual vicariously experienced or learned about an injury that occurs
within the workplace. In such cases, an individual is at risk of becoming injured while
performing the job. In fact, workers report that a shock or close call raises safety awareness
and helps them realize the potential consequences of unsafe behavior (Mullen, 2004).
Self-reported safety behavior and safety attitudes can be an alternative to relying on
mishaps data to evaluate the effectiveness of an organization’s safety program. For example,
Thompson et al. (1998) suggested that minor workplace accidents often go unreported, yet
these events may be the best indicators of improving (or worsening) safety conditions that
might eventually lead to serious injury or safety related events.
On the flip-side, safety- related events, or close calls, resulting in the realization of the
importance of safety in the workplace can increase the likelihood that individuals would
voluntarily perform their work safely (Mullen, 2004; Zohar, 2002). These safety- related
events are a direct function of the safety climate, within the organization. The call for
increased research focused on identifying factors that are associated with safety compliance
and participation has also come from Neal and Griffin’s (2002) review of the safety climate
and safety events literature.
Findings from Neal and Griffin (2002) support the relationship between safety
climate, safety events and safety behavior. Neal and Griffin (2002) also hypothesized that
safety behavior could be defined by the underlying construct measures of safety compliance
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and safety participation. While Neal and Griffin (2002) suggested that safety climate is one of
the potential predictors of safety behavior, they further identified other potential predictors of
safety behavior as supportive leadership and conscientiousness. In a previous study, Griffin
and Neal (2000) suggested that conscientiousness predicted safety motivation, safety
compliance, and safety participation. Other studies have suggested that a key component of
conscientiousness is self-efficacy (Scwazzer & Jerusalem, 1995; Chen, 2014).
In other studies, Neal and Griffin (2006) found that perceptions of knowledge about
safety and motivation to perform work functions safely significantly influenced self-report of
task and contextual safety performance, namely safety compliance and safety participation.
For these reasons, the authors suggest that an enhanced safety climate, through SMS
implementation could be a viable predictor of safety compliance and safety participation. The
authors also suggest that safety behavior may be intrinsically associated with safety events.
Summary and Conclusions
After an extensive synthesis of literature on SMS initiatives, implementation in
aviation, transformational safety leadership, safety motivation and self-efficacy and their
potential inter-relationships, there is ample evidence that there exists some level of paucity of
literature on the inter-relationships of these variables within collegiate aviation programs in
the US. While most research has focused on the airline, maintenance and air -traffic
organizations, there have been minimal studies focused on SMS implementation in collegiate
aviation.
This apparent minimal focus may be attributed to the fact that there is presently no
regulatory requirement for aviation training organizations (ATOs) such as collegiate aviation
programs in the US to implement SMS in their operations (FAA, 2012). However most of the
existing SMS programs running in collegiate programs are basically voluntary and fledgling
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in nature, and have not reached a matured point for a systematic evaluation of the processes
and system.
The success of any SMS initiative depends on a continuous improvement and a better
understanding of front-line operational personnel’s perceptions regarding the particular safety
system their organization adopts. Previous studies verified the relationship between the
implementation of SMS and the attitudes of employees towards safety in airport operations
(Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011). It was important to replicate such studies in collegiate aviation
operations. Finally, it was insightful to have a comprehensive understanding through
structural equation models of the relationship between SMS initiatives, self-efficacy,
transformational safety leadership on safety behavior, when safety motivation was used as a
mediating variable in collegiate aviation programs.
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CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH METHOD
The intent of this concurrent triangulation mixed-methods study was to evaluate the
inter-relationships between SMS initiatives, safety leadership, safety climate, self-efficacy,
safety motivation and safety behavior in a collegiate aviation program in the US. The study
aimed at filling a gap in research on SMS initiatives in collegiate aviation programs, add to
existing literature, and establish a coherent relationship between these variables through the
use of a comprehensive concurrent triangulation approach. Another aim of this study was to
establish a proactive operational safety change and benchmark for continuous monitoring and
improvements in SMS implementations within collegiate aviation programs.
In this study, a quantitative survey instrument was used to examine the relationship
between the perceptions of collegiate aviation flight personnel, i.e., flight students including
those with certified flight instructor ratings and employed in the program on Safety
Management System (SMS) initiatives, Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL), SelfEfficacy (SE), and Self-Reported Safety Behaviors (SB) while mediating with Safety
Motivation (SM). Safety behavior was measured by Safety Compliance (SC) and Safety
Participation (SP). The various dimensions were measured using the validated scales
outlined in chapter one and Appendix A.
A hypothesized measurement model was evaluated using the data from the responses
of the sample of collegiate aviation personnel. The results were analyzed using both first –
order and second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) and Structural Equation
Modeling (SEM) to determine the strengths of relationship among the variables while
iteratively determining the quality of both the hypothesized and final measurement models
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for the interactions. The relationship between these indicators of safety and safety outcomes
(self -reported safety events) was also be explored.
Concurrently, selected senior level management personnel/process owners (Assistant
Dean, Director of Academic Research, Director of Aviation Safety, and the Director of Flight
Operation) perspective on the state of SMS initiative and implementation in the program was
assessed through semi-structured interviews (Maxwell, 2005; Glesne, 2011). The rationale
for this assessment was to provide an insight into the strategic perspective of the operational
safety state in the aviation program. Another reason for the interview was to determine if
there existed real-time perceptual safety gaps in the SMS initiative and the inter-relationship
with the other research variables from the findings of the artifact/document analysis and
students’/instructors perceptions.
The final triangulation process was to integrate the quantitative data from the survey
of respondents’ perceptions on research variables, over-arching themes emerging from
coding/nodes of semi-structured interview transcripts of selected senior management
personnel, forensic analysis of safety artifacts/documents containing aggregate data of safety
performance indicators. Some of the safety performance indicators used was the number of
confidential safety reports filed by personnel and closed reports/feedback from safety office,
attendance to safety meetings, and number of students and instructors formally trained in
SMS between the active applicant period to the active conformance stage (2012-2016) of the
SMS initiative.
Research Design
Concurrent Triangulation Mixed Method Approach
A concurrent- triangulation strategy of mixed-methods design was used to collects
both quantitative, qualitative and documented aggregate safety data concurrently. The three
databases were compared to determine if there existed convergence, divergence, or some
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combinations. This approach has been found to help in comparing and cross-validating the
multi-sourced findings. This approach generally uses separate quantitative and qualitative
methods as a means to offset the inherent weaknesses in one method with the strength of the
other (Creswell, 2009; Glesne, 2011).
The results from all the analyses were integrated during the discussion /data
interpretation phase. A side- by- side integration had the quantitative analysis done first
followed by the qualitative analysis and then the document analysis to either support or
disconfirm the quantitative results. Figure 8 shows a two-dimensional overview of the
concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach.

Figure 8. An overview of the concurrent triangulation mixed-method approach.
Methodology
Population
The study focused on the responses to a survey instruments from a random sample of
respondents enrolled in flight-related courses within a population of flight students and flight
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instructors in an accredited four-year undergraduate degree awarding collegiate aviation
program (49 CFR Part 141) of a public owned university in the Mid-Western United States
(N= 800). The aviation program also offers graduate level degrees in aviation and aerospace
sciences. The aviation program in the university has been recognized by the FAA as an
active conformant in the implementation of the voluntary SMS program. The concurrent
qualitative phase of the study involved a semi-structured interview with a purposive sample
of four senior level management personnel of the collegiate aviation program.
Sampling Procedures
Power Analysis and Sample Size Selection
Several arguments have been proposed regarding the necessary sample size of a
covariance structure model (Stevens, 2002). Boomsma and Hoogland (2001) claimed that
200 cases constitute a reliable sample size for a correct model; one in which any problem
related to power analysis is less likely to occur. On the other hand, smaller samples have also
been used in the literature, while Kline (2005) suggests that sample size estimation should be
made based on the number of parameters.
While a ratio of 10 respondents per parameter is reasonable, a ratio of 20 respondents
per parameter ensures adequate power for the analysis (Kline, 2005). Since in this study
there were 14 parameters, using the criteria outlined by Kline, an estimated sample size of
280 was determined to suffice. Normally for SEM and CFA, it is highly recommended that a
sample size of more than 200 will ensure a more reliable model (Stevens, 2002). The sample
size was estimated at any value greater than 280 (n >280).
Even though the survey instrument would ensure adequate coverage and random
chance for all the respondents, a purposive sampling strategy limited the quantitative portion
of the study to only respondents who were either enrolled in flight related courses or
employed as CFIs (exclusion criteria) in both the collegiate aviation program and contract
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program. Non-flight students, graduate students, management pilots, faculty and staff were
excluded from the survey instrument phase of this study. Data collection was purposefully
limited to a three-week period in the fall 2016 academic semester.
Procedures for Recruitment, Participation, and Data Collection
An Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval from the university was sought before
the study commenced, since the study involved human subjects. Permission was sought from
the chair of the aviation program to facilitate the emails of all flight students and flight
instructors at the university. A confidential Qualtrics® generated online survey instrument
was sent to respondent’s university issued email address.
Faculty members were also requested to post the anonymous link to the survey on
their class sites for easy access by their students. The respondents accessed the survey
through a sign -in into their university email, using their username and password. After
accessing the link to the Qualtrics® online survey, the respondents were required to digitally
agree to and sign a consent form that explained all the rights of the respondent in the study.
A respondent who agreed to the consent proceeded to answer questions in the
survey. A respondent who did not agree with the consent was logged out. Respondents who
proceeded with the survey after consent could at any time quit the survey at their own
choice, without any adverse repercussions. The completed responses were stored in a secure
online database in accordance with the security protocols required by the university and the
Institutional Review Board (IRB).
The semi-structured interviews were done face-to- face with the top-level
management personnel and audio-recorded. The interviewees were given ample notice (Two
weeks) and the questionnaire for the interview and IRB consent forms were sent to them
prior to the interview. The audio recordings were transcribed and the transcript sent to the
interviewees for authentication and validation of contents. The validated contents were then
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coded for emergent themes and classifications. The coding and classifications were done
using a combination of manual means and computer –assisted qualitative soft wares such as
the Atlasti 7®, and NVivo 11®.
Even though the ultimate value existed in the relationship between the self-reporting
of events and individual respondents’ perception of SMS, self-efficacy, transformational
safety leadership, safety motivation, and safety behavior, the safety artifacts and records of
the collegiate program assisted in the triangulation of data provided by respondents. A
formal request was made to the relevant management personnel authorized to grant access
for the release of factual aggregate safety performance data and existing safety survey results
within the program.
A forensic analysis of safety documents containing aggregate data of safety
performance indicators i.e., number of confidential safety reports filed by personnel and
closed reports/feedback from safety office, attendance to safety meetings, and SMS training
of students and instructors within the active applicant period to the active conformance stage
of the SMS initiative formed the basis of the third component of the triangulation process
(Creswell, 2009; Patankar, Brown, Sabin & Bigda-Peyton, 2012).
Demographic Details
Demographic details such as age, gender, international students’ status, flight
certificate, year group, and SMS training status was sought from respondents. The rationale
for these demographic data was to facilitate analysis and helped to understand how
demographic variables also influenced the phenomena under investigations. However, such
data was collected in accordance with the requirements of the IRB and as much as possible
no personal identifying data was collected. Due to the anonymous nature of the quantitative
survey, it was difficult to have any form of follow -up or corroborations of submitted
responses.
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Instrumentation and Operationalization of Constructs
The scales used to obtain the measures of the variables are described below. All scales
were measured using a five-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 5=strongly agree) or
(1= very rarely; 5 = very frequent). To assess the reliability of scales, which refers to a
variable or a set of indicators of a latent construct being internally consistent in their
measurements (Fields, 2009), Cronbach’s coefficient was applied with a minimum alpha
value (α= 0 .70) being considered adequate for all the results in line with social science
research (Nunally, 1978; Stevens, 2002; Fields, 2009).
Perceptions on SMS Initiative
Perceptions on the SMS initiative were measured by twenty-two items derived from
the SMS evaluation scale developed from Chen and Chen (2012), Chen (2014), and the
Transport Canada SMS assessment guide (2005). The Chen (2014) SMS scale is designed to
identify the important aspects and items for airlines to develop an effective SMS and has a
reported reliability (α = 0.95). The items were modified to reflect the scale and operational
adaptability of a collegiate aviation program.
Due to the modifications, another set of Factor Analysis (Principal Axis Factoring)
was conducted on the items. An example of an item in the scale is “The safety policy is
signed and approved by the Dean, who demonstrates a strong commitment to safety through
active and visible participation in the safety management system”. The entire survey is
attached in the Appendix A. The various dimensions that measured the multi-dimensional
construct of SMS initiative was evaluated using first-order confirmatory factor Analysis
(CFA) and a path analyses (PA)/structural equation modeling (SEM) to evolve a final
measurement model that had a good fit of the data.
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Transformational Safety Leadership
Transformational Safety Leadership (TSL) at the group level of the collegiate aviation
program measured the quality of leadership provided by supervisory flight managers such as
Chief /Assistant Chief Flight Instructors. The construct was measured by six items derived
from the Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL) developed by Edwards, Knight,
Broome and Flynn (2010). The STL is a comprehensive assessment and non-commercial
instrument for transformational leadership that can be used to inform organizational selfmonitoring and training efforts that reflects approaches to the conceptualization and
measurement of transformational practices.
The STL is available free of charge (Public Domain), reliable, valid, and examines
five core components. These include four that are traditionally conceptualized as
transformational domains (i.e., idealized influence, intellectual stimulation, inspirational
motivation, and individualized consideration), plus one that is measured less frequently
(empowerment). The instrument was validated using focus groups, factor analysis, and
validation instruments. The Survey of Transformational Leadership (STL) utilizes a thorough
and comprehensive approach, eliciting detailed information about specific leadership
behaviors.
The strength of the STL lies in the fact that it addresses adequately, some important
components (such as empowerment), which are not routinely assessed. Additionally, most
existing instruments include scales with only one or two marker items that reflect important
themes within a core component. This approach works well when assessing a global construct
of core transformational components, but is inadequate when examining components in
greater detail for self-assessment and training purposes. Furthermore, the most commonly
used and most comprehensive measures of transformational leadership (such as the
Multifactor Leadership Questionnaire; Bass & Avolio, 1995) are only available for a fee.
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Reliability for all first-order STL factors met or exceeded Nunally’s (1978)
recommendation of 0.70 for newly developed scales. The alpha coefficient to measure the
internal consistency of the scale had scores ranging from 0.78 (Supports others) to 0.97
(Inspirational Motivation). The criterion validity showed Cronbach alphas for the validation
factors ranged between 0.94 and 0.88. A five-point frequency scale ranging from (1= very
rare to 5= very frequent) was used for the assessment. An example of an item in the scale was
“The Chief Flight Instructor clearly defines the steps to reach training program goals”. The
requisite citations and acknowledgement was done.
Self-Efficacy
Self-efficacy was measured by the Generalized Self-Efficacy Scale developed by
Schwarzer and Jerusalem (1995) to assess pilots’ self-beliefs with regard to coping with a
variety of challenges. Four items in the scale were used and sample items are ‘‘I can
solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort,’’ and ‘‘It is easy for me to stick to my
aims and accomplish my goals.’’ The reported coefficient alpha was 0.86.
Safety Motivation
Safety motivation was measured with three items from Neal and Griffin (2006) which
measures the degree to which respondents regard safety as an essential part of their flight
training and professional development. Examples of items in this scale are: ‘‘I feel it is
important to maintain safety at all times,’’ and ‘‘I believe that it is important to reduce the
risk of accidents and incidents in flight operations.’’ The reported coefficient alpha for this
scale was 0.90.
Safety Behavior
Safety behavior consisting of two components i.e., safety compliance (3 items) and
safety participation (3 items) was adopted from Neal, Griffin and Hart (2000) and Neal and
Griffin (2006). Safety compliance evaluates the core tasks that pilots have to accomplish to
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maintain flight safety. An example of an item in the safety compliance scale is ‘‘I pay full
attention to the pre-flight briefing to collect sufficient data for every flight.’’ Safety
participation assesses the extent to which pilots help develop an environment that supports
safety.
Some slight adjustments were made to the items to better match the characteristics of
flight students/flight instructors and the main focus of collegiate aviation programs. An
example of an item was ‘‘I attend aviation safety programs organized in the school.’’ The
reported coefficient alpha values for safety compliance and safety participation are 0.91 and
0.84, respectively.
Safety –Related Events
Safety Events is a measure of the knowledge of respondents on the frequency of
safety occurrences in the aviation program. This was used as a gauge of the safety
performance level within the program and was corroborated with verifiable data that was
acquired during the artifact collection stage of the study and interviews with senior-level
management personnel.
A relationship was also established between respondent’s knowledge about safetyrelated events and their safety behavior. The five items for this scale was derived from the
Collegiate Aviation Perception of Safety Culture Assessment Scale (CAPSCAS) (Adjekum,
2014b). An example of an item in the scale is “Collision of aircraft with fixed ground objects
while taxing”. The reported reliability for the CAPSCAS was an alpha of 0.92.
Construct Validity of Survey Instrument and Pilot Study
A pilot study to validate the modified survey (combination of scales into a single
survey) and establish preliminary reliability was done using a convenience sample of flight
students inclusive of those who are certified flight instructors at the university. Preliminary
draft copies of the modified survey were given to a panel of three SMS subject matter experts
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(SMEs) on faculty and at the safety department to peruse and make recommendations on
construct validity and suitability for collegiate aviation safety assessment.
After the review and comments by the SMEs, the requisite amendments were done
and a target sample of fifty students and flight instructors who were enrolled in the Crew
Resources Management (CRM) course in the program beta -tested the survey online. The
rationale for using these participants from this course was due to the copious mixture of both
initial and advanced flight students, some of whom were certified flight instructors. A paper
copy of the survey was given to ten international students volunteers (South-East Asians and
Middle Eastern/Arabic) for identification of areas that may pose comprehensibility problems.
That strategy helped to identify the cultural sensitivity and adaptability of the survey
instrument.
After a period of two weeks, all the surveys were collected and descriptive statistics
(mean, standard deviations and normality) were conducted. Factor analysis was used to
cluster and determine items that loaded strongly on factors and measure the underlying latent
constructs. Reliability checks were conducted and the retained items were used in the new
survey instrument for the actual online survey for this study.
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CHAPTER V
DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Quantitative Data Analysis and Validation
Quantitative survey data was imported from the Qualtrics ® data collection software
into the SPSS ® software and analyzed. Significant statistical values were set at the 0.05
alpha levels (2-tailed) for most of the analyses unless otherwise specified. The responses
from the items in the survey were reduced using factor analysis approach and the resulting
items that loaded strongly on factors were tested for content validity and reliability of scale.
Descriptive and inferential analyses were conducted using IBM SPSS 23® and IBM
AMOS Graphics 23® soft wares. The descriptive analysis included mean, standard deviation,
standard error of the mean, normality test (kurtosis and skewness) and physical inspections of
the resultant normal distribution curves. The inferential analysis included bivariate
correlations, T-test of mean, analysis of variances (ANOVA) and testing of hypotheses using
CFA and SEM-PA.
Qualitative Data Analysis and Validation
The qualitative portion of the study was analyzed by first validating the contents of
the interviews by sending a copy of the audio files and transcribed interviews to the
interviewees for their perusal and validation of the contents. Once the interviewees had
validated the transcripts, preliminary manual coding to identify keywords, phrases and
classifications that aligned significantly with the over-arching objective of answering the
research questions and hypotheses was done. After the manual coding, qualitative coding soft
wares Atlasti 7® and Nvivo 11® were used to code the interview transcripts into themes and
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identify common trends. The results of both manual and computer aided analysis were then
compared, validated and analyzed for relationships.
Demographic Information
At the end of the response three-week period, two hundred and eighty-two (n =282)
responses were completed beyond the consent page and used for analysis. Two hundred and
forty-seven- male (n= 247) representing 87.6% and thirty -five female (n=35) representing
12.4% of the total respondents’ submitted useable data for analysis. The overall online survey
response rate was about 35 % which is adequate for most internal online surveys (Tse-Hua &
Xitao, 2009). Twenty-five responses (n=25) were deleted because the respondents did not go
beyond the consent page and that made the data unusable.
In terms of the international students’ enrollment status, there were two-hundred and
fifty-one respondents (89.0%) identified as domestic US students as compared to thirty -one
who were international students (11.0%). One hundred and eighty-three respondents (64.9%)
stated that they have undergone formal SMS training while ninety-nine (35.1%) responded in
the negative. In terms of year groups there were thirty -two freshmen (11.3%), forty-nine
sophomores (17.4%), fifty-six juniors (19.9%) and one -hundred and forty-five seniors
(51.4%). The respondents comprised of four flight certification groupings of forty-two preprivate respondents (13.9%), seventy-two private pilot certificate respondents (25.5%),
eighty-two commercial certificate respondents (29.1%) and eighty-six certified flight
instructors (31.5%). Table 1 and Table 2 show the demographic distribution.
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Table 1. Demographic variables of Gender, Enrollment Status, and Educational Level Group.
Variable

Value

Percentages (%)

Male

247

87.6

Female

35

12.4

Total

282

100.0

Domestic

251

89.0

International

31

11.0

Total

282

100.0

Freshmen

32

11.4

Sophomore

49

17.4

Junior

56

19.8

Senior

145

51.4

Total

282

100.0

Gender

Enrolment Status

Educational Level

Note. Percentages are approximate values.
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Table 2. Demographic Variables of Flight Certificates, Age Groups and SMS Training.
Variables

Values

Percentages (100%)

Pre-Private

42

13.9

Private

72

25.5

Commercial

82

29.1

Certified Flight Instructor

86

31.5

Total

282

100.0

17-21

106

37.6

22-26

143

50.7

27-31

19

6.7

Others

14

5.0

Total

282

100.0

Yes

183

64.9

No

99

35.1

Total

282

100.0

Flight Certificate

Age Group

SMS Training

Note. Percentages are approximate values.

Question One
What are the factors that measure the latent construct of SMS initiative?
An Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) (Principal Axis Factoring) was conducted on
the SMS initiative scale using a varimax rotation. An EFA is a statistical method used to find
a small set of unobserved variables (also called latent variables, or factors) which may
account for the covariance among a larger set of observed variables (Steven, 2002). A factor
is an unobservable variable that is assumed to influence observed variables. Items with strong
loading on factors were extracted from each set of items in the subscales.
Strongly loaded items on the factors were identified after the rotation and two factors
emerged out of SMS Initiative data. The two factors were identified using the factor loadings
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and the scree plot of the SPSS® output. The scree plot helped to visually verify and confirm
the number of factors. The two factors that loaded separately were re-designated as SMS
policy implementation (SMSPol.Imp) and SMS process engagement (SMSPro.Eng).
Seventeen items loaded to SMSPol.Imp and five items loaded to SMSPro.Eng. Five items
were dropped due to low loadings and most of those items were related to emergency
response planning. The cut-off thresholds for the identified factors were any value greater
than 0.5 and Eigen values greater than 1 was adopted to avoid ambiguity.
The two factors SMSPol.Imp and SMSPro.Eng explained about 46% percent of the
variance in the initial Eigen values determined and are shown in Table 4. The SMSPol.Imp
denotes the actual implementation practices and strategies by the organizational leadership to
ensure the effectiveness of the SMS initiative while the SMSPro.Eng specifies the degree of
involvement and acceptance of organizational personnel towards the SMS initiative
processes.
The rotated factor loadings, scree plot and factor loading matrix in three dimensions
are shown in Appendix C. Internal consistency and reliability of the scales were determined
with the Cronbach’s Alpha test in the SPSS 23® software package and pre-determined
internal consistency baseline of an alpha (α) of .70 and above was used as a benchmark for
high internal consistency as recommended by both Stevens (2002) and Fields (2009).
All the items in the various scales showed good reliability above the .70 threshold and
the descriptive statistics on the summed items in each scale were conducted. The results were
determined to be consistent with the assumptions of normally distributed data. The
assumption of normality was confirmed based on histograms with normality plot. The
kurtosis and skewness values of the descriptive statistics tables were in the acceptable range
of -1 to +1. The results indicate that safety compliance had the highest mean scores on a five
point Likert-scale (M= 4.25, SD= .589) and the lowest score was awareness of involvement
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in a safety-related events (M= 2.57, SD = 1.007). The neutral point was 3 and any value
above that was considered desirable. Details of the sample size, mean, Standard Deviation
(SD), reliability and variances explained are shown in Table 3 and Figure 9.
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Mean Likert Score ( n= 282)
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Figure 9. Mean Likert Scores for all the Research Variables.
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA)
A first-order confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was conducted on all the items
describing the constructs SE, SM, SC, SP, TSL and SEV. Additionally, the CFA was used to
analyse the validity of these scales using a structural equation model -path analysis (SEMPA) techniques. A CFA allows researchers to test hypotheses about a particular factor
structure (e.g., factor loading between the first factor and first observed variable is zero).
Unlike an EFA, a CFA produces several goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the model but
do not calculate factor scores (Brown, 2006). SPSS AMOS 23® software was used to
evaluate the measurement models and determine the factor loadings. Details of the estimates
for MLE, S.E., C.R., p-value and standardized regression weights (β) are shown in Table 4.
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Study Variables using CFA.
Estimate

S.E.

C.R.

P

β

SE 1 <---

Self-Efficacy

.720

.057

12.664

*** .67

SE 2 <---

Self-Efficacy

.667

.055

12.173

*** .85

SE 3 <---

Self-Efficacy

.641

.050

12.747

*** .83

SM 1 <---

Safety Motivation

.610

.045

13.484

*** .81

SM 2 <---

Safety Motivation

.720

.046

15.672

*** .90

SM 3 <---

Safety Motivation

.647

.047

13.868

*** .83

SC 1 <---

Safety Compliance .648

.045

14.388

*** .85

SC 2 <---

Safety Compliance .642

.046

13.848

*** .83

SC 3 <---

Safety Compliance .654

.045

14.606

*** .86

SP 1 <---

Safe Part.

.673

.060

11.191

*** .74

SP 3 <---

Safe Part.

.734

.074

9.918

*** .94

SP 2 <---

Safe Part.

.922

.063

14.593

*** .66

TSL1 <---

Trans.SafetyLeader. .799

.059

13.488

*** .81

TSL4 <---

Trans.SafetyLeader. .770

.052

14.828

*** .80

TSL3 <---

Trans.SafetyLeader. .782

.059

13.190

*** .86

TSL5 <---

Trans.SafetyLeader. .751

.056

13.381

*** .80

SEV1 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents .950

.078

12.193

*** .75

SEV3 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents 1.021

.073

14.080

*** .89

SEV2 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents 1.027

.065

15.785

*** .83

SEV4 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents .816

.063

12.986

*** .78

SEV5 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents 1.100

.089

12.290

*** .75
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Question Two
What are the strengths of the relationship between SMS initiative, transformational
safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the outcome variable safety behavior
measured by safety compliance and safety participation?
A Pearson’s bivariate test of correlations was used to establish the strengths of
relationship between SMS initiative (SMS policy implementation and SMS process
engagement), transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, safety motivation and the
outcome variable safety behavior measured by safety compliance and safety participation.
This analysis was conducted, to find out variables that were linearly related, and could
potentially become viable predictors in the subsequent confirmatory factor analysis and SEM.
The results indicate that the highest statistically significant correlation existed
between SMS policy implementation and self-efficacy [r (282) = .56, p < .01 (2T)] and safety
participation and safety compliance [r (282) = .56, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS policy implementation
and safety compliance had significant correlation [r (282) = .50, p < .01 (2T)] and selfefficacy and safety compliance had significant correlations [r (282) = .49, p < .01 (2T)].
The results suggested that safety motivation and SMS policy implementation had
significant correlation [r (282) = .45, p < .01 (2T)] and self-efficacy and safety participation
were also statistically correlated [r (282) = .38, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS process engagement and
safety participation were significantly correlated [r (282) = .36, p < .01 (2T)] and SMS policy
implementation and safety participation were also significantly correlated [r (282) = .35, p <
.01 (2T)].
Safety participation and safety motivation also had significant correlation [r (282) =
.34, p < .01 (2T)] and self-efficacy and safety motivation were significantly correlated [r
(282) = .34, p < .01 (2T)]. SMS process engagement and safety motivation had significant
correlation [r (282) = .12, p < .05 (2T)] and SMS process engagement and safety compliance
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were significantly correlated [r (282) = .12, p < .05 (2T)]. Finally, there was a significant
negative correlation between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation [r
(282) = -.17, p < .01 (2T)]. Details of results are shown in Table 5.
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Question Three
What is the effectiveness of a proposed measurement model as compared to that of a
final measurement model that assesses the relationships between SMS initiative,
transformational safety leadership, self-efficacy, and the outcome variable safety behavior
measured by safety compliance and safety participation, when mediated by safety
motivation?
The use of exploratory factor analysis increased the number of constructs for the
initial proposed measurement model from the initial seven to eight accounting for the
splitting of SMS Initiative into two factors namely SMS policy implementation
(SMSPol.Imp) and SMS process engagement (SMSPro.Eng). In order to assess the proposed
measurement models, the covariance matrix of the variables served as the input to the
maximum likelihood estimation procedures of IBM SPSS® Amos version 23.
A large class of omnibus tests exists for assessing how well a model matches an
observed data, and the chi-squared (χ2) is a classic goodness-of-fit measure to determine
overall model fit. However, the chi-squared is sensitive to sample size, and it becomes
difficult to retain the null hypothesis as the number of cases increases (Kline, 2005). The χ2
test may also be invalid when distributional assumptions are violated, leading to the rejection
of good models or the retention of bad ones (Steven, 2002; Brown, 2006).
Another commonly reported statistic is the Root Mean Square Error of
Approximation (RMSEA). A recommended value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the
model in relation to the degrees of freedom (Brown, 2006). Another test statistics is the
Comparative Fit Index (CFI) that evaluates the fit of a user-specified solution in relation to a
more restricted, nested baseline model, in which the covariance among all input indicators are
fixed to zero or no relationship among variables is posited (Brown, 2006, p.86). The fit index
CFI ranges from 0, for a poor fit, to 1 for a good fit. Finally, the Tucker-Lewis Index (TLI) is
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another index for comparative fit that “includes a penalty function for adding freely estimated
parameters” (Brown, 2006, p. 85). According to Brown (2006), TLI may be interpreted in a
similar fashion as CFI, but can have a value outside of the range of 0 to 1.
Hu and Bentler (1999) provided rules of thumb for deciding which statistics to report
and choosing cut-off values for declaring significance. When RMSEA values are .05 or
below, and CFI and TLI are .95 or greater, the model may have a reasonably good fit.
Therefore, it is recommended to not only report χ2 but RMSEA and CFI/TLI. In the case of
the chi-squared goodness of fit, if the appropriate distributional assumptions are met and the
specified model is correct, then the values of the p-values is the approximate probability of a
chi-square statistic. The proposed measurement (fully mediated) model for the research and
SEM-PA analysis is shown in Figure 10.
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After the preliminary analysis was done using AMOS, the fully mediated model failed
to produce any good or acceptable fit, as evidenced by the fit indices: CMIN = 376.458; df =
14; P = .000; TLI = .137; CFI = .425; PNFI = .281; RMSEA = .304. The Modification indices
(MI) in AMOS suggested major modifications produce a more adequate fit for the model.
The substantial changes that were recommended to ensure an adequate fit were done in
incremental steps and are as follows:
a) Direct path between TSL and SMSPol.Imp.
b) Covariant path from SMSPol.Imp and SE.
c) Covariant path from SMSPro.Eng to SMSPol.Imp.
d) Removal of direct path from SMSPol.Imp and SP.
However, when the analysis was re-run the direct path from TSL to SMSPol.Imp was
found to produce additional modifications and a non-significant path coefficient. The direct
path was then removed and a new analysis was re-run based on the first model and adding of
covariant path from SMSPol.Imp and TSL. The resulting model was better than the initial
model but did not produce good fit as shown by the fit indices: CMIN = 62.681; P= .000; df =
4; TLI = .336; CFI = .873; PNFI =.125; RMSEA = .228. Figure 11 shows the new model
after the iteration.
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The next set of iteration to the model was done based on the recommendations from
the MI and the theoretical consideration of getting a model that will address the research
questions. Another covariant path was added between SMSPro.Eng and SE; SC and SP. The
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MI also recommended the removal of the direct path from TSL to SC to improve the fit. The
analysis was re-run and the new fit indices showed good fit: CMIN = 3.829; df = 3; P = .28;
TLI = .987; CFI = .998; PNFI = .143; RMSEA = .031. Figure 12 shows the emergent
measurement model.
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The measurement model was further improved by a recommendation from the MI for
a covariant path between TSL and SMSPro.Eng. The covariant path was added between TSL
and SMSPro.Eng and the sum of these modifications yielded the highest incremental
improvement to the model fit. The details of the fit index are: CMIN = 2.473; df = 2; P =
.290; TLI = .999; CFI = .989; PNFI = .095; RMSEA = .029. Figure 13 shows the final
measurement model with the best fit for the data and Figure 14 shows the standardized
regression weights and significance levels. Details of all the goodness-of-fit indices are
shown in Table 6 and Table 7 provides a summary of the maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE), standard error (SE), critical ratios (CR), p-values, estimated of effect sizes and
hypotheses of the final measurement model with best goodness-of-fit.
Table 6. Goodness-of-fit Estimates for various Measurement Models

Model

Chisquare df
(Х2)

P

Fully Mediated Model 1

376.459 14

PNFI

RMSEA LO 90 HI 90

.000 .137 .425

.281

.304

.277

.330

Partially Mediated Model 2 62.681 4

.000 .336 .876

.166

.228

.181

.280

Partially Mediated Model 3 3.829

3

.280 .987 .998

.143

.031

.000

.110

Final Best-fit Model 4

1

.285 .998 .991

.067

.026

.000

.189

1.141

TLI CFI
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Hypothesis Testing
The study hypothesized that there existed a relationship between SMS initiative and
safety behavior (safety compliance and safety participation). This study hypothesized that
safety motivation will mediate the relationship between SMS initiative and pilots’ safety
behaviors (safety compliance and safety participation). The construct Safety Management
System initiative was further split in to two underlying factors (SMS policy implementation
and SMS process engagement) using factor analysis. Hypotheses 1 to 16 were tested using
the final measurement model obtained from the SEM-PA.
Hypothesis 1. The first hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’
perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS initiative and safety motivation. The
results indicated that the relationship between SMS policy implementation and safety
motivation was statistically significant (β= .360; SE = .047; C.R. = 5.644; p = .000), and
supported the hypothesis. The coefficient of the direct path was .360 and indicates a medium
to large effect. There was no coefficient for the mediated path.
However, the results indicated that the relationship between SMS process engagement
and safety motivation was not statistically significant (β= .020; SE = .027; C.R. = .377; p =
.706). The final measurement model only supported the path that connects SMS policy and
safety motivation. There was no path for SMS process engagement and safety motivation in
the final measurement model. The overall results indicated that the relationship between SMS
Initiative and safety motivation was partially supported within the study population.
Hypothesis 2. The hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’
perceptions on SMS initiative and their safety compliance. The results indicated that the
relationship between the SMS policy implementation and safety compliance was statistically
significant (β= .191; SE = .050; C.R. = 3.486; p = .000). The coefficients of the direct path
were .191 and the mediated path was .103 yielding a total effect of .294.
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The relationship between SMS process engagement and safety compliance was not
statistically significant (β= -.001; SE = .030; C.R. = -.030; p = .976). The results suggested
that the model only supported the relational pathway between SMS policy implementation
and safety compliance within the study population. The overall results indicated that the
relationship between SMS initiative and safety compliance was partially supported within the
study population.
Hypothesis 3. The hypothesis tested the relationship between respondents’
perceptions on SMS initiative and their safety participation. The results indicated that the
relationship between the SMS process engagement and safety participation was statistically
significant (β= .290; SE = .046; C.R. = 5.631; p = .000). The coefficients of the direct path
were .290 and the mediated path was .005 yielding a total effect of .295.
The results support the hypothesis that there exist a positive relationship between
SMS process engagement and safety participation and the total effect was small to medium.
The model however did not support any relational path between SMS policy implementation
and safety participation. The net effect was that the hypothesis about the relationship between
SMS initiative and safety participation was partially supported.
Hypothesis 4. The hypothesis stated that respondents’ safety motivation mediated the
relationship between perceptions of their collegiate SMS initiative and safety compliance.
The results indicated safety motivation significantly mediated the path between SMS policy
implementation and safety compliance even though the effect coefficient was relatively small
(.103). There was no significant relationship between SMS process engagement and safety
compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The overall effect was that the hypothesis
was partially supported.
Hypothesis 5. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety motivation mediated the
relationship between the perceptions of their collegiate SMS initiative and safety
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participation. The results suggested that safety motivation significantly mediated the
relationships between SMS process engagement and safety participation with a negligible
effect (.005) while there was no mediational pathway between SMS policy implementation
and safety participation by safety motivation. The results suggest that the hypothesis was
weakly supported.
Hypothesis 6. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was
related to safety motivation and the results indicated that there was a significant relationship
between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation at the .05 significant level
(β= -.129; SE = .020; C.R. = -2.457; p = .014). The results suggested a small negative effect
(-.129) in the relationship. The hypothesis was supported among the study population.
Hypothesis 7. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was
related to safety compliance. The final model did not have any relational pathway between
the two variables and the hypothesis was not supported among the study population.
Hypothesis 8. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was
related to safety participation. The results suggested that there was a significant relationship
between transformational safety leadership and safety participation (β= .110; SE = .031; C.R.
= 2.385; p = .000). The direct effect coefficient was .080 and the overall effect was .110. The
hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis 9. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was
related to safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that
there was no relational path in the final model and the hypothesis was not supported within
the study population.
Hypothesis10. The hypothesis stated that transformational safety leadership was
related to safety participation when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that
there was a significant relationship between transformational safety leadership and safety
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participation (β= .110; SE = .031; C.R. = 2.385; p = .000) when mediated by safety
motivation. The mediated effect coefficient was -.030 and the overall effect was .110. The
hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis11. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was
related with safety motivation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant
relationship between self-efficacy and safety motivation at the .05 significant level (β= .133;
SE = .045; C.R. = 2.087; p = .037). The total effect coefficient was .133 and the hypothesis
was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis12. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was
related with safety compliance. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant
relationship between self-efficacy and safety compliance (β= .289; SE = .050; C.R. = 5.109; p
= .000). The direct effect coefficient was .289 and the total effect was .410. The hypothesis
was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis13. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was
related with safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically
significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .256; SE = .068;
C.R. = 4.704; p = .000). The direct effect coefficient was .287 and the hypothesis was
supported within the study population.
Hypothesis14. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ perceived self-efficacy was
related with safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggest that
there existed a statistically significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety
compliance (β= .289; SE = .050; C.R. = 5.109; p = .000) at indirect (mediated) effect
coefficient was .13. The hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis15. The hypothesis stated that self-efficacy was related to safety
participation when mediated by safety motivation. The results suggested that there was a
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significant relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .256; SE = .068;
C.R. = 4.704; p = .000) and the mediated (indirect) effect coefficient was .031. The
hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Hypothesis16. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety motivation was related
to safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant
relationship between self-efficacy and safety participation (β= .231; SE = .096; C.R. = 4.236;
p = .000). The total effect coefficient was .231 and the hypothesis was supported within the
study population.
Hypothesis17. The hypothesis stated that safety motivation was related to safety
compliance. The results suggested that there was a significant relationship between safety
motivation and safety compliance (β= .288; SE = .065; C.R. = 5.449; p = .000) and direct
effect coefficient was .288. The hypothesis was supported within the study population.
Question Four
What are the strengths of the relationship between Safety behavior (Safety
participation and Safety compliance) and Safety-related events?
A mediation analysis was performed using the Baron and Kenny (1986) causal-step
approach and the Preacher and Hayes (2008) bootstrapped confidence interval for ab indirect
effect procedure using the SPSS AMOS® 23 software package. The path analysis helped to
establish predictive causal path and relationships between safety behavior and safety-related
events. The null hypothesis was that safety- related events will not have an effect on safety
participation when mediated by safety compliance within the SMS initiative of a collegiate
aviation program.
The path models also helped to determine the causal path coefficients for the variables
under investigations. The maximum likelihood estimates, standardized regression weights,
critical ratios, total, direct and indirect effects were determined. Finally, the p-value was also
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determined to find out whether the hypothesis under examination was supported. A
preliminary data screening suggested that there were no serious violations of the assumptions
of linearity or normality. All the coefficients reported are standardized and the statistical
significance criterion was .05 (two-tailed). The results from this analysis were used to test
hypothesis 18, 19 and 20.
Hypothesis18. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance was related
with safety participation. The results suggest that there existed a statistically significant
relationship between safety compliance and safety participation within the study population
(β= .83; SE = .041; C.R. = 20.209; p = .000). The direct effect of safety compliance on safety
participation was 0.83 which suggest a large effect. The result indicated a failure to accept the
null hypothesis in favor of the alternate hypothesis.
Hypothesis19. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance was related
with safety participation when mediated by an awareness of safety -related events. The results
suggest that there was no statistically significant mediational path between safety compliance
and safety participation when mediated by an awareness of safety-related events (β= .20; SE
= .042; C.R. = .167 p = .867). The results indicate a failure to reject the null hypothesis in
favor of an alternate.
Hypothesis20. The hypothesis tested how respondents’ safety compliance when there
is an awareness of safety -related events. The results suggest that there existed a statistically
significant relationship between safety compliance and safety-related events (β= .32; SE =
.068; C.R. = 4.847; p = .000). The direct effect was 0.32 and the results suggest a small to
medium effect. Details of the path estimates for the interactions between SC, SP and SEV
and the causal model are shown in Table 8 and Figure 15 respectively. A summary of all the
result of research hypotheses tested in questions three and four are shown in Table 9.

115

Table 8. Path Estimates for Interactions between SC,SP and SEV.
Null
Interactions

MLE S.E. C.R.

β Direct Indirect
Effect Effect

Total
Effect

P

Hypothesis

SC

<--- SEV .329 .068 4.847 .32 .320

-

.320

***

Reject

SP

<--- SEV .007 .042 .167 .20 .007

.265

.272

.867

Accept

SP

<--- SC

-

.828

***

Reject

.825 .041 20.209 .83 .828

Figure 15. SEM-PA of relationship between SP, SC and SEV.
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Table 9. A summary of all the result of research hypotheses tested.
Hypothesis

Results

H1A: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS policy
implementation are related to their safety motivation.

Supported

H1B: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation program SMS process
engagement are related to their safety motivation.

Not
Supported

H2A: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS policy implementation
are related with to safety compliance.

Supported

H2B: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS process engagement are
related with to safety compliance.

Not
Supported

H3A: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS policy implementation
are related with to safety participation.

Not
Supported

H3B: Pilots’ perceptions of their collegiate aviation SMS process engagement are
related with to safety participation.

Supported

H4A: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions
of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety compliance.

Supported

H4B: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions
of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety compliance.

Not
Supported

H5A: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions
of their collegiate SMS policy implementation and safety participation.

Supported

H5B: Pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship between their perceptions
of their collegiate SMS process engagement and safety participation.

Not
Supported

H6: Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related
to pilot’s safety motivation.

Supported

H7. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related
to pilot’s safety compliance.

Not
Supported

H8. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is related
to pilot’s safety participation.

Supported
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Table 9. Cont.
Hypothesis

Results

H9. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is
related to pilot’s safety compliance when mediated by safety motivation.

Not
Supported

H10. Collegiate aviation program transformational safety leadership style is
related to pilot’s safety participation when mediated by safety motivation.

Supported

H11: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related with their
safety motivation.

Supported

H12: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their
safety compliance.

Supported

H13: Collegiate aviation pilots’ perceived self-efficacy is related to their
safety participation.

Supported

H14: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship
between perceived self-efficacy and safety compliance.

Supported

H15: Collegiate aviation pilots’ safety motivation mediates the relationship
between perceived self-efficacy and safety participation.

Supported

H16: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety motivation is related to safety participation.

H17: Collegiate aviation pilot’s motivation is related to safety compliance.

H18: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation.

Supported

Supported

Supported

H19: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety participation
when mediated by safety –related events.

Not
Supported

H20: Collegiate aviation pilot’s safety compliance is related to safety –related
events.

Supported
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Question Five
What are the differences in perceptions among the demographic variables (years in
program, age group, SMS training status, and flight certification) on safety behavior and
self-reported safety events?
A one-way between-S ANOVA was done to compare the mean scores on perceptions
on safety compliance among age brackets in the flight program. An examination of a
histogram of scores of respondent on safety compliance was approximately normally
distributed with no extreme outliers. Prior to the analysis, the Levene test for homogeneity of
variance was used to examine whether there were serious violations of the homogeneity of
variance assumption across groups, but no significant violation was found: F (3, 278) = .112,
p = .953. The overall F-value for the one-way ANOVA was not statistically significant, F (3,
278) = 1.740, p =. 159. There were also no significant differences in the mean scores on
safety participation among the age brackets, F (3, 278) = 2.379, p =.070 and the differences
in the mean scores on safety -related events among the age groups, F (3, 278) = 2.216, p
=.087.
There were also no significant differences in mean scores on safety- related event
among flight certification groups, F (3, 278) = 1.504, p = .214. However, there was
significant statistical differences among the flight certificate groups in terms of mean scores
on safety compliance, F (3, 278) = 4.965, p = .002 (2T). A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test
revealed significant differences between the mean scores of pre-private students (M=4.05,
S.D =.578) and certified flight instructors (CFI) who had a mean value of (M= 4.44, S.D =
.479).
The results suggest the CFI group had a slightly higher level of safety compliance
than the pre-private /student pilot certificate holders. There were also significant differences
in the mean scores on safety participation in terms of flight certification, F (3, 278) = 4.911, p
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=. 002 (2-Tail). A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test revealed significant differences between
the mean scores of pre-private students (M=3.61, S.D =.807) and CFI who had a mean value
of (M= 4.03, S.D = .695).
In terms of the academic year groups, there was significant differences in mean scores
of safety compliance, F (3, 278) = 3.047, p =. 029 (2-Tail). The differences in scores were
between the seniors (M=4.32, S.D =.593) and the freshmen (M=4.0, S.D =.598) and shows
that relatively seniors had higher safety compliance than freshmen. There was statistical
significance in the differences in mean score on safety participation F (3, 278) = 3.114, p =.
027 (2-Tail).
A Bonferroni-Tukey post-hoc test showed that seniors (M=3.86, S.D =.762)
significantly had a relatively higher participation in safety activities than juniors (M=3.56,
S.D =.869). Finally, there was statistical significance in terms of mean scores on awareness
and involvement in safety-related events F (3, 278) = 3.273, p =. 022 (2-Tail). A BonferroniTukey post-hoc test showed that seniors (M=2.70, S.D =1.050) significantly were more aware
or involved in safety -related events than juniors (M=2.18, S.D =.947).
An independent t-test of mean was done to determine if there were any differences in
the mean scores on safety compliance, safety participation and safety -related event between
respondents who had been formally trained in SMS and those who had not. The results
showed there were no statistically significant differences in mean scores on safety
compliance [t (280) =1.63, p = .097, two-tail] among those trained in SMS and those who
have not. The results also indicate no statistical significance in mean scores on safety
participation [t (280) =1.45, p = .149, two-tail] and safety-related events [t (280) = .392, p =
.695, two-tail].
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Semi –Structured Interviews
The over-arching purpose of questions posed to the selected senior management
personnel during the semi-structured interview were to find out the leadership perspective on
the level of implementation of the SMS initiative and current safety performance of the
collegiate aviation program. The following themes with underlying codes emerged after the
qualitative analysis using both manual and computer –aided methods. Some direct quotes
from the interviewees are also added to corroborate the results which suggest the following:
Leadership
There was unanimous agreement among the top level management personnel
interviewed that leadership at the highest level (The Dean), who happens to be the
accountable executive for the SMS initiative was and continues to be very instrumental in
getting the initiative on a very strong pedestal. The results suggest that the Dean has provided
the vision, resources and transformational leadership to both start and sustain the SMS
initiative.
Commitment and Acceptance. The results also suggest that leadership at all levels
within the organization (Top-level and Supervisory) “bought –in” completely to the initiative
and continue to fully support the initiative. The acceptance of the SMS at all levels of
leadership has also evolved a higher level of commitment to the objectives and goals of the
SMS initiative. One of the top level management personnel, who is also a process owners
intimated that at the initial stages of the SMS implementation, some of the top leadership
could not fully understand the concept due to the technical nature of SMS and lack of
literature.
One of the top management personnel interviewed who was a major player in the
SMS initiative stated that even though there was acceptance among the top level
management, some did not fully make it a priority and were a bit reluctant to accept the
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change from the status quo that SMS presented. The top level manager further stated that
these process owners and managers wanted the benefits of SMS, however, they continued to
be content with the status quo at times so getting them to buy in to the SMS concepts was
sometimes a little bit more difficult than would have been expected. Below is a direct quote
from this top level management person:
As far as the process managers go, they accepted the SMS process; however, most of
them were happy to let a small core people do all of the work. And it turned out to be
a situation where about 10 percent of the people did 90 percent of the work on the
SMS development. So to kind of summarize that first question, I think everyone was
very, very supportive.
However, not everyone made it a priority; not everyone was involved. And
again, at times, I think there are still process owners and managers that sometimes
appear to be happy with the status quo of how things were done in the past, relative to
how things should be done as it relates to SMS.
The opinions of the above mentioned top level management personnel was however
divergent from that of another top level management personnel who intimated that most
process owners and managers accepted the challenge and fully supported the Dean’s effort to
implement the SMS initiative by using effective communication and cooperation to rally
support. One of the direct quotes from this top level management personnel/ process owner
clearly throws light on the level of commitment and acceptance from the top:
The top level leadership bought in very early to the SMS program. However, I do
think that a lot of people, leadership included, didn’t quite understand what an SMS
program’s all about and how involved it was. But from the beginning, the higher-ups,
the Dean, the accountable executive for the program; you know, it was very clear that
this was the direction they wanted to go. And they did go through, the FAA came in
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and did several days of training with them, and they sat through all that. So
leadership played a big role, because without them this would have never gotten off
the ground. It would have just been another science project that didn’t amount to
much.
Resource Provision. The results suggest that top level management; specifically, the
accountable executive provided resources at every phase of the SMS initiative and continues
to resource the program. A process owner stated that SMS like any organizational initiative
that aims to transform safety can be a costly process in terms of financial, material and
human capital during the implementation phases and it was refreshing that the accountable
executive fully provided adequate resources necessary to get the program running.
Another process owner directly involved with the SMS initiative intimated that the
SMS required comprehensive organizational adjustments in operational processes and
systems in an effort to align actual performance with desired safety performance benchmarks.
The process owner suggested that due to these adjustments, there were some hesitancy among
some process owners to allocate human resources from their departments to be part of the
initial implementation team because that might affect their productive capabilities. The
process owner however alluded to the fact that because there was a strong backing from the
accountable executive, it served as a leverage to get these process owners to allocate the
require human resources from their departments to be part of the initial implementing team.
The results show that top level management provided initial indoctrination training
for management personnel through the use of subject matter experts (SME) from the SMS
program office of the FAA. The top level management also allocated funding for two faculty
members and one process owner to be trained as subject matter experts. These indigenous
SMS subsequently worked full time implementing the SMS initiative. These SME performed
the preliminary and detailed GAP analysis as part of the active applicant phase.
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Another top level leadership personnel /process owner interviewed intimated that
even though the SMS initiative has been extensive, expensive and time consuming there has
been constant provision of adequate resources to sustain the initiative. Finally, one of the top
level management personnel/process owners was of the opinion that the proactive safety
resource such as the flight data monitoring (FDM) program established has provided a datadriven approach to the SMS initiative. An active quote from the top level management
personnel succinctly provides clarity on the support from top level leadership:
We talked about it at some of our leadership meetings. And the Dean was always 100
percent, let’s do this. We’ll find the money if it’s going to cost extra money. This is
something that we’ll ensure that what we say, our safety is number one, and generally
all organizations say that; but this is putting our effort and our money behind it. And
so I know that was – from the Dean’s office, I know it was a high priority and never
hesitated at all to get it going. And gave all the support necessary for those that are
working on it day to day – day by day, to – have the full green light. Financially,
materially, personnel wise, everything was provided.
Responsibility and Accountability. Two of the top level management personnel
interviewed agreed that the SMS initiative has ensured an active awareness among leadership
at all levels (Top and supervisory) of their responsibilities and accountabilities for safety in
their process domains as compared to the pre-SMS initiative period. These top level
management personnel further emphasized that safety benchmarks were clearly outlined and
documented in a safety policy and safety management system manual signed and approved
by the accountable executive (The Dean). A process owner stated that the safety policy
required leadership at all levels to ensure that operational processes and activities under their
management are conducted safely and meet the safety performance benchmarks of the
organization.
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The statement by the process manager was further corroborated by other top level
management personnel, who stated that the safety policy in the SMS initiative gives clarity
on safety accountability as a metric in the performance evaluation of leadership at all levels
within the flight program. Another process owner also stated that the safety policy clearly
requires leadership at all levels to be responsible for hazard identification and safety risk
management within their operational processes. The process owner also stated that the safety
policy requires the process owners and their supervisory leadership to use safety risk
assessment on identified flight operational hazards and apply control strategies outlined as
part of the SMS to minimize these safety risks to levels tolerable for flight training and
operations.
Operational Performance Impact
There was general agreement among all the top level management personnel
interviewed that the SMS initiative has and continue to have a positive operational
performance impact on the flight program. The notable areas that came up during the
interviews were safety risk management, efficiency of flight operations and safety risk
behavior among students and flight instructors.
Safety Risk Management. Two of the top level management personnel who were
actively involved in the formulation of safety risk management strategies as part of the
initiative shed light on the entire process. The consensus among these two top level
management personnel consolidated the opinions that the organization’s knowledge of what
actually goes on in flight operations had greatly increased due to the SMS initiative. One of
them who double as a process owner stated that prior to initiating SMS and establishing
proactive flight data collection strategies, the flight program’s safety management was very
reactionary and only acted when there was a safety occurrence.
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One of the top level management personnel who doubles as a faculty and was part of
the initial SMS initiative team strongly supported the earlier opinion by a process manager
that the SMS initiative had provided the capability for all flight activities and operational
processes to be tracked and analyzed for abnormal trends so that pre-emptive remedial
actions can be taken before any safety occurrence takes place. When asked for specifics to
corroborate the assertion, the top level management person said:
These are things we do track, in one way or another. And one of the cases, the
unstable approaches, I can talk a little bit about our Phoenix op. When we were first
sort of looking at the high-low, fast-slow tools, which is kind of the way we loosely
defined stabilized approach in Phoenix. I mean, there were a lot more things that go
into a stabilized approach, but at its core, we thought high-low fast-slow would be a
good one. And so we started looking at that and we found a number of flights that
were landing early, because these are really long runways, and the VASIS were
displaced, you know, like two or three thousand feet down.
And so people weren’t following the VASIS; they were just kind of landing.
And so we made everyone aware, we showed them the data and we said, look what’s
going on. And then it helped a little bit, and then we had a couple of safety meetings
down there; and we were able to largely mitigate on most of the runways. There was
one runway we were never able to solve. But that was an example of how we were
able to specifically use the program to achieve a desired result.
A top level management person interviewed who was directly involved in the SMS
initiative stated that the flight program had all the essential components of an SMS in place
prior to the formal active applicant level. This top level management person stated that safety
reporting system, flight data monitoring, safety meetings, safety training and a safety council
were already in existence but did not meet the FAA specifications and guidelines. The top
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level management person stated that the SMS initiative has brought these components into
conformance with FAA specifications and guidelines.
The top level management personnel also stated that performance metrics such as
safety reporting has remained fairly constant over the past five years since the SMS initiative
started. However, the top level management person was of the view that the introduction of
SMS in the academic syllabus was a positive one even though it was elective and not a core
requirement for flight students. This top level management person was of the opinion that
SMS should be made a co-requisite or pre-requisite for other mandatory flight courses to
increase the level of training in SMS.
Safety Risk Behavior.

In terms of safety risk behavior among students and flight

instructors, the general consensus among all the top level management personnel interviewed
was that the SMS initiative was positively having an impact on safety risk behavior. One of
the top level management personnel who also double as a faculty member was of the opinion
that the SMS initiative has helped to track and remedy mitigation decay and specifically
organization safety behavior over time. The faculty member stated that:
We corrected the organization’s behavior; I also could track over time, the return of
the organization back to the old behavior which was the pre-mitigation behavior. And
demonstrated that many cases, after – it was roughly, give or take, depending on the
situation, it was around six months. If we didn’t continue to remind, they returned to
their unsafe and old behavior.
And so – I’m sorry, it was more like eight months. So my recommendation
was, every six months, sit down and review this data again and reset everything. So it
was kind of – it was a very data driven, very interesting way to manage your safety.
The old fashion way would have been to wait for someone to go off the end of the
runway.
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One of the top level management personnel who is also a process owner with a lot of
experience in flight operations stated that effective communication and cooperation has
helped to ensure that safety risk to flight operations are discussed in a candid and constructive
manner with all stakeholders. The process owner stated that there was good liaison between
safety department staff and operational department staff in in promoting a cultural change in
safety reporting behavior and the great benefits of safety reporting among students and flight
instructors. The process owner was of the opinion that safety reporting among flight students
and instructors had relatively improved due to the safety communication process and these
improved safety reporting has enabled proactive analysis for high accident potential
conditions and attitudes. A statement from the process owner sums up the point:
The safety reports, I read all those; and I find them interesting. And everything that
happens, it seems like that is – becomes certainly a single occurrence, or if they see
some trends – they, meaning the flight operations people, get that out as quickly as
possible. One of them just came out last night about a somewhat near miss on an
approach. Two planes coming in. And that could be something just to – no, that’s not
good so let’s not talk about it. But no, they’re right up front with everything. And
everything that needs to be talked about seems like it is, and presented very, very well.
Another top level management personnel who is directly involved in students’
administrative issues and a member of the review committee on drugs and alcohol violations
within the program stated that there were relatively lower cases of drugs and alcohol
violations among flight students and instructors as compared to previous years and attributed
it to the enhanced safety awareness created by the SMS initiative. The top level management
personnel also reiterated the effectiveness of the proactive data-driven approach to managing
safety within the program that effectively identify hazards and used safety risk management
techniques to mitigate and control these risks before safety occurrences hamper flight
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operations. Finally, to affirm the robustness of the drug and alcohol policy, the top level
management personnel stated:
Again, my role on the review board for alcohol and drug and behavioral issues, we
take that very seriously. And we work very closely with the students when the – in fact,
we had one yesterday at review board and I – just sitting through the process, I’m
going – you know – it’s amazing how much – how the organization takes this so
seriously. And we just don’t pay lip service to it.
Efficiency. A process owner who has extensive oversight of flight operational
activities stated that even though the initial investment into the SMS initiative may have been
high, the impact on efficiency of flight operations has been positive. The fact that flight
hazards can be identified early and risk mitigated and controlled through an effective data
monitoring system has reduced the potential “down- time” an accident or incident could have
on both personnel and equipment.
The process owner also intimated that the SMS initiative had brought about a
relatively high level of standardization in procedures and documentation of all processes,
which even though may seem cumbersome, was very good at ensuring that losses and
inefficient operational procedures and practices are tracked and mitigated. Another process
owner with in-depth experience in flight training and operations was of the opinion that due
to the collegiate program’s SMS initiative, there has been greater investments in modern
training aircraft fleet with enhanced safety technology such as digital navigational and flight
deck displays, automated dependence surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) and global position
systems (GPS).
The process owner stated that though these technologies had greatly improved safety
and efficiency of flight training, the investments had relatively also increased the direct
operational cost for flight training and opined that there should be a good cost -benefit
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analysis between extensive investments in latest safety technology and cost over-runs and
transfer to flight students who eventually pay for these safety enhancements.
Implementation Challenges
The SMS initiative obviously has not had it all smooth and there have been some
challenges during the implementation and sustenance. Some of the challenges identified
during the interviews were operational productivity and safety balance, technicality of SMS
training and technical expertise and guidance from the FAA.
Operational Productivity and Safety Balance. Two process owners were of the
opinion that one of the biggest challenges faced in the SMS initiative is a collaborative
agreement on the acceptance of a tolerable level for safety in flight operations among
stakeholders involved in making safety risk decisions relating to flight. A process owner
stated that on some occasions there have been disagreements with the aviation safety
department over safety risk assessments and remedial measures recommended by the
department.
The process owner was of the opinion that even though the personnel at the aviation
safety department did a good job most of the time, they also had to balance their safety
recommendations with operational productivity that commensurate with the needs and reality
of the flight operations business. Another process owner interviewed was of the opinion that
sometimes risk control measures recommended by the aviation safety department required
costly and unrealistic financial input that was counterproductive in respect to a good return on
investment for flight training as a business.
The process owner was of the opinion that disagreements over safety risk
assessments, control strategies and cost implications have sometimes resulted in a perception
that some of these leaders do not fully support the SMS initiative. The process owner also felt
that at times personnel of the aviation safety department tries to encroach into the domain of
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other process owners by attempting to implement risk mitigation and control measures
recommend by the same aviation safety department, when in actual fact that should be the
preserve of the respective process owner. These actions sometimes result in friction between
the process owners and the aviation safety department. A top level management person who
doubles as a process owner had the following comments:
I also have to worry about the business side. I have to balance production with safety.
When all you look at is safety, it’s easy. But when you have to balance the two, and
that’s where the challenge comes in. But myself and safety will at times struggle
together because I feel, not necessary. Example, we’re currently – we’re having a
meeting on hangar occurrences; we call it hangar rush. Where lining pulls out an
aircraft and they might hit a wingtip; okay. And it happens.
We do thousands of aircraft moves a day, okay. And we go through and we
calculate X amount of damage a year. So example, say we do $10,000 to $15,000 of
damage a year to aircraft by moving them in or out. Safety says this is a problem, we
have to address it. And we look at the safety risk assessment; we look at it and I’ll go
through and they make all the recommendations to me, and their recommendations
will be you must hire more line personnel so we have wing-walkers on every wing,
when we move an airplane in or out. So I say, okay I have to hire four additional
people. You pay them $30,000 a year plus fringe, so that’s $45,000 a year. I hire four
people, that’s $200,000 a year it’s going to cost me to stop $15,000 of damage. So
when do you accept such assessments?
Another process owner with extensive flight training responsibility was of the opinion
that the structured nature of the SMS initiative and the need to document every process
sometimes inhibited initiative and flexibility in safety risk decisions as supervisors and midlevel managers have to periodically resort to either their bosses or the safety department for
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clearances on operational issues with safety implications that could have been easily dealt
with at their level. The process owner stated that:
At some point, you have to trust your managers to make decisions, and they have to
do things. But when some people lean fully on this SMS program, everything they feel
has to go back to the Safety Management System. And I feel sometimes that takes
away the ability of your managers to make decisions to work within your
organization.
Technicality of SMS Training. Two of the top level management personnel
interviewed were of the opinion that due to the technical and sometimes complex structure of
the SMS initiative, there was a lot of apprehension and lack of understanding of the entire
process among some management personnel. Even though the accountable executive (The
Dean) arranged for experts from the FAA regional offices and headquarters to conduct
orientation training for most of the leadership, some of these management personnel still
struggled with the entire SMS concept. A top level management person also stated that even
though SMS training has been implemented as part of the training course outline in the flight
program, there were still some training gaps in terms of making it a compulsory requirement
for all flight students as compared to the present state where it is an elective course.
The top level management personnel however noted that most of the flight instructors
in the flight program had been extensively trained in the SMS concepts as part of the flight
instructors’ standardization program. The top level management person however stated that
areas with least SMS training were the line and maintenance departments where most of the
personnel are not graduates from the collegiate aviation program of the university.
In the opinion of the top level management personnel, a lot of work has to be done to
simplify the technical verbiage of SMS manuals and processes and make it comprehensible to
the various personnel within the program who may not have extensive technical background.

132

The top level management personnel reiterated the need for concepts under the SMS
initiative to be simplified and correlated with real-time operational activities so that it will be
effectively utilized by flight students, flight instructors, faculty and other personnel. A quote
from the top level management personnel sum up the points:
The second thing, of course, was the time and the effort. I also think that a lot of
people didn’t understand what an SMS was or what it entailed; so a lot of people kind
of saw this like, I don’t really want to participate in that or don’t know about it. So
there was a little bit of that too. Those are probably the biggest challenges.
Technical Expertise and Guidance from FAA. There were some conflicting views
among three of the top level management personnel interviewed on the role of the regulator
(FAA) in the SMS initiative. One of the top level management personnel was of the opinion
that the FAA was very active and instrumental in the initial training and technical assistance
provision during the active applicant through to the active conformance levels, while two top
level management personnel ( One is a process owner and the other doubles as a faculty
member) were of the opinion that the certification maintenance team (CMT) out of the Fargo
Flight Safety District Office (FSDO) which locally oversees the SMS implementation
program was not well resourced with SMS technical experts. These top level management
personnel were of the opinion that this factor delayed and stifled the initial efforts and
subsequent oversight of the SMS initiative in the flight program. A quote from one of the top
level management personnel gives insight to the point:
Yeah, there were definitely challenges. I mean, both in the implementation and
presently. I personally believe the biggest challenge has been the governmental or the
policy side; because the folks that oversee our SMS, they’re down in Fargo, the Fargo
[FSDO.] And they probably were not properly resourced. And so they ended up kind
of not really being trained for SMS, and it was difficult because they had to sign off on
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our SMS and we had to surveil it and everything. And so to me that was one of the
biggest things.
The sentiments shared by the top level management personnel was further re-echoed
by another process owner and top level management personnel who stated that the
documentation required for the SMS initiative was cumbersome, some of the processes were
changed mid-stream and some of the principal inspectors from the local FAA who were
supposed to ensure oversight over the SMS initiative were not trained nor technically capable
of the oversight resulting in implementation delays. A quote from the process owner
highlights the point:
The FAA documents were very cumbersome; they were hard to understand; they
changed halfway through – the FAA changed the whole process halfway through.
With all due respect to our local flight standards district office; they weren’t involved;
they had nobody there that had training. So that again, created a lot of challenges.
We weren’t able to deal with our local FAA office in Fargo for example. When we
had questions we had to deal with a regional office, and it was sometimes hard to get
feedback or get them involved or schedule them to come to meetings.
We had a couple of meetings with the FAA’s SMS experts from regional and
national offices. But there were times where it would take six or seven or eight weeks
to get them to respond to an e-mail, for example. So yeah, there were a lot of
challenges internally in our organization and we had challenges outside the
organization, primarily with our FAA office. None of those inspectors were trained in
the SMS concept. They knew what it meant, but they couldn’t answer any questions
for us.
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Sustainability
Within the backdrop that the flight program has been recognized by the FAA as a
fully-fledged voluntary collegiate SMS program with all the components functional (Active
conformance level) there is a need to sustain that level through evaluation, monitoring and
continuous improvement. The top level leaders interviewed were asked to share their
opinions on strategies adopted to ensure the sustainability of the SMS Initiative. Some of the
key areas that emerged were evaluation and monitoring, data-driven analysis and
improvements and active personnel involvement and process ownership.
Evaluation and Monitoring. There was a general agreement among all the top level
management personnel interviewed that some positive effort has gone into the area of
actively monitoring the SMS initiative and the processes aligned with it. One process owner
was of the opinion that there had been a constant awareness of safety risk assessment in every
facet of operational processes and also the effectiveness of the confidential and non-punitive
reporting systems put in place to identify hazards and risk to safety.
However, the process owner was of the opinion that there were only few people with
the expertise and normally within the safety office who were actively doing the evaluation
and monitoring. Two of the top level management personnel were of the opinion that the
implementation mistakes, disagreements and set-backs have provided a lot of organizational
learning that has further improved the SMS initiative. Below is a quote by one of the top level
management personnel:
There was a team doing an SRA on congested airspace. And we actually weren’t
following the process, and it upset me in the fact this group was meeting and making
decisions and implementing without my approval as a process owner. They wanted
me to park airplanes to reduce congested airspace. And I said, do you realize every
airplane out there costs $330,000 and you’re going to tell me to park them? I refuse
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to do it; I will not do it. We will look for other ways to mitigate the safety, or you guys
are going to have to go above me to my boss, and he’s going to tell me to park them,
or I will not.
So that was a very good learning process for us as an organization. I knew I
was going to upset some people and I was going to ruffle some feathers; but I went in
there and said, as the process owner I don’t agree to this. You’re taking this one and
this one off the list; you’re dealing with the rest. And it was a good thing for us to go
through.
Data-driven Analysis and Improvements. Another process owner was of the
opinion that the investment in a flight -data monitoring system (FDM) for flight operations
has helped to increase the acquisition of real-time flight data and the use of empirical means
to determine trends that have the potential to degrade flight operational efficiency and safety.
The top level management personnel who has a lot of experience in safety data analysis
stated that the data-driven analysis of risk in the flight program has helped leadership to make
smart safety risk decision and to put in place cost effective control strategies that has
substantially improved both the business and operational safety ends of the program. This
was a quote from the top level management personnel:
Now the way we’re doing it, which I think is acceptable; is we’re identifying risks,
and we’re doing SRAs on those. And there is now a list of them that we keep track of,
and we keep track of the SRA activities. It is based on perceived threats and hazards
or what the data might be indicating to us. But I do think there might be a better way
to maybe more formalize that; and to maybe use the data to actually point to what
your biggest problems may be. So when you do a risk assessment – and I mean, I
think we do a pretty good job. I don’t know that there’s anything that’s wrong with
what we do.
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Active Personnel Involvement and Process Ownership. Three of the top level
management personnel interviewed suggested that in order for the SMS initiative to be
sustainable and continuously improve there should be active personnel involvement in the
processes under the initiative and not have the perception that SMS only belongs to the
aviation safety department.
One of these top level management personnel was of the opinion that some students,
flight instructors and personnel were not knowledgeable about the components and structure
of the SMS and the role expected of them. The top level management person was of the
opinion that it may have been a reason for some apathy towards issues related to SMS during
the initial phases and presently. The top management personnel opined that a continuous
engagement between the aviation safety department and other departments and sensitization
outreach could bridge the SMS knowledge gap.
A process owner also stated that personal interaction with supervisory managers and
personnel within the department highlighted a perception that the aviation safety department
had an adversarial attitude of fault finding with their operations and activities and that has
resulted in some resentment towards the safety personnel resulting in a need to avoid them.
The top level management personnel recommended that mid-level and low- level
personnel should be included in safety risk decision making, especially ones related to
hazards these personnel have identified or filed in safety reports. The top level management
personnel further agreed that the sense of involvement could potentially bring in acceptance
and process ownership of the SMS initiative. This was a quote from one of the top level
management personnel to buttress those points:
Get the buy-in and involve everybody through the implementation process. That’s the
important part. Don’t let one or two individuals take it and do everything, and then at
the end say, here it is. Yeah, don’t shove it down our throats – involve.
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Performance Review and Recommendations
The four top level management personnel interviewed were finally asked to review
the performance of the SMS initiative and also make recommendations for other collegiate
programs that intends to or are in the process of implementing SMS. The themes that
emerged were top level leadership active commitment, effective communication and
cooperation, scaled implementation and progressive metrics and tenacity and resilience.
Top level Leadership Active Involvement. There was a unanimous declaration
from all the leaders interviewed that based on the experiences and review of the SMS
initiative from the initial implementation to the present level, a key element for a successful
SMS program is the active involvement of top level leadership. Almost all the leaders
interviewed affirmed that the transformational leadership and personal involvement of the
Dean in the SMS initiative motivated them to actively get involved in the process. The
leaders stated that provision of financial, material and human resources is a function of top
level leadership and they as leaders set the tone for the students, instructors, faculty and other
personnel to “buy-in” the entire concept of SMS.
The leaders further reiterated that it was very important for them to “walk the talk”.
They recommended that any collegiate aviation program that intends to start an SMS
program must have a progressive and proactive top level leadership ready to provide moral,
financial and physical support for the SMS initiative. A quote from one of the top level
leadership provides clarity on the point:
If someone asked me; if another program asked me what would be – I’d say, you’d
have to have the buy-in of your senior management team, and they have to be sincere
about it. Because if they are not – if they’re not directing, let’s do this, and this isn’t
just an exercise, no work committed to this; that makes it – that’s going to trickle all
the way down.
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Effective Communication and Cooperation. A top level management personnel
and process manager stated that there was an important need for effective communication
among top level leadership and between leadership, students, flight instructors, faculty and
personnel for any successful SMS initiative. The top level management personnel intimated
that the vision and objectives of the SMS initiative needs to be clearly stated and outlined in a
policy statement and documented.
One of the top level management person stated that due to the technical nature of
some of the concepts of SMS, there needs to be effective communication through formalized
SMS training and information network. Two top level management personnel also reiterated
the point about cooperation among top level leadership in the area of safety risk mitigation
and control strategies. They were of the opinion that communication and cooperation will
minimize over-stretch into other process owners’ areas of responsibilities when safety
mitigations are required.
In the opinion of these top level management personnel that will also reduce duplicity
of effort and inefficiency in flight operations. Overall the leaders were of the opinion that a
culture of candor and openness will foster cordial exchange of ideas on how to optimize
positive benefits out of the SMS initiative. One of the leaders summed up the point
succinctly:
I believe in SMS, I really do. I think it’s great for organizations to have it. I just think
it’s important again that you continuously educate, and as an organization, sit down
and evaluate how you’re using that program. So do your homework, visit operations
that have it, take it back to your staff, get the buy-in and involve everybody through
the implementation process.
Scaled Implementation and Progressive Metrics. There was agreement among two
of the top level management personnel interviewed on the need for a step-wise or scaled
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implementation process for the SMS initiative. One of the top level leaders stated that due to
the size and complexity of each organization, there may be difficulties in comparing SMS
initiatives across board. The top level management personnel and faculty member who was
part of the initial team trained to implement the SMS initiative recommended that aviation
collegiate programs aspiring to implement SMS must use both internal and external resources
such as the FAA and other aviation colleges with robust and recognized SMS.
The top level management personnel further stated that aspiring collegiate aviation
programs should adopt strategies that will align with the scale of their operations. The top
level management personnel also recommended that metrics should be progressive, clearly
outlined and not lumped together since that could result in frustration within the organization
due to un-attainable metrics. Below is a quote from the top level leader to buttress the points:
But my advice would be to take a longer term view of everything. So yes, we have to
always worry about tomorrow or the next day, but we also need to worry about one
year from now or two years from now. And so make sure they stay focused on the
longer term too. What are you trying to do for your organization? And if the goal is –
is one year from now, we want to have a safer organization than we have today; I
think that’s a really good way to – to that. So then that would be my recommendation;
my advice.
Tenacity and Resilience. There was agreement among all the top level management
personnel interviewed that key characteristics principal to initiating and sustaining any SMS
initiative are tenacity and resilience. A top-level leader and process owner stated that any
time there are organizational changes that could result in paradigm shift of institutional
cultures, systems and processes there are normally a lot of resistance from people who may
be accustomed to doing things the old way.
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The top level management personnel intimated that implementing an SMS initiative
requires some tenacious, tactful and strong-willed safety champions. Another top level leader
and a process owner also pointed out that when implementing SMS, things will not always go
as expected or planned. The process owner stated that during non-normal and novel situations
that could adversely affect flight operations and organizational cohesion there needs to be
structures in place to restore the organization back to normalcy. This was a quote from the
top level management personnel:
The other recommendation I’d have is not to be – to another program – I mean, not to
be fearful of the whole process. I mean, it takes a while but it’s the right thing to do.
It’s going to improve the program, and it’s the paradigm that students are going to
have to learn to operate under anyway, so program shouldn’t have the fear of going
through it.
And if it takes them a little bit longer, that’s fine; at least you’re making
progress towards it. Yeah, and it kind of goes back to – one of the things I was just
saying is, don’t be fearful of starting. But then also once you’ve started, see it
through. And it does take probably some strong personalities to kind of push it
through.
A qualitative conceptual tree (hierarchical structure) of the codes and themes is shown
below as Figure 16 and the conceptual map and word cloud of the computer assisted
qualitative analysis can be found in Appendix C.
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Factual Operational Performance Data
An analysis of safety documents containing aggregate data of both historic and realtime safety performance indicators i.e., number of confidential safety reports filed by
personnel and closed reports/feedback from safety office, attendance to safety meetings, and
SMS training conducted for students and instructors between the active applicant period
(2012) to the active conformance stage (2016) of the SMS initiative was done for Grand
Forks flight program (GFK) and Mesa Programs. The results show that the six –year average
was 495 reports per Flying Year (FY) for GFK and 28 reports per FY for the Mesa flight
operations.
Factual Safety Reporting (GFK and Mesa)
Analyzing the overall safety performance in terms of safety reporting, the results
suggest that in FY 2014 (451 safety reports) there was a 9% increment in safety reporting as
compared to the six-year mean safety reporting. In 2015 (556 safety reports) there was about
12 % increase in safety reporting and then the trend dipped in 2016 (352 safety reports as at
September 30) with a 28% reduction. The two year forecasted trend suggests a slight increase
in safety reporting in 2017 (~ 410 safety reports) and a level trend in 2018 (~ 400 safety
reports). Figure 17 shows the trend pattern of safety reports submitted from 2011-2016 and
the forecast.
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Figure 17. GFK Operations Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016).
An audit of the respective annual and six-year mean performance in terms of safety
reporting for the Mesa flight operations showed that the six- year mean for safety reports
processed by the aviation safety office was 28. Comparing the yearly safety reports processed
to the mean value, there was a 25% reduction in safety reporting in 2014. In 2015 there was
about 67 % increase in safety reporting. The trend increased substantially in 2016 (Third
Quarter) with a 100% increase. A two year forecasted trend suggests a significant increase in
safety reporting in 2017 (~ 63 safety reports) and 2018 (~ 72 safety reports). Figure 20 shows
the trend pattern of safety reports submitted from 2011-2016 and the forecast.
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Figure 18. Mesa Operations Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016).
The breakdown of safety reporting for the various departments in GFK such as flight
operation, line operations, maintenance, supervisor of flight (SOF) and others suggest that
flight operations had the highest reporting within the periods (2011-2016) with a mean safety
reporting of 398 and SOF having the lowest of 4. At the Mesa program, the results show that
operations had the highest mean safety reporting value of 26 as compared to line and
maintenance with 1 each.
A two- year forecast suggests that there will be a slight increase in safety reporting in
2017 and a level trend in 2018 for flight operations at GFK. A two year forecasted trend for
Mesa suggests that there will be a substantial increase in safety reporting within the flight
operations department. Figures 19 and 20 show the departmental safety reporting trends at
GFK and Mesa respectively.
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Figure 19. GFK Operations Safety Reports Submitted by Departments (2011-2016).
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Figure 20. Mesa Operations Safety Reports Submitted by Departments (2011-2016).
In order to understand the safety reporting performance at the granular level, the
number of reports per month for the period 2012-2016 was analyzed. The mean safety
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reporting per month within the specified period was 47 for GFK operations. The results show
that the month of September had the highest safety reporting of 69 and compared to the mean
value shows a 47% increase in safety reporting.
The other months with high safety reporting were March (51reports) and October (52
reports) showing an 11% increase compared to the mean value. The month with the lowest
safety reports was December (22 reports) which corresponds to a 53% decrease when
compared to the mean value. The Figure 21 shows the monthly safety reporting for the
periods 2012-2016 and the forecasted trend suggesting a decrease in safety reporting for
January and February 2017 compared to the five-year mean values for January (36 reports)
and February (46 reports).
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Figure 21. GFK Operations Monthly Safety Reports Submitted (2011-2016).
The number of safety reports submitted was compared to flight activities (safety
reports/1000 hours flown) to determine the rate and identify trends both at GFK and Mesa.
The results show that GFK program had a six-year mean rate of 0.006 (6 reports per 1000
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hours) and the mean rate in Mesa was 0.003 (3 reports per 1000 hours). The results show that
Flying Year (FY) 2016 had the highest rate of 0.008 (8 reports per 1000 hours) as compared
to the lowest rate of 0.005 (5 reports per 1000 hours) for FY2013 and FY2014 in GFK.
The results suggest a 33% improvement of the FY 2016 reporting rate over the sixyear average in GFK. The results from Mesa indicates that the highest rate was in FY2015 (5
reports per 1000 flight hours) as compared to the lowest rate of 0.001 (1 report per 1000
flight hours) in FY2012. The results suggest a 67% increase in reporting rate compared to the
six-year mean value. The forecasted trends suggest a decrease in reporting rates in GFK (~ 7
reports) in 2017 and a relatively stable rate in Mesa (~ 5 reports). The safety reports per 1000
flight hours for the period 2012-2016 in GFK and Mesa are shown in Table 10, Figures 22,
Table 11 and Figure 23 respectively.
Table 10. Safety Reports per 1000 Flight Hours at GFK.
Years

Flight Hours
Flown (1000)

Safety
Reports

Safety Reports/
Flight hours

Rate x 1000

2012

87.80

667

0.007

7

2013

102.00

510

0.005

5

2014

90.20

451

0.005

5

2015

86.70

556

0.006

6

2016

42.80

352

0.008

8
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Figure 22. GFK Operations Safety Reports per 1000 flight hours (2012-2016).
Table 11. Safety reports per 1000 flight hours at Mesa.
Years

Flight hours
Flown (1000)

Safety
Reports

Safety Reports/Flight
Hours

Rate
x1000

2012

4.893

5

0.001

1

2013

6.722

28

0.004

4

2014

11.61

21

0.002

2

2015

19.931

47

0.002

2

2016

12.025

56

0.005

5
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Figure 23. Mesa Operations Safety Reports per 1000 flight hours (2012-2016).
Safety Meetings (Factual Data)
A safety performance analysis of attendance to safety meetings for the periods fall
2014 – spring 2016 suggest a mean attendance of 1047 students and other personnel. The
highest attendance value over the four-year period was in fall 2015 (1094) as compared to the
lowest in spring 2015 (990). The findings suggest that the value in fall 2015 was a 4.5%
improvement over the four-year mean and the value for spring 2015 was 5.4 % reduction
compared to the mean value. However, the forecasted trend indicates an improvement in
safety meeting attendance in the next two reporting periods of fall 2016 and spring 2017. The
GFK operations safety meetings attendance is shown in Figure 24.
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Figure 24. GFK Operations Safety Meeting Attendance (2014-2016).
SMS Training (Factual Data)
A safety performance analysis of number of students and instructors formally trained
in SMS was also evaluated for the spring 2012 – spring 2016 academic semesters in both
GFK and Mesa. The findings suggest a mean number of 157 students and 131 instructors
were trained each semester within the stated period. The highest number of students trained
per semester was 259 in fall 2015 (65% improvement over the mean value).
The lowest number of students trained was 90 in spring 2012 and spring 2013 (43%
decrease compared to mean value). The highest number of instructors was 375 in fall 2015
and the lowest number was zero in spring 2012 and spring 2013. The forecasted trends
suggest that there will be an increase in SMS training for students (~230) and instructor/staff
(~ 345) in fall 2016 and spring 2017 academic years when compared to the mean number of
personnel who receive SMS training. The values for the number of students and instructors
trained in SMS are shown in Figure 25.
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Figure 25. Number of Students, Instructors and Staff Trained in SMS (2012-2016).
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CHAPTER VI
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, CONCLUSION
SMS Initiative Construct Validation
The results and findings from the research suggest that in attempting to measure the
latent construct of SMS initiative using factor analysis, two underlying factors emerged
namely SMS process engagement and SMS policy implementation. The SMS policy
implementation (α = .93) explained about 38.2% of the total variance for the SMS Initiative
construct as compared to SMS process engagement (α = .75) which explained about 10.8% of
SMS Initiative construct. It was however very interesting most items on an important
component of SMS initiative, Emergency Response Planning (ERP) had poor loadings and
had to be dropped. These may indicate that respondents were not familiar with policies and
processes related to ERP.
The two factor obtained corroborates earlier findings by Chen (2014) who also found
had two underlying factors measuring SMS among airline pilots in Taiwan. Chen (2014)
designated the two underlying scales as SMS policy (α = .95) and SMS practices (α = .95).
While Chen (2014) had the underlying factors explain about 71% of total variance for the
SMS evaluation scale, the present study had about 46% explanation of total variances in the
construct SMS.
The higher level of experience and professionalism of airline pilots and the depth of
knowledge about their organization’s policy implementation, practices and process
engagement relating to SMS initiatives may have a higher effect on the perceptions of these
professional pilots as compared to pilot trainees and flight instructors in a collegiate aviation
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program implementing an SMS Initiative. These factors could possibly be a reason for the
relatively high variance in Chen (2014) as compared to this study.
The two factors identified in this study was also different from factors identified in an
earlier study by Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, Vázquez-Ordás (2007) in which a scale
made up of 29 items turned out eight first-order factors; policy, incentives, training,
communication,

preventive

planning,

emergency

planning,

internal

control

and

benchmarking techniques.
This study also differs from the number of factors identified by Chen and Chen,
(2012) who developed an SMS measurement scale from the perspective of aviation experts
and airline managers to evaluate the performance of airline’s SMS. The results revealed a
five-factor structure consisting of 23 items. A reason for these differences may be the type of
respondents used. Both the current study and Chen (2014) used front-line operational
personnel such line pilots and flight students and flight instructors instead of senior line
managers who may have a different perspective on SMS.
This research also adds to existing literature on SMS construct validations in aviation
such as Liou and Chuang (2010) who mapped out structural relationships among diverse
components of SMS and identified key factors in their model and another study by Hsu, Li
and Chen (2010) that developed an analytical framework for defining the key components
and dimensions of an airline SMS and their interaction.
SMS Policy Implementation
A common thread in all of these studies and the current study reveals that the factor
“SMS policy” as a key component and under pins the importance of a coherent SMS policy in
any organization that wants to implement an SMS initiative. The findings in this study also
highlights SMS policy implementation as essential in explicitly describing core
responsibility, authority, lines of accountability and pursuable targets. The findings from both
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the survey instruments and the semi-structured interviews suggest that roles, responsibility
and relationship outlined in safety policies of collegiate aviation programs can have a positive
effect on the sustenance of high operational safety standards and these roles must be clearly
defined for an effective SMS policy implementation (ICAO, 2009).
The results also support extant literature that SMS policy implementation must
originate from the highest echelon of authority in an organization and must have ample
evidence of top leadership initiatives, commitment and support for the implementation drive
(FAA, 2015b). The safety policy implementation must be documented and enshrined in the
core mission and vision statement. The safety policy implementation strategies must be
visible and communicated wide across the structures of the organization and must be widely
known and accepted by all employees as a bona-fide safety policy (Wood, 2003; IATA,
2012).
SMS Process Engagement
The results also suggest that sometimes safety policy implementation does not always
result in effective SMS process engagement which is the reciprocal gesture or acceptance of
the key tenets of the SMS policy by front-line operational personnel such as flight students
and flight instructors. The study suggest that top level leadership must use ingenuity and
smart promotion strategies to get the necessary “buy-ins” and acceptance from these “sharpend” operational personnel to get some level of parity between SMS policy implementation
and SMS process engagement.
The interviews with some of the top level management personnel and process owners
revealed that the SMS policy implementation was very effective which was corroborated by
the survey among the students and flight instructors. However, the SMS process engagement
component seems weak and may be attributed to the fact that realistically most students and
flight instructors are actually distal from implementation strategies and are only beneficiaries
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of the windfalls of any of these SMS polices. Three of the top level management personnel
interviewed suggested that in order for the SMS initiative to be sustainable and continuously
improve there should be active personnel involvement in the processes under the initiative
and not have the perception that SMS only belongs to the aviation safety department.
A top level management person interviewed was of the opinion that some flight
students, flight instructors and personnel were not knowledgeable about the processes and
structure of the SMS and the role expected of them and that may be a reason for some apathy
towards issues related to SMS during the initial phases and presently. The top management
personnel opined that a proactive and ingenious outreach and engagement between the
aviation safety department and other departments could bridge the SMS knowledge gap and
may reduce the perception among students and instructors of “they and us” while actively
promoting process ownership and engagement.
The results suggest that collegiate aviation programs with SMS initiatives must
engage individual student, student organizations and flight instructors during the SMS
implementation process and also in the subsequent continuous improvement processes. The
challenges to these recommendations may be the reality of constraints due to time and
academic activities for most collegiate aviation students, which may restrict a greater role and
engagement in the SMS initiative. Another challenge will be the level of expertise and
knowledge that may be required to execute the SMS policy implementation within a
collegiate aviation program. However, it may be still beneficial to reach out to these students
and flight instructors through SMS initial and recurrent training.
An analysis of factual safety performance data suggested that in terms of SMS
process engagement strategies such SMS initial and recurrent training for flight students and
instructors, some effort has been put in place by the top level management but more needed
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to be done and the forecasted trends suggested that there will be an increase in SMS training
for students (~230) and instructor/staff (~ 345) in fall 2016 and spring 2017 academic years.
Triangulated Results on SMS Initiative
The results suggest that collegiate aviation programs could use in-house resources and
external resources such as the FAA SMS program office to assist in policy implementation.
However, sometimes the local FAA offices may not have SMS experts and that may stifle the
SMS initiatives’ progress since the local FAA traditionally has oversight over the
certification process. The results suggest that such aviation collegiate programs may need to
establish a healthy rapport and liaison with their local FAA offices and possibly get external
expertise from the FAA SMS office at the regional or national level to assist in the drafting of
initial SMS policies, Gap Analysis, training, Job Aids and actual process integrations.
The results from the factual data corroborates the findings from the survey and the
semi-structured interviews that the SMS policy implementation has provided the flight
program with the necessary benchmarks and tracking mechanism for safety performance. A
critical assessment of the six-year performance data from the flight programs operations at
both GFK and Mesa showed a substantial increase in safety occurrence reporting and safety
meeting attendance among students and flight instructors, which may be attributed to
enhanced safety promotion efforts outlined in the SMS policy implementation. These trends
may be some of the data-driven behavioral benchmarks that need to be tracked in an SMS
initiative. It was quite difficult to gauge the level of process engagement in Mesa but at least
the results seem to indicate an effective SMS policy implementation.
Theoretical Implications
The theoretical implications of this study are that an attempt has been made to
measure the dimensionality of SMS Initiative in a collegiate aviation program. The findings
of this study may serve as a foundation and road-map for future research by further refining
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the dimensions through the use of a larger sample and participation of more collegiate
aviation programs with functional SMS Initiatives. Finally, the results corroborate extant
literature that any SMS policy should outline the key safety goals and objectives, which must
be attainable, pragmatic, must be included in the overall corporate strategic plan (Stolzer,
Halford & Goglia, 2008).
Relationships between SMS Initiative and Other Study Variables
One of the key rational for this study was to evaluate the relationship between SMS
initiative, self-efficacy, transformational, safety leadership, safety motivation, safety
participation, safety compliance and safety -related occurrences. The results from the
structural equation model and path analysis indicate that respondents’ perceptions about the
SMS policy implementation had a positive and significant effect on their safety motivation,
safety compliance and safety participation. The results indicate that an investment in SMS
initiative may enhance the perceptions of flight students and instructors on the collegiate
programs operations and safety culture.
This result corroborates findings in earlier studies on SMS and safety culture
(Dillman, Voges & Robertson, 2010; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015; Freiwald,
Lenz-Anderson & Baker, 2013, Chen, 2014) which highlighted the positive benefits of SMS
in improving organizational safety culture and specifically safety behavior in aviation. The
results also validate findings in previous studies that indicated a positive trend in attitudes and
behavior of employees towards safety after SMS implementation in airport operations
(Remawi, Bates & Dix, 2011).
Safety Policy Implementation and Safety Participation
The results indicate that organizational indicators such as perceptions on SMS process
engagement have a higher predictive power with regards to respondents’ safety participation
than SMS policy implementation which did not have any significant direct path to safety
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participation. The only significant pathway from SMS policy implementation to safety
participation was when mediated by safety motivation. The results indicate that although
SMS policy implementation may not directly have a positive effect on safety participation,
the indirect effect through safety motivation may positively improve safety participation.
The results also validate the suggestion by Neal and Griffin (2006) that SMS
implementation could be a viable predictor of safety compliance and safety participation. The
results further indicate that when respondents understand and associate with the SMS policies
and how it is implemented, it may motivate them to get involved in safety related activities.
This finding is very important since a well-defined SMS policy is very essential to drive the
entire SMS initiative and improve the safety culture of the organization as recommended by
Stolzer, Halford & Goglia (2008), (ICAO, 2013) and FAA (2015).
SMS Process Engagement and Safety Participation
The results from the final structural model supported the hypothesis that SMS process
engagement has a significant positive direct effect on safety participation. The finding is
supported by Mc Gregor’s Theory Y which has a profound implication for respondents to
have “buy-in” and participate in SMS initiated in a collegiate aviation program. Under the
conditions outlined by Theory Y, this finding may encourage flight students and instructors to
seek out responsibility within the SMS process engagement factor and collegiate aviation
programs can decentralize the SMS policy implementation and ensure operational level
participation under the process owners.
Policy Implication. Under Theory Y, the scope of SMS process engagement by flight
instructors can be broadened, which may add variety and opportunities, while engaging them
in the decision-making process. In ensuring SMS process engagement, students and flight
instructors may be allowed to set performance objectives that meet or even exceed FAA
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requirement and participate in the process of evaluating how well they were met as
recommended by Sorenson (2015).
SMS Process Engagement and Safety Motivation
The path way from SMS process engagement to safety motivation was not
significant, indicating that safety motivation alone may not influence personnel to actively
engage in safety actives if they feel that they are not part of SMS process or have been
sidelined in the SMS process implementation. The results therefore implore collegiate
aviation programs to actively reach out and engage the students and flight instructors in the
processes of SMS such as safety promotion, safety risk management and very importantly
emergency response planning (ERP) which is one area that there were lots of non-responses
from respondents. Flight instructors may be included in safety promotion councils and flight
students may be included in flight data monitoring or event review team (ERT) memberships.
Safety Process Engagement and Safety Compliance
The results did not support the hypothesis that there existed a relationship between
SMS process engagement and safety compliance. This finding was very interesting and
suggests that getting respondents to be part of SMS process may not affect their safety
compliance. A reason for this finding could be the idea that in collegiate aviation program,
most of the task and operations are heavily regulated and higher compliance is required by
the FAA in order to maintain certification status. Non-compliance with the requirements of
regulations may elicit disciplinary actions and sanctions, hence the need to comply whether
actively engaged in the SMS initiative processes or not.
Self-Efficacy and Safety Compliance
The results from the final structural model supported the hypothesis that self-efficacy
has a strong direct effect on safety compliance and an even stronger total effect on safety
compliance when mediated by safety motivation. This result strongly corroborates findings in
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earlier research Schwarzer & Jerusalem (1995) which suggested that respondents with higher
perceived self-efficacy are likely to better resist pressure and devote more efforts to
improving their work-related and management performance. This result also supports
findings in earlier research (Parasuraman, Molloy & Singh, 1993; Prinzel, 2002) that applied
as the self-efficacy as an observed predictor in the number of studies that investigate pilots’
work-related behaviors.
Self- Efficacy and Safety Motivation
The results support prior research in the field of teaching and learning in collegiate
environment that demonstrated that self-efficacy has effects on the level of motivation,
learning and performance and a consistent predictor of behavior and behavioral change
(Graham and Weiner, 1995; Schunk and Pajares, 2001). This finding suggests a positive
trend among respondents and for attaining the performance objectives of the SMS initiative.
Self-Efficacy and Safety Participation
The results indicate a positive direct effect of self-efficacy on safety participation and
a positive total effect when mediated by safety motivation. This may be good news for
leadership in the collegiate aviation program as it may offset the rather non-direct effect of
SMS policy implementation on safety participation in the model. Although self-efficacy may
be a function of an individual inherent character it may be improved by formal training which
can ensure massive participation from flight students (Schunk and Pajares, 2001; Chen,
2014).
Policy Implication. The inclusion of self-efficacy in flight course or SMS training
programs can be adopted as a policy in the collegiate aviation program. Since the flight
program already has a robust SMS training program as corroborated by findings of the factual
safety data it may be intuitive to team up with the psychology department and include
modules on self-efficacy to both initial and recurrent SMS training classes. However, it is

161

important to state that like all self-reported surveys, there may be issues of social desirability
bias in terms of respondents’ perceptions on their level of self-efficacy.
Self- Efficacy and Safety Compliance
There was a significant positive relationship between self-efficacy and safety
compliance and that is nominally very good, however some researchers have expressed
concern that it could be a two-edged sword and that people with high self-efficacy may be
extremely goal –oriented at the expense of safety (Prinzel, 2002). Under deadlines, peer
pressure, and budget factors, some flight students and instructors with high self-efficacy may
decide to logically disregard procedures. This behavior is termed the “Superman Syndrome”
by the Petersen Accident Theory. That is why the active engagement of students groups and
flight instructors in the SMS initiative could equip them with a sense of process ownership
and peer review of this undesired safety behavior.
Transformational Safety Leadership, Safety Participation and Safety Compliance
The results from the final measurement model indicates that there was a significant
direct effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation and no direct path or
effect on safety compliance. There was a positive indirect effect of transformational safety
leadership on safety compliance through the mediation of safety motivation. However, even
with a small negative direct effect of transformational safety leadership on safety motivation,
the total effect on safety participation and safety compliance were significant and positive.
The results were contrary to earlier findings by Chen (2014) who found out that at the
group aspect level ethical or morality leadership did show a significant direct effect on airline
pilots’ safety compliance. Chen (2014) suggested that pilots by virtue of their level of
professionalism normally have their behavior dictated by their training and since most airline
pilots actually work as a team with other crew members, sharing information and learning
from each other, their safety behaviors may not be influenced by a single fleet manager or
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chief pilot and recommends that the influence of leadership on pilots’ safety compliance may
need to be interpreted from a different perspective.
However, the result was similar to empirical findings from extant literature that
suggest a positive relationship between transformational leadership and enhanced task
performance and safety behavior (Howell & Avolio, 1993; Barling, Weber, & Kelloway,
1996; Zohar, 2002; Inness, Turner, Barling & Stride, 2010; Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón,
Vázquez-Ordás, 2014; Pilbeam, Doherty, Davidson & Denyer, 2016).
A reason that could be adduced by the counter-intuitive finding of the negative direct
relationship between transformational safety leadership and safety motivation may be the
idea that when chief flight instructors and other senior flight supervisory staff exhibit high
levels of transformational safety leadership traits in a flight program with a matured and
functional SMS initiative, flight students and flight instructors become complacent and less
motivated to pursue safety objectives because in their opinion the system is inherently safe
and dependable with such transformational leadership in place.
That may create a spurious “Dependency Syndrome” that leadership will always
ensure a safe operational environment even without the input of these respondents. This trend
could potentially be detrimental to continuous improvement and sustenance of any SMS and
could lead to operational drift and mitigation decay. It was rather interesting that the
interview with one of the top level leadership and a faculty member with very close
association to flight student organizations re-iterated similar sentiments about waning safety
motivation among flight students over time.
The top level management person was of the view that even though top leadership has
provided transformational leadership in safety and resourced the SMS initiative, there have
been periods of behavioral mitigation decays over time. The top leader emphasized that
recommendations have been made to consistently use data-driven strategies to track
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behavioral and attitudinal trends within the flight program for indicators such as lack of
safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation among flight students and
instructors to pro-actively mitigate such hazardous attitudes before the flight program slips
back to a pre-mitigation period of unsafe attitudes and behaviors.
Another reason that may explain this result is that although top level flight
supervisory staff may be exhibiting transformational leadership traits, they may be missing
out on some underlying potential motivational factors that can enhance proactive safety
behavior in collegiate aviation programs (McLeod, 2014). Two of the four elements of
transformational safety leadership are individualized consideration and inspirational
motivation (Bass & Riggio, 2006) and when respondents observe the other components of
TSL such as idealized influence and intellectual stimulation but not the first two, the net
effect may be negative perception of TSL, which could wane safety motivation.
Sometimes respondents may not directly come into contact with some of these
supervisory flight leaders, but will hear negative things about them from third-party sources
and that may skew their perceptions about TSL within the organization. On the contrary there
may be real issues of poor traits of TSL in these supervisory flight leaders but due to the
over-arching proactive safety culture within the organization and the personal expectations
and goals of these respondents to place higher value on safety outcomes, they may be selfmotivated to ensure safety behavior as grounded in the Vroom’s Expectancy Theory.
Realistically, these supervisory flight leaders have to ensure some level of
transactional leadership based on non-individualized hierarchical relationships and
specifically Corrective leadership (or active management by exception) that monitors
individual performance against standards, detecting errors and correcting them (Zohar, 2002).
Therefore, if these supervisory flight leaders exhibit transformational safety leadership traits
most of the time, there may be periods where they could become overwhelmed balancing
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relationship maintenance and attaining operational goals. This becomes more challenging
during times of high flight training periods and operational exigencies. Zohar’s Corrective
Leadership may create a perception that these supervisory flight leaders do not identify with
the cognitive and physiological needs of flight students and instructors such as fatigue and
stress. These factors may adversely affect safety motivation. These observations are also
theoretically grounded in the Maslow’s Hierarchy Theory.
These flight students and instructors need to feel emotionally and physically safe and
accepted within the flight program to progress and reach their full potential. These flight
students and instructors must be shown that they are valued and their opinions respected by
their supervisory flight leadership in order to create an environment that ensures high safety
participation and safety compliance as recommended by Maslow.
It was however interesting to note that the factual safety data analysis revealed that
safety behavioral markers such as safety occurrence reporting and safety meeting attendance
had increased among respondents over the six-year reporting period and the projected trends
also indicated an increase in reports and attendance in Mesa and GFK respectively. These
trends may suggest that overall the impact of transformational safety leadership provided at
the highest level in resourcing and actively supporting the SMS initiative may be yielding
benefits.
Safety Motivation, Safety Participation and Safety Compliance
The result supported the hypothesis that safety motivation has a direct positive effect
on both safety participation and safety compliance. This finding supports extant theories that
examined the effects of safety motivation on safety behavior such as the Frederick
Herzberg’s Motivational Theory (Two-Factor Theory) which theoretically explains why
safety motivational factors such as achievement, advancement, recognition and responsibility
encourage desired and proactive safety behavior in an organization (Hines, 1973; Neil, 2007;
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Greenberg, 2013). The results also confirm previous findings by Chen (2014) and Friewald
(2013) that suggested that safety motivation positively influenced airline pilots and flight
students respectively to exhibit proactive safety behavior.
Theoretical Implication. The theoretical implications of this finding for a collegiate
aviation program with a functional SMS is that policies, processes and procedures may
improve the safety motivation of flight students that can positively affect operational
practices such as the tendency to act safely, and follow training guidelines and safety
instructions. Safety motivation may create an awareness and incentives that operational
outcomes are positive as compared to unsafe acts, which may have adverse consequences.
This invariably may improve safety compliance and is well grounded in the Skinner’s
Operant Theory. Another theoretical implication of this finding is that when respondents are
motivated as a result of positive reinforcement from safety award programs, they may be
more apt to engage in safety compliant behavior and participate in safety activities supported
by the Thorndike’s Reinforcement Theory.
Policy Implication. Based on this finding, it may be beneficial for collegiate aviation
programs with SMS to use some form of positive reinforcement such as bonuses for flight
instructors who undertake occurrence –free training over a period of time. Other incentives
such as safety awards and public recognition may improve the level of safety motivation. Top
level leadership may also award “free” training hours to flight students for exemplary safety
operations and behavior.
The use of safety motivational strategies such as positive reinforcement could
improve flight students and instructors’ safety behavior as suggested by the positive direct
effect of the causal path in this study. However, top level leadership should be guided by the
limitations of incentives and reinforcement especially in times of high flight training regime
in resource constrained environment, where the potential for unsafe working conditions could

166

derail gains made from safety motivations and adversely affects safety behavior (Reason,
1998; Greenberg, 2013).
Safety Compliance, Safety Participation and Safety -Related Events
The result supported the hypothesis that safety compliance was related to safety
participation. However, the hypothesis that safety- related events mediated the causal path
between safety participation and safety compliance was not supported. There was a
significant positive causal path between safety -related events and safety compliance. The
finding suggests that there exists a strong correlation between safety compliance and safety
participation due to the fact that they are both factors that explain safety behavior (Griffin and
Neal, 2000).
The result supports earlier findings by Zohar (2002) that suggested a causal
relationship between personnel safety performance indicators such as compliance with safety
regulations, and safety- related events. The result also buttresses earlier findings by Griffin
and Neal (2000) that suggested that behaviors that are characteristic of safety compliance will
lead to fewer safety- related events in the workplace. For example, personnel who comply
with established safety regulations are less likely to experience safety- related events than
those who do not comply with established safety regulations. The findings also support
previous findings from studies by Mullen (2004).
The result did not support earlier findings on the relationship between safety
participation and safety -related events. Earlier studies by Cree and Kelloway (1997) had
suggested that that individuals who experience close calls or safety related events, display
higher levels of safety participation. More current research findings by Mullen (2004) found
that perceived risks associated with a job tended to be heightened when an individual
vicariously experienced or learned about an injury that occurs within the workplace and these
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safety -related events raised their safety awareness and increased their participation in safety
activities.
Even though the hypothesis that safety -related event mediated safety participation
and safety compliance was not fully supported, the relationship between safety-related events
and safety compliance was supported by the causal path model and corroborates findings by
Neal and Griffin (2006) that knowledge about the safety climate and safety-related events
significantly influenced self-report of task and contextual safety performance, namely safety
compliance and safety participation.
Factual data on safety -related events could not be obtained for this study but the
findings from the other factual safety performance indicators suggest that the SMS initiative
had greatly improved the safety participation levels of respondents and one of the top level
leadership personnel interviewed stated that even with a generally high level of safety
compliance and participation there were still occasional cases of safety -related events such
as aircraft in close proximity in airspace (air-prox) that required remedial and corrective
action as part of the safety risk management program of the SMS.
The top level management personnel also indicated that there have been some recent
cases of safety risk behavioral issues involving alcohol that have been dealt with by a safety
review team. It may be difficult to determine within the context of this study if the knowledge
and awareness of such safety -related events by respondents may have significantly improved
safety participation.
Effects of Demographic Variables on Safety Behavior and Safety-Related Events
One of the essential elements of any SMS initiative is to improve the safety culture
within the organization and especially among the various demography that make up
collegiate aviation programs (von Thaden, 2008; Adjekum, 2014b; Adjekum et al., 2015).
The findings from an ANOVA conducted suggested that there were significant differences in
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terms of safety compliance between certified flight instructors (CFI) and pre-private and
student pilots.
This result may not be surprising since most CFI have relatively extensive experience
with standard operating procedures (SOPs), aircraft systems and limitations and airspace
compared to pre-private and student pilots. Another factor could be the motivation factor and
incentives. Most CFI have worked assiduously to obtain their ratings and certificates as
instructors and they know the repercussions of non-compliance with safety regulations and
violations. That may serve as a motivation to ensure that they operate under full compliance
with standards and federal regulations. The CFI may also be held to higher standards in case
of non-compliance as compared to the student pilot or pre-private student who may not have
any certificate to lose.
The findings also indicate that the CFI group had a significantly higher safety
participation than the pre-private and student pilots group. This finding may also not be
surprising considering the fact that most of these CFI have been well adapted to the safety
culture and SMS initiative and may be even active in the process engagement. Another
reason may be that CFI are required as part of their standardization to attend safety meetings
and meets specific institutional safety requirements that are mandatory as part of their roles as
CFI. The pre-private group may not have such roles and responsibility to actively participate
in safety activities since some of them may not even know about the components of the SMS
initiative nor be well adapted to the institutional safety culture.
It was also interesting finding that in terms of academic year groupings and safety
compliance, there was a significant difference. The seniors had a significantly higher level of
mean scores on safety compliance as compared to the freshmen. This was also not very
surprising considering that facts that most of the seniors were enrolled in higher level flight
course and actively engaged in more training flights, relatively experienced, had better
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institutional knowledge on safety procedures and SOPs, and most likely CFI who were more
at risk to substantially lose if their flight certifications were revoked or they face sanctions for
non-compliance with regulations.
These listed factors may pre-dispose the seniors to be more compliant than the
freshmen who may not have much, institutional knowledge on safety, SOP, aircraft systems
and above all may have not much to lose in case of violations and non-compliance. Some of
these freshmen in pre-private and student pilot courses may defer to their CFI who may be
seniors to comply with procedures and standards since they deem them to be more
experienced and responsible for the overall safety of flights during training. Another factor
could be negative transfer of safety risk attitudes and behaviors from other domains that can
pre-dispose these freshmen to be less compliant with safety procedures and regulations.
In terms of the safety participation the results suggested that there were significant
differences between the seniors and juniors. The seniors had a higher mean score on safety
participation compared to the juniors and that may be due to the fact that relatively the
seniors may be in a phase of their flight training where there be some flexibility in terms of
flight schedules and academic intensity to allow them to be more involved in safety activities
as part of the SMS initiative.
Some of the seniors may also be CFI who as earlier adduced have to participate in
SMS training and other safety activities as part of their certificate requirements and
institutional standardization. On the other hand, these juniors may be at the most intensive
phases of their flight training such as CFI training, multi-engine training and even instrument
phase and that may not allow them the flexibility to participate in a lot of non- mandatory
safety activities. The seniors may also be gearing up as part of their professional development
into industry and the knowledge and participation in safety activities may enhance their
personal safety culture while boosting their resume.
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There were significant differences in terms of knowledge and involvement in safety related-events among the academic year groups. A post-hoc test revealed that there were
significant differences in the mean score on safety-related events among the seniors and the
juniors. The seniors had a relatively higher exposure to safety -related events as compared to
the juniors. This finding could also be adduced to the notion that a sizable sample of the
seniors were CFI and that meant they had more flight activities relative to the juniors and
more experiences with the risk of flight training. The higher level of flight operational
engagement may account for the higher scores.
These seniors may also be more active in safety activities such as SMS training and
safety meetings where information on safety occurrences may be shared. These seniors as
CFI may have better inter -phase with activities at the flight lines and safety reports from the
flight students assigned to them and that may pre-dispose them to know more about safetyrelated occurrences than the juniors.
SMS Training Effects on Demography
A T-test of mean was conducted to determine if SMS training had any effect on
various demography within the flight program. The results indicate that there was no
significant effect of SMS training on mean scores on safety participation, safety compliance
or safety-related events. This finding was quite interesting and fascinating since extant
literature on safety culture and SMS such as Vinodkumara and Bhasib (2010) suggested that
SMS training was identified as the most important safety management practice that predicted
safety knowledge, safety motivation, safety compliance and safety participation.
However, triangulating this result with the factual safety performance data analyzed
revealed that though there has been an aggressive action by top level management to increase
the level of initial and recurrent training SMS among flight students, there were still training
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gaps. The analysis from the factual safety performance data suggest a forecasted increase in
SMS training for 2017 academic year.
Policy Implication. The finding identifies a training gap and need and suggests that
training in the concepts and principles of the SMS should be expanded to cover all flight
students and flight instructors. The findings from both the factual data and interviews suggest
a policy change of making SMS mandatory in the academic curriculum in the flight program
so that every flight student will have some form of initial SMS training.
Conclusions and Future Research Direction
The focus of this research was to establish a coherent causal relationship between
SMS Initiative, Transformational Safety Leadership, Self-Efficacy, Safety Participation,
Safety Compliance, and Safety-Related Events when Safety Motivation is used as a
mediation variable the use of a comprehensive triangulation approach in a collegiate aviation
program in the US. The study also sought to establishes a proactive operational safety
benchmarks for continuous monitoring and improvements in SMS implementation within
collegiate aviation programs.
Overall the findings from the triangulation of various data sources showed a positive
perception of respondents on the SMS initiative in the collegiate program and that was
corroborated by factual safety performance data and interviews with top level management
personnel. The study conceptualized the causal relationships and effects of Safety
Management System (SMS) initiative, self-efficacy, and transformational safety leadership as
constructs with safety behavior (measured by safety compliance and safety participation)
when mediated by safety motivation using a concurrent-triangulation approach. The study
also evaluated the relationship between safety behavior and safety -related events.
Structural Equation modeling techniques and Path Analysis (SEM –PA) were used to
derive a final measurement model that fit the empirical data after four iterations of the initial
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conceptual model using both modification indices and theoretical considerations. The model
iterations allowed for the improvement of the data fit; the best-fit model accounted for the
data and was used to test the study hypotheses and validate the conclusions.
Utilizing a sample of 282 collegiate flight students and instructors from a collegiate
aviation program in a large public university in the United States with a fully functional SMS
program that has been recognized by the FAA as attaining the active conformance level, a 46item survey was conducted to measure respondent’s perceptions on the study variables.
Concurrently, semi- structured Interviews were also conducted with 4 top-level management
personnel to sample their opinions on the effectiveness of the SMS initiative. Finally, factual
safety performance data on the flight program over a six-year period was analyzed to
complete a concurrent -triangulation approach.
The results indicated that perceptions of SMS policy implementation had direct,
positive effect on safety compliance and SMS process engagement had direct, positive effect
on safety participation. Self-efficacy and safety motivation had direct, positive effect on both
safety compliance and safety participation. Safety motivation fully mediated the positive
effect of transformational safety leadership on safety participation.
However, the best- fit measurement model indicated that there was no direct effect of
transformational safety leadership on safety compliance. Safety –related events did not fully
mediate the effect between safety compliance and safety participation. Most of the survey
items related to Emergency Response Planning (ERP) had poor loadings during the factor
analysis and had to be dropped. That may indicate that respondents were not familiar with
policies and processes related to ERP.
An ANOVA suggested that certified flight instructors significantly had better safety
participation and safety compliance than pre-private pilots. The ANOVA further revealed that
senior students significantly had better safety participation than junior students. The
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ANOVA finally revealed that senior students were significantly more exposed and aware of
safety –related events more than junior students.
A T-test of mean did not reveal any significant differences in safety participation and
safety compliance between respondents who had formal SMS training and those who did not.
A review of factual safety data suggests a positive effect on the safety reporting and safety
meeting attendance among respondents due to the SMS initiative. Interviews revealed that
top level management support, resource provision and resilience are key elements in the
success of any SMS initiative. SMS process ownership by respondents was also identified as
essential for a sustainable SMS initiative. Technical expertise was identified as a major SMS
implementation challenge.
Overall, this study was timely and provided additional insight and literature on SMS
to help collegiate aviation management, regulators and policy makers to establish a data
driven approach in formulating policies for SMS implementation and continuous
improvement on safety, while reducing safety events and accidents. This study also
investigated the effects of a collegiate aviation SMS initiative on pilots’ safety behaviors for
two reasons. Even though SMS is gradually becoming an industry accepted benchmark for
safety and reliability and is getting a lot of advocacy from both the FAA, industry and, ICAO,
there is still limited research examining SMS initiative in collegiate aviation (Adjekum,
2014b, Chen, 2014).
Limitations
Some of the limitations of this study were the fact that the survey was about
individual’s attitudes and perceptions and that inherently renders such responses to response
bias and social desirability bias. It was assumed that the responses reflected the actual
perceptions of these respondents within that time and moment. Some of the respondents were
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freshmen and pre-private students who were still getting used to the institutional safety
culture and that may have an effect on their perception on the SMS initiative.
The conceptual measurement model for this study was subjected to iterative
modification to get a good- fit to estimate the strengths of relationships among the constructs,
resulting in a final measurement model that aimed at adequately representing the constructs
under study. The use of factor analysis (Exploratory and Confirmatory) as a data reduction
tool resulted in a series of modifications of the final model compared to the proposed model.
The concepts of transformational safety leadership and self-efficacy are highly
subjective and were measured as the perceptions of the respondents. Neither the instrument
nor the study differentiated among flight level supervisory management relative to the
respondents, as they may come into various contacts with diverse people, whose leadership
traits at any particular time may represent operational safety leadership.
The concurrent –triangulation method was also limited to a snapshot of perceptions of
SMS initiative implementation within the study period and may not have reflected the general
trend over a long period. The dynamic nature of flight operations and the real-time
occurrence of a safety –related event during the study period have a potential to affect the
perceptions of respondents.
Future Directions
This particular study has established a benchmark for assessing SMS at within the
collegiate aviation environments and provides a template for evaluation of the effectiveness
of an SMS program with established safety performance metrics using a concurrenttriangulation method which provide a holistic and thorough audit of the safety initiative.
Future studies may concentrate on a longitudinal study that will assess how the
predictive capabilities of the exogenous variables such as SMS initiative, self –efficacy,
safety motivation and transformational safety leadership affects safety behavior and safety-
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related events over time by sampling a cohort of flight students from the freshman year to the
senior year. Other studies may involve an inter-collegiate triangulation studies to include
other US collegiate aviation programs with and without functional SMS programs. Another
research area could be a comparative assessment of collegiate aviation programs in the US at
the various levels of the FAA voluntary SMS program implementation level to gain insight
into some of the trends and predictive relationship that may exist between the exogenous
variables, safety behavior and safety-related events.
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APPENDIX B
SMS Initiative Dissertation Survey 2016 (Used for Quantitative Part of Research)
Demographic Details
Q1 Year Group





Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior

Q2 Flight Certificate Held





Pre-Private/Student
Private
Commercial
Certified Flight Instructor (CFI, CFII, MEI)

Q3 Age Group






17-21
22-26
27-31
32-36
Other

Q4 Gender
 Male
 Female
Q5 Are you an International Contract Student?
 Yes
 No
Q6 Have you had any formal initial training in Safety Management System (SMS) in your
program?
 Yes
 No
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Q7. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
Safety Management System (SMS) in your flight program
Strongly
Disagree
Neither
Agree (4) Strongly
disagree
(2)
disagree or
agree
(1)
agree (3)
(5)
SMS1. The safety
policy is
documented and
includes a
commitment to
involve all
students/personnel
at all levels in the
maintenance of
SMS











SMS 2.The safety
policy is
communicated to
all
students/personnel
to make them
aware of their
individual safety
obligations.











SMS3.The safety
policy is signed
and approved by
the Dean, who
demonstrates a
commitment to
safety through
active and visible
participation in the
SMS











SMS4.Conditions
under which
punitive
disciplinary action
would be
considered (e.g.
illegal activity,
negligence or
willful misconduct)
are not clearly
defined.
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Q8. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
SMS in your flight program
Strongly
Disagree
Neither
Agree (4) Strongly
disagree
(2)
agree nor
agree
(1)
disagree
(5)
(3)
SMS5.There is an
established means of
spreading information on
SMS related matters to
students/personnel.











SMS6.Safety objectives
and goals are publicized.











SMS7.Students/personnel
are not informed on the
primary contacts for
aviation safety related
matters.











SMS8.Top level
management allocates
resources for achieving
the safety objectives and
goals of the school.
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Q9. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
SMS in your flight program
Strongly
Disagree
Neither
Agree (4)
Strongly
disagree
(2)
agree nor
agree (5)
(1)
disagree
(3)
SMS9.Students/personnel
are aware of procedures
that measure safety
performance on a regular
basis, with the purpose of
improving safety.











SMS10.The results of
safety performance
reviews are used by the
program leadership as
input for safety
improvement processes.











SMS11.There is a
process that provides for
the capture of
information on hazards,
incidents, accidents and
other data relevant to
SMS.











188

Q10. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
SMS in your flight program
Strongly
disagree
(1)

disagree
(2)

Neither
agree nor
disagree
(3)

agree (4)

Strongly agree
(5)

SMS12.There is a
feedback process to notify
contributors that their
safety reports have been
received and the results of
the analysis shared.











SMS13.Students/personnel
know the criteria for
evaluating the tolerable
level of risk the flight
program is willing to
accept.











SMS14.The scope of
safety related hazards that
must be reported are not
explained to
students/personnel.











SMS15.There is a constant
awareness of the
Emergency Response Plan
(ERP) in the flight
program.











SMS16.Students/personnel
are not familiar with their
role in the Emergency
Response Plan (ERP) of
the flight program.











SMS17.Student/personnel
are part of periodic drills
to test the effectiveness of
the ERP.
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Q11. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
SMS in your flight program
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Agree (4)

Strongly agree
(5)

SMS18.There is a
process for the
systematic
investigation of
operational
conditions that
have been
identified as
potentially
hazardous











SMS19.Corrective
and preventative
actions are
generated in
response to event
investigation and
analysis











SMS20.Safety
professionals with
appropriate skills,
knowledge and
experience
conduct SMS
training
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Q11.Cont. Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about
the SMS in your flight program.
Strongly
disagree
(1)

Disagree
(2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)

SMS21.SMS
training is part
of
indoctrination
training upon
enrollment or
employment.











SMS22.SMS
training is kept
current to
reflect new
techniques,
results of
investigations
and corrective
actions.
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Q12 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements
about yourself
Strongly
Disagree
Neither
Agree (4)
Strongly
disagree
(2)
agree nor
agree (5)
(1)
disagree (3)
SMS23.I can
always
manage to
solve
difficult
problems if I
try hard
enough











SMS24.It is
easy for me
to stick to my
aims and
accomplish
my goals











SMS25.I am
confident that
I can deal
efficiently
with
unexpected
events











SMS26.I can
remain calm
when facing
difficulties
because I can
rely on my
coping
abilities
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Q13 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements
about yourself
Strongly disagree
(1)

SMS26.It’s
worthwhile
to improve
personal
safety
SMS27.It’s
important to
maintain
safety at all
times
SMS28.It’s
important to
reduce risk
of safety
events in
flight
operations

Disagree (2)

Neither agree nor
disagree (3)

Agree (4)

Strongly
agree (5)
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Q14 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements
about yourself
Strongly disagree
(1)

Disagree (2)

Neither agree nor
disagree (3)

Agree (4)

Strongly agree
(5)

SMS29.I pay
full attention
to pre-flight
briefing
during flight
operations











SMS30.I
follow correct
safety
procedures in
flight
operations











SMS31.I
ensure the
highest level
of safety in
flight
operations











SMS32.I
promote the
safety
program
within the
flight
program











SMS33.I put
in extra effort
to improve
the flight
safety
program











SMS34.I
volunteer for
safety related
task in the
flight
program
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Q15 Please provide your degree of agreement regarding the following statements about the
quality of leadership provided in your flight program by these supervisory managers (Chief
Flight Instructor/Assistant Chief Flight Instructor)
Strongly
disagree (1)

Disagree (2)

Neither agree
nor disagree
(3)

Agree (4)

Strongly agree
(5)

SMS35.Look
out for the
interest of the
flight
program over
personal
interest











SMS36.Does
not listen to
students
concerns











SMS37. Can
be trusted to
overcome
every obstacle











SMS38.
Clearly
defines the
steps needed
to reach
training goals











SMS39.
Considers the
ethical
consequences
of decisions











SMS40. Is
disrespectful
in handling
students
errors
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Q16 Please state to the best of your knowledge, frequency of safety events that have occurred
in the program this academic year
Very Rare
(Has never
occurred)

Rare (Has
occurred only
once)

Occasional (2-3
times)

Frequent (45 times)

Very
frequent
(more than 5
times)

SMS41.
Deviation from
ATC
instructions
under normal
flight
conditions











SMS42.
Runway
incursions











SMS43. Close
proximity to
another aircraft
requiring
evasive action











SMS45.
Collision with
ground object
while taxiing











SMS46. Loss
of flight
privilege/Flight
hold due to
alcohol or
controlled
substance use.











Q17 what are your opinions on the safety performance of the aviation program with the
implementation of the SMS initiative?
Q18 How can the aviation program improve the SMS initiative?
Q19 Thanks for taking part in this study.
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APPENDIX C
SPSS® Outputs and Nvivo® Screen Shots

Figure 1C. Scree Plot of factors obtained in SMS initiative.
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Table 1C. Rotated Factor Matrix of SMS Initiative.

Items
SMS3 - The safety policy is signed and approved by the

Factor
SMSPol.Imp.
SMSPro.Eng.
.752

Dean, who demonstrates a c...
SMS23- Safety professionals with appropriate skills,

.746

knowledge and experience conduct...
SMS14 -There is a process that provides for the capture of

.729

information on hazards...
SMS13 -The results of safety performance reviews are used

.718

by the program leadership...
SMS25- SMS training is kept current to reflect new

.700

techniques, results of investigations...
SMS2 -The safety policy is communicated to all

.694

students/personnel to make them aw...
SMS24- SMS training is incorporated into indoctrination

.677

training upon enrollment o...
SMS6 -Top level management clearly articulate the

.660

importance of safety when addressing...
SMS12- Students/personnel are aware of procedures that

.659

measure safety performance...
SMS16 -Students/personnel know the criteria for evaluating

.646

the tolerable level of...
SMS1- The safety policy is documented and includes a

.642

commitment to involve all students and personnel.
SMS4- There is a policy in place that provides immunity

.631

from disciplinary action...
SMS22- Corrective and preventative actions are generated in
response to event investigations.
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.629

Table. 1C. Cont.
Items

SMS Pol.Imp.

SMS11- Top level management declares a strong

SMS Proc.Eng.

.568

commitment to SMS, even when SMS goa...
SMS8 Safety objectives and goals are publicized.

.561

SMS15- There is a feedback process to notify contributors

.552

that their safety report...
SMS7- There is an established means of spreading

.546

information on SMS related matte...
SMS10 -Top level management allocate resources for

.518

achieving the safety objectives...
SMS21- There is a process for the systematic investigation of

Low Loading

operational condition...
SMS9- Students/personnel are not informed on the primary

.790

contacts for aviation s...
SMS17- The scope of safety related hazards that must be

.723

reported are not explained...
SMS20- Student/personnel are part of periodic drills to test

.569

the effectiveness of...
SMS5- Conditions under which punitive disciplinary action

.537

would be considered (e....
SMS18 -There is a constant awareness of the Emergency

Low Loading

Response Plan (ERP) in the...
SMS19 - Students/personnel are not familiar with their role
in the Emergency Response...
Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
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Low Loading

Figure 2C. Factor Plot in Rotated Space for SMS Initiative.

Table 2C. Estimates of Variables using CFA.
Estimate

S.E.

C.R.

P

β

SE 1

<---

Self-Efficacy

.720

.057

12.664

*** .67

SE 2

<---

SelfEfficacy

.667

.055

12.173

*** .85

SE 3

<---

SelfEfficacy

.641

.050

12.747

*** .83

SM 1

<---

SafetyMotivation

.610

.045

13.484

*** .81

SM 2

<---

SafetyMotivation

.720

.046

15.672

*** .90

SM 3 <---

SafetyMotivation

.647

.047

13.868

*** .83

SC 1

<---

SafetyCompliance

.648

.045

14.388

*** .85

SC 2

<---

SafetyCompliance

.642

.046

13.848

*** .83
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Table 2C. Cont.
Estimate

S.E.

C.R.

P

β

SC 3

<---

Safety Compliance

.654

.045

14.606

***

.86

SP 1

<---

SAFEPART

.673

.060

11.191

***

.74

SP 3

<---

SAFEPART

.734

.074

9.918

***

.94

SP 2

<---

SAFEPART

.922

.063

14.593

***

.66

TSL1

<---

TransformationalSafety
Leadership

.799

.059

13.488

***

.81

TSL4

<---

TransformationalSafety
Leadership

.770

.052

14.828

***

.80

TSL3

<---

TransformationalSafety
Leadership

.782

.059

13.190

***

.86

TSL5

<---

TransformationalSafety
Leadership

.751

.056

13.381

***

.80

SEV1 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents

.950

.078

12.193

***

.75

SEV3 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents

1.021

.073

14.080

***

.89

SEV2 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents

1.027

.065

15.785

***

.83

SEV4 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents

.816

.063

12.986

***

.78

SEV5 <---

SafetyRelatedEvents

1.100

.089

12.290

***

.75
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Figure 3C. Conceptual Qualitative Coding Tree (Using NVivo 11®).
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Figure 4C. Screen shot of Qualitative Coding Word Cloud (Using NVivo 11®).
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Figure 5C. Screenshot of Nodes Clustered by Coding Similarities (Using Nvivo 11®).
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